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ABSTRACT
BRAINS AND BARNS:
THE ROLE OF CONTEXT IN EPISTEMIC ATTRIBUTION
FEBRUARY 2005
JULIE M. PETTY, B.A., RANDOLPH-MACON WOMAN”S COLLEGE
Ph.D, UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Fred Feldman
The topic of the dissertation is this: How well does contextualism, in general, fare
as an epistemic theory? And the answer comes in three parts:
The Root of The Skeptical Problem : I argue that the source of the skeptical
problem is neither the underdetermination principle nor the closure principle. Instead, I
claim that it is a change in context that generates the problem in the first place. Though I
make no explicit argument in favor of contextualism as a solution to skeptical problems,
the chapter amounts to a de facto defense of the contextualist solution to skeptical
problems.
The Problem with Gettier: I consider criticisms of contextualism’ s capacity to
resolve Gettier cases. As it stands, Lewis’ contextualism can’t resolve a wide range of
Gettier cases. However, I offer a new rule, the Rule of Special Similarity, as a
replacement rule for Lewis’ Rule of Resemblance. I then show how the new rule, though
not problem-free, can do a much better job of resolving the Gettier problem.
Contextualism, then, needn’t fail because it can’t solve Gettier problems; it can.
The Wavs of Context: One goal is to get a clear map of the territory, one that
underscores the fact that precisely how context is incorporated into the theory matters
v
epistemically. Another is to make the point that contextualism - the claim that context
plays an essential semantic role in knowledge ascriptions - is not just one particular view,
but a family of similar views. Also, I offer a new kind of contextualism that avoids many
of the substantial criticisms aimed at the others in the family.
Though the primary aim of the dissertation is a defense in three parts of the
contextualist approach I general, a view emerges from the dissertation. I call the view
condexicalism, and the dissertation is, secondarily, a development and defense of that
view.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Descartes, in Meditations on First Philosophy, introduced something like the
following argument:
(51) I don't know that I am not being deceived (about having hands) by an evil
demon.
(52) If I don't know that I am not being deceived (about having hands) by an evil
demon, then I don't know that I have hands.
(53) Therefore, I don't know that I have hands.
The argument above is a typical version of an argument a skeptic might offer in trying to
establish that we can never know any ordinary propositions. Intuitively, ordinary
propositions are those like that my car is in the lot
,
but not ones like that all bachelors
are unmarried men
,
or that I am here now. In the skeptic's argument, SI seems true; if
none of my evidence rules out the possibility that I'm being deceived by an evil demon,
then how could I possibly know that I'm not being so deceived? This premise relies on the
idea that knowledge is infallible. If we know P, then our evidence eliminates all
possibilities in which not P. S2 seems true. If for all I know I am being deceived by an
evil demon, then for all I know the demon may be deceiving me into thinking that I have
hands when I do not. Many think this premise is an instance of some form of the closure
principle. One form of the closure principle is: If S knows P and S knows P implies Q,
then S knows Q. The skeptic's argument is deeply plausible. Yet the conclusion, S3
--
along with the skepticism that shortly follows - is widely rejected and pretty clearly false.
At first glance, the problem of skepticism appears to be that SI, S2, and the denial
of S3 are each widely held to be true, yet they appear to be inconsistent. But this isn't
all
there is to the problem. Otherwise, G. E. Moore's well-known response would have
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sufficed to solve it. The Moorean solution — that we are more certain that the conclusion
is false than we are that either of the premises is true - requires that we sacrifice either
the infallibility of knowledge or knowledge's closure under implication. Part of the
problem, then, is that we want to avoid skepticism, but we don't want to do so at the
expense of knowledge's infallibility or its closure under implication.
One nod toward a solution is that there are two senses of the word 'know' - an
ordinary sense and a philosophical sense. In everyday discourse we use the word's
ordinary sense, and the sort of whole-scale skepticism described above is false. But when
we do philosophy, we use the word's strict and philosophical sense, and some very
limited "philosophical skepticism" is actually true. In some strict and philosophical
sense, we do not know any ordinary propositions. But what reasons are there for
accepting that 'know' is ambiguous? And what further explanations can be given for
these two senses of the word?
A more complete statement of the problem is needed: How can we maintain that
knowledge (even in its everyday sense) is infallible and closed under implication, yet
skepticism (of the serious variety) is false? In addition to offering an account of
knowledge that resolves the problem of skepticism, the mark of a successful solution will
be that it offers some theoretical explanation of the appeal of the skeptic's argument in the
first place (see DeRose 3 and Cohen 1988, 93-94). Though any reasonable solution will
imply that skepticism is false, the successful solution may well allow for (and provide a
defense for) a very limited sort of philosophical skepticism. Finally, the account of
knowledge that provides a successful solution to the problem of skepticism must not in
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offering a solution open itself to other defeating objections, such as a failure to solve the
Gettier problem or lottery problems.
David Lewis offers a solution to the problem of skepticism in which he claims
that sentences such as I know I have hands are true in some contexts and false in others.
It is the appeal to context that is the key to solving the problem of skepticism. In "Elusive
Knowledge", Lewis proposes the following definition of knowledge:
S knows that P iff S's evidence eliminates every possibility in which not-P
—Psst! except for those possibilities we are properly ignoring (Lewis 554*).
Notice that this definition does not contain the word 'context'. But it is context, via a set
of rules, that determines which possibilities are properly ignored. The application of the
rules to the context yields the set of possibilities that are epistemically relevant in that
context. And it is this set of possibilities against which S's evidence is compared in that
context. Lewis’ epistemology, then, is contextualist.
Understanding the consequences of Lewis’ brand of contextualism—in particular
its response to the skeptical problem — requires determining which possibilities may, and
which may not, be properly ignored according to the account. Lewis’ rules of relevance
divide into two types: those that prohibit a possibility from being ignored, and those that
allow -defeasibly - a possibility to be ignored. The Rule of Actuality, for example, is of
the former kind; it says that the possibility that actually obtains may never properly be
ignored (Lewis 554). According to the Rule of Actuality, the subject's circumstance or
"location in the realm of possibilia" determines which possibility is actual (in that
context). The Rule of Belief is another prohibitive rule: No possibility that the subject
' Throughout, all references to Lewis are to his “Elusive Knowledge” unless otherwise specified (by date).
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believes or ought to believe (given the subject’s evidence and arguments that justify a
belief) may be properly ignored (Lewis 555). The Rule of Attention is also a rule about
what may be properly ignored, but this rule is sensitive not to the subject’s circumstance
of beliefs but to the focus of the speakers and hearers in the context. According to this
rule, if a possibility is not in fact ignored by the speakers and hearers, then it is not
properly ignored. When this rule is applied to a context, the set of epistemically relevant
possibilities can be affected dramatically.
From these rules alone, it is clear that Lewis' account entails that if S knows P, P
is true. Even in a context in which the speakers and hearers themselves ignore actuality
by presupposing something false, the Rule of Actuality guarantees that actuality is still
epistemically relevant in that context. In every context, then, S's evidence must be
compared to the actual world. In comparing unignored possibilities with S's evidence, a
possibility is eliminated by S's evidence just in case in that possibility S's perceptual
experience and memory do not match exactly S's perception and memory in actuality
(Lewis 553). Since S's perception and memory in actuality are self identical, S's evidence
will never eliminate actuality. Actuality can't be properly ignored and actuality will never
be eliminated by S's evidence. So whenever 'S knows P' is true, P will be true, since
every unignored, uneliminated possibility (which always includes actuality) is one in
which P is true. This is how Lewis' account protects the truth condition.
Lewis' view also entails that knowledge is infallible and closed under implication
— when these notions are themselves understood as context dependent. Knowledge is
infallible on Lewis’ view because if S knows P (in some context), then S's evidence
eliminates all the (unignored) possibilities (in context) in which not P. And knowledge
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is closed under implication. If S knows P (in some context), and S knows P implies Q (in
that context), then (in that context) all unignored possibilities that remain uneliminated by
S's evidence are possibilities in which P. Because P implies Q, aU possibilities in which
P are possibilities in which Q. So, (in that context) all unignored, uneliminated
possibilities are possibilities in which Q. So, S knows Q (in that context).^
Lewis explanation of the skeptical problem also involves some of the permissive
rules. According to the Rule of Reliability, it is permissible to take for granted the
reliability of our perception, memory, and testimony (Lewis 558). “We may properly
presuppose that they work without a glitch in the case under consideration. Defeasibly -
very defeasibly! - a possibility in which they fail may properly be ignored'’ (Lewis 558).
The Rules of Method and the Rule of Conservatism also allow us to properly ignore the
failure of other normally reliable processes of transmitting information - like “that a
sample is representative”, “that the best explanation is the true explanation”, or that we
can adopt the customary presuppositions of those around us (Lewis 558-559).
Lewis' view provides a reply to the skeptic: When I go about my everyday,
ordinary business, I generally ignore a great many possibilities, among them the
possibility that I am being deceived by an evil demon. And in a typical everyday context,
my ignoring of this possibility (and others like it) is perfectly proper; the Rule of
Reliability says that we may ignore possibilities in which perception, memory, and
testimony are unreliable. So, in this context I know I have hands. No possibilities in
which I am being deceived by an evil demon are uneliminated by my evidence; in my
2
Lewis's view actually entails a stronger closure principle. See Schiffer, p.320 for an interesting discussion
about several ways in which a contextualist closure principle might be stated. Lewis's account entails the
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current context I properly exclude such possibilities as epistemically irrelevant in the first
place.
And in providing for philosophical skepticism, Lewis also accounts for the
plausibility of typical skeptical arguments: Later (after finishing my everyday, ordinary
business), I go to epistemology class. I focus on the possibility that I might be a brain in a
vat, I concentrate on the idea that I might be being deceived by an evil demon. Because
the Rule of Reliability is defeasible, and the Rule of Attention defeats it, I may not - in
this new context -- properly ignore such possibilities. We can never properly ignore
unignored possibilities. In the new context, the possibility that I am being deceived by an
evil demon is epistemically relevant. This possibility is included among those
possibilities against which my evidence must be compared. Since my sensory experience
and memory in actuality would not differ from what would be my sensory experience and
memory were I being deceived by a demon (save their reliability), my evidence does not
eliminate every possibility in which I do not have hands. In the new context, I don't know
that I have hands. Whenever I am confronted with a typical skeptical argument, I am at
that moment in a context in which I fail to know many ordinary things, such as that I have
hands. Epistemology, says Lewis, makes knowledge vanish (Lewis 560). But we needn't
do epistemology all day. When I return to the everyday ordinary business of tomorrow, I
am free again to ignore the possibility of life as a brain in a vat.
Lewis’ contextualism seems to solve the skeptical problem without opening itself
to other defeating objections based on a failure to preserve the truth condition or to
preserve the closure principle. However, does this contextualist view fail because it is
three that seem right and doesn't entail the one that doesn't.
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unable to solve the Gettier problem or lottery problems? In fact, Lewis offers solutions to
these classic epistemic problems as well.
Lewis describes a version of the Gettier problem, which was first introduced by
Edmund Gettier in “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?” (1963 Analysis v.23, 121-123):
I think that Nogot owns a Ford, because I have seen him driving one; but
unbeknownst to me he does not own the Ford he drives, or any other Ford.
Unbeknownst to me, Havit owns a Ford, though I have no reason to think so
because he never drives it, and in fact I have often seen him taking the tram. My
justified true belief is that one of the two owns a Ford. But I do not know it; I am
right by accident. (Lewis, 557).
Lewis also describes a version of the lottery problem, introduced by Flenry Kyburg, in
Probability and the Logic ofRational Belief(Wesleyan University Press, 1961):
...[Y]our true opinion that you will lose the lottery isn’t knowledge, whatever the
odds. Suppose you know that it is a fair lottery with one winning ticket and many
losing tickets, and you know how many losing tickets there are. The greater the
number of losing tickets, the better is your justification for believing you will lose.
Yet there is no number great enough to transform your fallible opinion into
knowledge - after all, you just might win. (Lewis 551).
On Lewis’ version of contextualism, it is the Rule of Resemblance that blocks
knowledge both in Gettier cases and Lottery cases:
The Rule of Resemblance: Suppose one possibility saliently resembles another.
Then if one of them may not be properly ignored, neither may the other.
(Or rather, . . .if one of them may not be ignored in virtue of rules other
than this rule, then neither may the other). (Lewis 556).
Both in Gettier cases and lottery cases, the Rule of Resemblance makes relevant in the
context a new possibility—one that saliently resembles some other possibility already
made relevant in that context by some other rule, and in each case the subject’s evidence
fails to eliminate that newly relevant possibility. Lewis offers the following diagnoses:
Lottery: For every ticket, there is the possibility that it will win. These
possibilities are saliently similar to one another: so either every one of
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them may be properly ignored, or else none may. But one of them may not
properly be ignored: the one that actually obtains (Lewis 557).
^ett^er: I d° not know [that either Nogot or Havit owns a Ford], because I have
not eliminated the possibility that Nogot drives a car he does not own
whereas Havit neither drives nor owns a car. This possibility may not
properly be ignored. Because, first, actuality may not properly be ignored:
and second, this possibility saliently resembles actuality. It resembles
actuality perfectly as far as Nogot is concerned; and it resembles actuality
well so far as Havit is concerned, since it matches actuality both with
respect to Havit’ s careless habits and with respect to the general
correlation between careless habits and carlessness (Lewis 557).
So, at first glance, and using Lewis' version as an example, contextualism looks
like a promising epistemology: It provides avoids skeptical results, while explaining the
pull of the skeptic’s argument; it preserves the truth condition; it preserves closure; and it
seems to do so while also resolving Gettier cases and lottery cases. But critics claim this
rosy contextualist picture is too good to be true. Stewart Cohen makes a compelling case
that Lewis’ version of contextualism fails to handle a wide range of Gettier cases (Cohen
1998a). Cohen’s point, while directed at Lewis, suggests that contextualists in general
can’t solve Gettier cases, particularly those in which neither the subject nor the speakers
and hearers are aware that the subject is in a Gettier situation. Others object along
linguistic lines, or lines of theoretical parsimony. Jonathan Schaffer (Schaffer 2004)
claims that contextualism’ s account of ‘knows’ is faulty; it fails to offer a suitable
meaning for the term because the meaning provided by the theory is ad hoc
,
amounting to
a mere laundry list of conditions. Jason Stanley (forthcoming) claims that if
contextualism is true, this makes ‘knows’ a linguistic freak and that the results gained by
the contextualist framework can be had at a lower cost, that is, without appeal to the
mechanism of context.
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The topic of the present dissertation is this: How well does contextualism, in
general, fare as an epistemic theory? And the answer comes in three parts:
The Root of The Skeptical Problem : Historically, the problem of skepticism has
been pinned either on the underdetermination principle or on the closure principle. I
argue that the root, or source, of the skeptical problem is neither. Instead, I claim that it is
a change in context that generates the problem in the first place. Though I make no
explicit argument in favor of contextualism as a solution to skeptical problems, the
chapter amounts to a de facto defense of the contextualist solution to skeptical problems.
The Problem with Gettier: Using Lewis as an example, I consider criticisms of
the view’s capacity to resolve Gettier cases. As it stands, Lewis’ view can’t resolve a
wide range of Gettier cases. Nor can a minor modification save the view from these
damning consequences. However, I argue that contextualism can successfully resolve
Gettier cases. I offer a new rule, the Rule of Special Similarity, as a replacement rule for
Lewis’ Rule of Resemblance. I then show how the new rule, though not problem-free,
can do a much better job of resolving the Gettier problem. Contextualism, then, needn’t
fail because it can’t solve Gettier problems; it can.
The Ways of Context: Significantly, there are many ways of incorporating
“context” into an epistemic theory, and not all of these ways are contextualist. Here, I
map the ways of using context to accommodate an example case. One goal is just to get a
clear map of the territory, one that underscores the fact that precisely how context is
incorporated into the theory matters epistemically. Another is to make the point that
contextualism - the claim that context plays an essential semantic role in knowledge
ascriptions - is not just one particular view, but a family of similar views. I consider
9
specific versions of this family of views to determine which views are subject to which
criticisms. And I offer a new kind of contextualism that avoids many of the substantial
criticisms aimed at the others in the family.
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CHAPTER 2
THE ROOT OF THE SKEPTICAL PROBLEM
The central motivation for accepting a contextualist account of knowledge is
that it provides an escape from what Lewis calls “the whirlpool of scepticism” (Lewis
550). Before addressing the question of whether or not some version of contextualism
provides a solution to the problem of skepticism about the external world, it is important
to be clear about what the problem of skepticism about the external world is. It is, I
think, no easy matter to say precisely what that problem is. Skeptical stories are a widely
diverse lot; some involve demons, others dreams or vats, still others invoke painted mules
or barn fa9ades. Each story invariably concludes that we do not know some or all of the
mundane things we take ourselves to know. Each of these stories, then, provides the
background for an argument for skepticism. There is little controversy over the surface
structure of such arguments. Generally, skeptical arguments appear in the following
simple form, where P is some appropriately mundane proposition and SK is some suitable
i
skeptical hypothesis :
1 ) If I know P, then I know not-SK.
2) I do not know not-SK.
3) Therefore, I do not know P.
' Cohen ( 1998b) actually thinks that it is better to view the problem as a paradox rather than as an argument
of either form (see his footnote 8, p. 147). Briefly, we have a paradox because we have good reason to
think each of the three central propositions is true, but they can’t all be true.
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Despite general agreement about this simple form, there is much disagreement
about which principle (or principles) lies at the heart of the problem of skepticism. Umit
Yulcin has this to say about the search for such a principle:
It will be highly implausible to suggest that in all those cases in which the
skeptical challenge takes hold, we presuppose that we have to know that the
possibility just raised (e.g., dreaming, evil demon, or what not) does not obtain,
without being led to such presuppositions by virtue of some general principle. [A
principle to which we conform, though not one we are aware of intentionally
following]. The existence of a multiplicity of structurally similar possibilities
indicates that (1) our intellectual response to Descartes’ reasoning is not based on
the unique features of the dream possibility qua dream possibility; and (2) that
there is good reason to believe that our response is based on the existence of some
general principle that leads us to judge, in each case, that our knowledge claims
are (at least until further investigation) rendered suspect by the raising of that
possibility.(Yulcin 8).
Umit Yulcin in “Skeptical Arguments from Underdetermination,” Anthony
Brueckner in “The Structure of the Skeptical Argument”, and Barry Stroud, among
others, argue that the underdetermination principle is the one general principle on which
all skeptical arguments are based:
UP: For all S, <(), \\f, if S’s evidence does not favor <j) over some incompatible
hypothesis \j/, then S’s evidence does not justify (j).
They argue that something like the following reconstruction correctly reveals the deeper
2
structure of the skeptical argument:
ARGUMENT U
(1U) If my evidence does not favor P over SK, then my evidence
does not justify P. [an instance of UP]
(2U) My evidence does not favor P over SK. [premise]
(3U) My evidence does not justify P. [from 1U,2U]
2
These versions of the relevant arguments are Cohen’s (Cohen 1998b, 145-146). I’ve renamed the key
arguments so that the names are more intuitive. What I call Argument U, Cohen labels ‘C’. What he later
calls UND is essentially the same argument. What I call Argument C, Cohen labels ‘D’, and then later he
calls what is essentially the same argument, DC.
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(4U) I do not know P. [from 3U]
Historically, others have thought that the one general principle at the heart of the
skeptical problem is some version of the closure principle. One reasonable version of the
closure principle is a closure principle for the kind ofjustification that is necessary for
3
knowledge:
CJ: For all S, (j), v|/, if S’s evidence justifies <j> and <j) entails v|/, then S’s evidence
justifies \\j .
Advocates of the view that the closure principle is the central principle behind skeptical
arguments think something like the following reconstruction correctly reveals the deeper
structure of skeptical arguments:
ARGUMENT C
(1C) If my evidence justifies P, then my evidence justifies not-SK.[an
application of the closure principle CJ]
(2C) My evidence does not justify not-SK. [premise]
(3C) My evidence does not justify P. [from 1C,2C]
(4C) I do not know P. [from 3C]
In “Two Kinds of Skeptical Argument,” Stewart Cohen attempts to put to rest the
notion that there is exactly one route to skepticism. He claims:
In principle CJ, ‘justification’ is to be understood as the kind ofjustification necessary for knowledge
(whatever that may turn out to be). CJ is just one of many versions of the closure principle. Here are just a
few other versions: If S knows P and P entails not- SK, then S knows not-SK; IfS knows P and S knows P
entails not-SK, then S knows not-SK; IfS is justified in believing P, and P entails not-SK, then S is justified
in believing not-SK. CJ is one plausible version of the principle because it does not require the subject to
recognize that his evidence justifies the relevant proposition; S is not required to recognize all the perhaps
extremely complex propositions that, via entailment, his evidence justifies. Rather, this version claims that
if the subject has justification for P and P entails SK, then S has justification for not-SK. Because
‘justification’ is so understood in premises one and two of Argument C, the conclusion, strictly speaking,
follows only with an additional premise that links the lack of propositional justification in premise 3 to the
lack of doxastic justification in the conclusion. Also, strictly speaking, in order for Argument C to be valid,
P must be the kind of proposition such that knowledge of P requires evidential justification (e.g., P can’t be
known a priori). In this paper P is always such a proposition. Similar comments apply to UP and
Argument U.
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[E]ach principle provides the basis for an independently motivated skeptical
argument. Because of this, neither principle is required to make the case for
skepticism, nor is either principle superfluous.(Cohen 1998a, 143).
According to Cohen, UP may be used to formulate plausible skeptical arguments in some
but not all skeptical cases, while CJ may be used to formulate plausible skeptical
arguments in virtually all skeptical cases (Cohen 1998a, 15 5).
In what follows, I argue (in agreement with Cohen) that UP cannot be the
epistemic principle behind all skeptical arguments, and (contra Cohen) that CJ cannot be
the epistemic principle behind all skeptical arguments. I also argue that it is not the case
that all skeptical arguments can be divided between those based on UP and those based
on CJ. I argue that the problem of skepticism can be generated without appeal to either
UP or CJ. In fact, CJ and UP are largely irrelevant to the skeptical problem; neither
principle is at the heart of the skeptical problem.
Preliminary Remark: During this discussion, it will be helpful to adopt - for the
present - Cohen’s division of skeptical stories into those in which the skeptical
alternatives are ‘global’ and those in which the skeptical alternatives are ‘restricted’, or
‘local’. Global skeptical alternatives, such as that I am a brain in a vat or that I am being
deceived by an Evil Demon, “compete with any proposition I claim to know about the
external world” (Cohen 1998b, 154). Local skeptical alternatives, such as Alvin
Goldman’s barn faqade, Fred Dretske’s painted zebra, or the car theft case, “compete only
with a restricted class of knowledge claims”(Cohen 1998b, 155). Later in the paper, I
reject this rhetorically convenient distinction as theoretically unfounded. I’ll assume that
the skeptical stories are familiar enough that they needn’t be retold.
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Underdetermination is not the root of the problem.
In “Two Kinds of Skeptical Arguments” there seem to be three interestingly
different ways to defend the second premise of the underdetermination argument:
( 1 U) If my evidence does not favor P over SK, then my evidence does not justify
P. [instance of UP]
(2U) My evidence does not favor P over SK. [premise]
(3U) My evidence does not justify P. [from 1U, 2U]
(4U) I do not know P. [from 3U]
I argue that none of these defenses is adequate — either the defense is based on claims that
fail to capture the sufficient conditions on favoring, or the defense captures the relevant
conditions on favoring but yields the result that 2U is implausible, or else the defense is
question-begging. Since 2U is either indefensible or implausible, the underdetermination
principle cannot be the principle at the heart of the very compelling skeptical problem.
Brueckner defends the claim that 2U is true by claiming that “E (my evidence)
would be true regardless of whether P or SK is true”. (Cohen 1998b, 148; Brueckner 835).
That is,
(B) S’s evidence, E, does not favor P over SK because if SK were true, E would
be true and if P were true, E would be true.
Clearly, if the nearest SK world is one in which E is not true, while the nearest P-world is
one in which E is true, E would favor P over SK. But the sort of counterfactual
consistency to which B appeals is not sufficient to show that E does not favor P over SK.
As Cohen points out, the mere fact that if SK were true, E would be true does not seem to
count against the claim that E favors P over SK (Cohen 1998b, 148). Consider the
following trial case:
Suppose there has been a horrible theft in the neighborhood. Deaton’s copy of
Duke Nukem has been stolen. The police have investigated, finding Jones was
15
seen entering the room. Jones’ fingerprints were found all over the room,
especially near the computer. Furthermore, Jones is a seedy, angry fellow who
has a history of computer-game theft. Jones was found by police playing Duke
Nukem. Smith, police discover, can’t stand either Jones or video games.
Let’s call the police’s evidence E. Since the police’s evidence as a whole points to Jones,
E clearly favors J - that Jones did it - over S - that Smith did it. (Let’s stipulate that
Smith and Jones would not have worked together because they don’t get along.) Note
that if J were true, E would be true. J and E, let’s assume, are in fact true. But also, if S
were true, E would be true, had Smith stolen the game he would have been a more careful
thief and would have stolen it to spite Jones. Even though E would be true regardless of
whether J or S were true, E makes it much more likely that J is true - Jones did it - than
that S is true - Smith did it. So, E is counterfactually consistent with both J and S, even
though E favors J over S.
This case illustrates that counterfactual consistency is much weaker than non-
favoring, or evidential neutrality. B is not an adequate defense of 2U because B offers
support insufficient to show that E does not favor P over SK; E might favor P over SK
even though E is counterfactually consistent with both P and SK.
Cohen mentions what might be an alternative defense of 2U in a footnote in which
he rejects Brueckner’s (B); he says:
I appeal to the fact that if SK were true, it would explain the truth of E. This is
because the mere fact that E would be true if SK were true does not seem to be
enough. Let SK be the bare hypothesis (not-P & E). The mere fact that if SK
were true, E would be true, does not seem to count against saying that E justifies
[or favors] not-SK. We need some skeptical hypothesis that would explain the
truth of E. That is the reason for specifying the hypothesis that I am a brain-in-a-
vat...
For this reason, the motivation for [2U] is better conceived as the fact that the
truth of E would be explained, regardless of whether P or SK is true. (Cohen
1998b, 148)
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This suggests a second possibility for the defense of 2U:
(C 1 ) S s evidence, E, does not favor P over SK because if SK were true, SK
would explain the truth of E, and if P were true, P would explain the truth
of E.
Cl is also an inadequate defense of 2U. First, in most local skeptical cases SK fails to
explain E, so Cl does not provide a reasonable defense of 2U in these cases. Second,
even in cases in which both P and SK explain E, the defense Cl offers is insufficient.
In many local cases SK fails to explain E. In the car-theft case, SK seems to
explain none of the evidence. In this case, P is that my car is in the lot where Iparked it
,
and SK is, roughly, that my car is not in the lot but in the hands ofcar thieves. My
evidence in this case consists of a memory of leaving the car in a certain spot plus some
statistical evidence about the likelihood that my car has been stolen. But SK - that my
car is not in the lot but in the hands of car thieves -- in no way explains my memory of
having left my car in the lot this morning. Nor would my car’s having been stolen (SK)
explain the statistical evidence about the unlikelyhood of car theft in general. So, in the
car-theft case, Cl simply would not apply as a defense for 2U because SK (if true) would
not explain E. (Note that P doesn’t explain much of E either.)
In most (if not all) other local skeptical cases SK explains some but not all of the
evidence. In the barn fa9ade case, the subject has visual evidence as of a bam. There is
also evidence that it takes much time and money to generate a realistic bam fa<?ade, that
relatively few people have such money, and that even fewer who have it would likely
choose to spend it on such a frivolous endeavor, etc. I’ll call this second kind of evidence
’background evidence’. In the barn case, SK - that I am seeing a barn fa9ade rather than
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a barn - does seem to explain my visual evidence, but it does not explain any of my
background evidence. My seeing a bam facade would not explain anything about the
general propensity of those in rural settings to spend large amounts of money frivolously.
Nor does the mundane hypothesis, P, fare much better in explanatory power; there being a
regular barn in my visual field clearly provides no explanation of bam-fa?ade financing.
Similar remarks apply to the zebra case as well as other local skeptical cases. In these
cases, the background evidence isn’t explained by either P or SK. So in most local
skeptical cases, Cl is inadequate because the defense it offers is inapplicable to the case;
4
in such cases, Cl is entirely beside the point.
Cl is also an inadequate defense of 2U in general for both local and global cases.
Like B, it fails to provide a sufficient reason for the claim that E does not favor P over
5
SK . Two competing hypotheses might be such that, if true, each would explain E, yet E
might still favor one hypothesis over the other. Consider the following case:
You see an image of a rainbow. One hypothesis is R: A regular rainbow (a
certain pattern of light being refracted through clouds of ice crystals) exists,
causing your rainbow image in the normal way (whatever that is). A competing
hypothesis is M: No rainbow is present; Martians have sprinkled into the air a
magical stardust that causes rainbow-like images in humans.
Someone might have a very restrictive view of what counts as evidence. On such a view, E might be
restricted to just the visual evidence. On this view, then, in all the local cases just discussed (except the car
theft case) both P and SK explain E. Still, Cl is no good as a defense of 2U. The discussion of Cl’s
general inadequacy (rainbow case, following paragraph) should suffice to show why. Additionally, this
account of evidence seems implausibly narrow.
Someone else might claim that in the local cases, though P and SK do not themselves explain E,
they are parts of rival (and equally good) explanations of E. On this view, then, some sort of general
principle like the following must be behind the defense of 2U: For any x and y and any explanations X| and
X 2 , if x is a part of X) and y is a part ofX2 and X! and X 2 are competing explanations of E, then x is not
favored over y. Again, the discussion of C l’s general inadequacy (the rainbow case, following paragraph)
should suffice to show that such a defense of 2U is inadequate. Additionally, the general principle seems
implausible.
The case under consideration is a local one, but it serves to make the point that in general (i.e., in both
local and global cases) even if two competing hypotheses have equivalent explanatory power with respect to
E, E may still favor one hypothesis over the other.
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Each hypothesis, R and M, would, if true, explain your visual evidence of a rainbow.
However, just as in the local skeptical cases, neither explains the additional background
evidence - such as that undetected Martian entry into the atmosphere is a bit unlikely or
that there seems to be no reliable information about the workings of magical stardust, etc.
But we can extend both R and M appropriately so that each actually explains the full body
of evidence that exists - both the visual image and the background evidence. To extend
R sufficiently, we would need to add claims that explain how the world works with
respect to rainbows and light refraction, claims that would explain that Martian
participation in daily events is highly unlikely, and claims that our information about the
failings of magical stardust are pretty well-founded. Perhaps there are other items that
would need to be added to R, but it is clear that R could be appropriately extended. Call
this new, widely extended hypothesis R*. M would also need to be expanded. M is to be
expanded exactly as R was, except that on this one particular instance and no other your
rainbow image was caused by Martians with stardust. M*’s explanation of the
infrequency of Martian visits is just like R*’s, and M*’s explanation of the general
distrust of magical stardust is just like R*’s. In short, if R* were true it would explain
every piece of background evidence, and if M* were true it would explain each piece of
background evidence in the very same way that R* does. The only difference
explanation-wise is that if R* were true your visual evidence would be explained by light
refraction (or something) while if M* were true your visual evidence would be explained
by Martian stardust. R* and M* are competing hypotheses. Each is such that, if true, it
would explain E (your full body of evidence on rainbow viewing). R* and M* are
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equally good explanations of E. Yet E clearly favors R* over M*. After all, much of E
consists of claims about the high degree of improbability of Martian stardust use for the
creation of rainbow images in humans.
C 1 , then, is not an adequate defense of 2U in two respects. First, in most local
cases, Cl is not applicable because SK does not explain E. Second, Cl is unsuccessful in
general because the fact that competing hypotheses might, if true, explain E equally well,
does not count against the claim that E favors one hypothesis over the other. Equivalent
counterfactual explanatory power with respect to E does not guarantee epistemic
neutrality with respect to E. The critical feature in skeptical stories is not that, if true, SK
would explain E. Rather, the important feature in these stories is that SK explains just
how it could be that E might be true while P is not.
Since neither B nor Cl is an adequate defense of 2U, proponents of the
underdetermination argument might turn to C2 as a defense of 2U:
(C2) S’s evidence, E, does not favor P over SK because Pr(P/E) does not exceed
Pr(SK/E).
6
On one way of interpreting C2, it makes a claim about the statistical probabilities of P
and SK respectively, given E. A C2-like defense of 2U that appeals to statistical
probabilities might seem reasonable at first glance, but Cohen shows that such a C2-like
defense is not successful for local skeptical cases, such as the car-theft case:
For though our evidence justifies us to some degree in believing restricted
skeptical alternatives are false, it is very plausible to suppose it does not justify us
to the degree necessary for knowing skeptical alternatives are false. But it is not
very plausible to suppose that my evidence does not favor the mundane
propositions we claim to know over restricted skeptical alternatives. For example,
while it is very plausible to suppose that my evidence does not justify me to the
6
Suggested by remarks Cohen makes on pp. 149 and 155.
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degree necessary for knowing my car has not been stolen, it is not very plausible
to suppose that my evidence does not favor the hypothesis that my car is parked in
my garage over the hypothesis that my car has been stolen. The fact is that I have
fairly good statistical evidence that favors the former hypothesis over the latter.
Nonetheless, it is natural to balk at saying I know my car has not been
stolen.(Cohen 1998b, 155).
C2 is an inadequate defense of 2U in the car-theft case because it is false that Pr(P/E)
does not exceed Pr(SK/E). In the car-theft case, E contains something like the following
proposition: In general, car theft does not occur very often. That E contains this sort of
statistical information makes P—that my car is (now) in the lot where I left it- more
likely than SK -that my car is (now) in the hands of car thieves. Given our evidence that
car theft in general is statistically less likely than not, it is far more likely that my car
7
(right now) is in the lot rather than in the hands of thieves. The state of affairs described
in P is a specific instance of a general type; the state of affairs described in SK is a
specific instance of another general type; and we have some evidence that the former
g
general type has a higher frequency of occurrence than the latter.
Similar remarks apply to other local skeptical cases; P and SK each describe a
state of affairs that is a specific instance of a more general type, and E contains some sort
of statistical information that bears on the likelihood of these general types, with the
result that the general P-type state of affairs has a higher frequency of occurrence than the
general SK-type. That zookeepers are both deceptive and artistically talented is
statistically less likely than that they are either honest or not artistically talented; that one
In these cases we are clearly assuming that “all other things are equal”. That is, we have no additional
information such as that there were thief-like people hovering near your car when you left it or that there has
been a huge and very localized increase in car thefts.
g
It is well-known that assigning one type to a specific event, state of affairs, or act token can be
problematic, but I ignore that issue here.
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will run across a barn fa9ade is far less likely than that one will run across your average
old barn; etc. In fact, on the statistical interpretation of favoring that C2 suggests, 2U not
only is indefensible in the local cases, it is false.
That underdetermination arguments are not successful in local cases because 2U is
false is an important claim in Cohen’s paper. He says:
[P]lausible deductive closure arguments can be constructed using either kind of
skeptical alternative, underdetermination arguments require global skeptical
alternatives. (Cohen 1998b, 155).
I think Cohen is partly right. Underdetermination arguments are at best implausible in
local skeptical cases. Not only is C2 unsuccessful in defending 2U in the local case, but
so are Cl and B. I also think Cohen is partly wrong. Underdetermination arguments are
not plausible in global skeptical cases either. I have already argued that neither Cl nor B
will provide an adequate defense of 2U in either local or global cases. But what about
C2? Can such a defense succeed in the global cases?
In both local and global cases, it is reasonable to think of P and SK as describing
states of affairs that are specific instances of a more general type, but in global cases it is
not reasonable to claim that we have any evidence about the frequency of occurrence of
these general types. While in the local cases there is some statistical evidence available
to serve as the basis for the relevant probability claims (though this evidence also makes
2U seem false), there is no relevant statistical information to serve as the basis for
statistical probability claims in the global cases. In the global case, both the skeptical
hypothesis and the mundane hypothesis are open to a kind of generalization. SK, after all,
does describe a specific instance of a more general type - being envatted, being wholly
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deceived, or being such that each detail of life has merely been dreamt. And P also
describes a specific instance of a more general type - being handed. From a God’s-eye
perspective there may be information available about the frequency of being envatted
versus the frequency of being handed, but from a non-God’s-eye perspective, any claim
that the statistical likelihood of the former general type is equal to, greater than, or less
than the latter type is entirely unjustified. In the global cases, since S is not privy to the
relevant God’s-eye perspective, S’s evidence contains no information about the frequency
of the general type of which P is an instance nor any information about the frequency of
the general type of which SK is an instance. Since in the global cases our evidence
contains no statistical information that could sensibly serve as the basis for the claims that
Pr(P/E) is not greater than Pr(SK/E), in these cases C2 is wholly unfounded. When the
probabilities are interpreted statistically, C2 just does not work as a defense of 2U in
global cases because there is no rational basis for the probability claims it contains.
Perhaps to understand the probabilities mentioned in C2 as being statistical
probabilities is to misunderstand C2. Instead, C2 might be understood as a claim about
degrees of evidential support. C2 then claims that 2U is true because my evidence does
not more strongly support P than SK.
First, on this interpretation of the probabilities, not only does C2 fail to offer a
satisfactory defense of 2U, but 2U seems false. That is, my evidence more strongly
supports P than SK. Consider some of my evidence in the global case:
9
It should be clear that the objective probability is not what’s relevant here, otherwise (presumably) there’d
be no skeptical problem. Rather, what’s relevant is S’s access to information about that probability.
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have evidence from reading scientific journals that the necessary vat technology
is not currently available. And I surmise that if I were a brain in a vat there
would most likely be occasional glitches or repeated sequences in my stream of
sensations; I’ve not been aware of any such glitches. I have never even seen a
show on PBS that explains how specific impressions get created. I have other
evidence along similar lines. Plus, I have some “background evidence” such as
t lat simpler hypotheses seem more likely to be true than more elaborate ones.
There may be other background evidence as well.
Just as “background evidence” alone makes it more likely that there is a straight-forward
evil demon deceiving me about everything than that there is an eccentric evil demon who,
while standing on one leg, deceives me just on leap year Tuesdays and only about the
appearance of maple trees, so the background evidence alone makes it at least ever so
slightly more likely that I have hands than that I am a brain in a vat or that I am being
deceived by an evil demon. Surely, the background evidence plus the (possibly neutral)
other evidence in global cases makes P ever so slightly more likely than SK. In fact, I
think it is hard to claim with a straight face that my evidence in these cases really does
equally support P and SK! C2 works as a defense of 2U only if P is not more likely than
SK given E. I think that C2 is unsuccessful because P does seem more likely than SK
given E. Rather than providing a means for C2 to support 2U, this way of looking at the
probabilities makes 2U seem false.
Although / am convinced that P is (slightly) more likely than SK given E, surely
some remain unconvinced. However, the central point remains: C2 does not provide an
adequate defense of 2U in global cases. Why? Because when C2 is understood to be the
claim that 2U is true because E does not support P more strongly than SK, C2 is a
question-begging defense of the claim that E does not favor P over SK. When the
probabilities are understood as claims about degrees of evidential support, C2 simply
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repeats the premise it ostensibly defends; it amounts to the claim that E does not favor P
over SK because E does not favor P over SK. Particularly in light of the argument that
2U is false, the burden to offer some independent defense of 2U belongs to the skeptic.
No such support of 2U gets offered by C2; C2 simply “repeats the line” for which it is
,
„
.
10
supposed to offer independent support.
Along with B and Cl, C2 also fails to offer an adequate defense of 2U. In local
cases, C2 can sensibly be understood as a claim about statistical probabilities, but the
reason C2 offers - that P is not statistically more probable than SK given E - is clearly
false. In global cases, when C2 is understood as a claim about statistical probabilities, the
statistical claims it makes are wholly unfounded, and when it is understood as a claim
about degrees of evidential support, the reason C2 offers — that E does not more strongly
support P than SK — is at best question-begging as a defense of 2U.
Skeptical arguments are, once grasped, powerful arguments - whirlpool-like in
their pull toward an unwanted conclusion. If underdetermination arguments are adequate
reconstructions (or interpretations) of the skeptic’s argument, then these too ought to be
difficult to dismiss. But far from being difficult to dismiss, the underdetermination
arguments - both local and global - seem indefensible at best. The indefensible line of
the argument is 2U - E does not favor P over SK. The defense B offers is insufficient.
The reason Cl offers is also insufficient, as well as false in the local cases. C2 sensibly
can be interpreted as a claim about statistical probabilities in local cases, but when so
My comments on the interpretation of probabilities in C2 also apply to a recent version of UP proposed
by Jonathan Vogel in “Varieties of Skepticism”:
UP: If q is a competitor to p, then a subject S can know p only if p has more epistemic merit (for
S) than q. (Vogel 2).
For Vogel, p may favor q on “broadly inductive grounds” (Vogel 2).
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understood the defense C2 offers seems false. C2 can not sensibly be interpreted as a
claim about statistical probabilities in global cases, so in these cases C2 is at best
question-begging (and likely false). None of these provides a successful defense of 2U.
(And some suggest reasons that 2U is false). Upon examination the underdetermination
argument, then, is implausible for both local and global cases because 2U seems either
indefensible or false. Far from being at the heart of the skeptical problem, the
underdetermination argument is largely irrelevant to it.
Closure is not the root of the problem.
I now turn to the closure argument:
(1C) If my evidence justifies P, then my evidence justifies not-SK.[an
application of the closure principle CJ]
(2C) My evidence does not justify not-SK. [premise]
(3C) My evidence does not justify P. [from 1C,2C]
(4C) I do not know P. [from 3C]
I think it is 1C that reveals why closure is not at the heart of the skeptical problem."
Recall that 1C is supposed to be an instance of the closure principle:
For Vogel, p may favor q on “broadly inductive grounds” (Vogel 2).
A brief digression regarding 2C:
Cohen argues that the second premise in the closure argument does not depend for its plausibility
on UP. Briefly, he claims to show that 2C does not rely on 2U because even if E favors P over SK, E
needn’t be so strong as to justify SK (Cohen, pp. 146-147). That the two are independent is important to
Cohen for two reasons - because he claims there are two distinct routes to skepticism (one via UP and one
via CJ) and because he claims local skeptical cases are plausible only when formulated as arguments based
on closure. Cohen, then, is obliged to produce a successful defense of 2C that does not rely explicitly or
implicitly on the underdetermination principle. He gives the following defense:
Suppose we conceive of my evidence as being represented by the proposition E. Now
one thing that is particularly salient about the skeptical hypothesis SK is that if SK were
true, it would explain the truth of E. But having noted this, it becomes extremely
puzzling... how that very evidence could justify not SK....I do think [this] represents a
very natural motivation for premise [2C]. (Cohen 1998b, 146-147)
Cohen intends his support for 2C to remain intuitive. However, for those who find the need to appeal to
some general principle in support of 2C, he suggests principle Z (restricted to non-contradictions):
(Z) For all S, (j), if the truth of <]) would explain S’s evidence, then S’s evidence does not justify
not-(J).
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CJ: For all S, (j), \\), if S’s evidence justifies (J) and § entails v|/, then S’s evidence
justifies \\j .
The first premise of the closure argument appears to be a substantive premise, generated
by the closure principle, CJ. However, in most skeptical stories even when CJ is
applicable it generates a first premise that is essentially trivial. In order to see this point
more clearly, we can divide the skeptical hypothesis into two parts: Let SK* be all the
parts of the skeptical story that do not entail not-P, and let not-P* be the part (or parts) of
the story that entails not-P. Now consider the following version of the evil deceiver case:
Split Interpretation Case : There is an evil deceiver. This entity has lots of
power. The deceiver causes hand-like images and sensations. These are
detailed andjust like images and sensations you would have were there a
hand in front ofyou. Furthermore , the deceiver causes you to think you
have a hand when you do not.
In this skeptical story P is that I have a hand. All of the parts of the story that are
italicized belong in SK*, because none of these parts, nor any combination of them,
entails not-P. The part of the story that belongs in not-P* is just the part in bold, the
explicit denial of P. (Whenever not-P* just is not-P, I’ll drop the asterisk.) Consider the
following application of CJ:
CJ1: If S’s evidence justifies P and P entails not(SK* and not-P), then S’s
evidence justifies not (SK* and not-P).
CJ applies because P entails not (not-P). So in Split Interpretation
Case
,
though CJ
applies, the details of the skeptical hypothesis itself - the crazy story
we most often
Principle Z may or may not be true, but in local skeptical cases it just
does not apply. Nor does Cohen’s
more intuitive defense. As 1 have already argued above, SK does not
explain large chunks of the evidence
in these cases Specifically, SK does not explain any of the evidence
at all in the car theft case nor do
explain dw background or statistical evidence in other local cases. 2C may
well be plausible. 1. may well
have a defense. But at least in the local cases, neither
Z nor Cohen’s more intuitive remarks will provide
such a defense. While Cohen claims that arguments based
on UP are not plausible in local cases, he
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identify with the skeptical hypothesis (SK*) — are really a superfluous feature of CJ1
;
the
relevant entailment holds even if these details are absent. SK*, then, plays no essential
role in C J 1 . Consequently, the corresponding instance of 1 C is oddly just a trivially true
claim about evidence for P:
1 C 1 : If S’s evidence justifies P, then S’s evidence justifies not (SK* and not P).
That is,
1 C I' : If S’s evidence justifies P, then S’s evidence justifies either not-SK* or P.
Since the skeptical hypothesis is incidental to the first premise, the first premise
essentially reduces to a trivial claim about evidence for P. Upon careful consideration, it
is the second premise, rather than the first, that is the only substantive premise in this
closure argument. Presumably the details of the skeptical hypothesis will be essential in a
plausible defense of the second premise in a closure argument. But in such a defense the
essential feature of the skeptical hypothesis is not that it entails not-P; that is, the defense
of the second premise is not based on a closure principle. So, in Split Interpretation Case,
the first premise is based on closure, but it is just trivially true. The second premise is a
substantive premise, but it does not rely on closure. In this argument, then, the closure
principle cctn be used to formulate some kind of plausible skeptical argument, but rather
than producing a substantive first premise, it offers a first premise whose content is
essentially trivial. I think that virtually all skeptical stories can be interpreted along
the
maintains that arguments based on closure are plausible in local
cases. He has not, however, supplied a
successful defense of2C in local cases.
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lines of Split Interpretation Case. If so, closure begins to look less central to the
13
formulation of skeptical arguments in general.
Second, some skeptical stories are such that CJ cannot be used to formulate a
plausible skeptical argument, because in some cases, the mundane hypothesis does not
entail the denial of the skeptical hypothesis. In some skeptical cases CJ is not applicable
because the skeptical hypothesis is open-ended so that again the mundane proposition
does not entail the denial of the skeptical hypothesis. In these cases, closure arguments
are not plausible because the relevant instance of closure just does not apply. Consider
the following skeptical story:
Open-ended Case : I am looking at something that looks like a barn, and I’m
considering whether or not I know that I see a barn. You arrive and tell
me that there is an area of up-state New York in which some of the barn-
like structures are real and others are fa9ades. You say that we might be in
that area or we might not be. I then decide that I do not know that I see a
barn. In fact, I am looking at a bam and we are not in an area where there
are barn facades.
In this case, the skeptical hypothesis - that I am in the area of up-state New York in
which some of the barn-like structures are barns but others are mere barn facades - leaves
open whether P or not-P is true (where P is that S sees a barn). So P does not entail not-
SK. In Open-ended Case, where SK* is the skeptical story minus the mundane
hypothesis and its denial, the relevant instance of CJ would be:
12
If SK is that I am a brain-in-a-vat and P is that I have a hand, then clearly not-P is
an essential part of SK.
So this is a case that cannot be interpreted along the lines of
Split Interpretation Case . However, 1 still
think closure is irrelevant to this case, and I think Gettierized Case
reveals why.
13
Additionally, if the first premise of Argument C can be defended without the use
of closure, then what I
say here shows that the closure principle is incidental to the
problem. I think that 1C is plausible even when
P does not entail the denial of SK. So, I think there must
be some defense of 1C that does not involve
closure or underdetermination.
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CJ2: If S’s evidence justifies P, and P entails not [SK* & (P or not-P)], then S’s
evidence justifies not [SK* & (P or not-P)]
It is clear that P does not entail not[SK* & (P or not-P)]; P is consistent with [SK* & (P
or not-P)]. In Open-ended Case and others like it, the closure principle does not apply to
1C because the relevant entailment does not hold.
In still other cases, the skeptical hypothesis may even contain some explicit claim
about P’s being true. In such cases, SK clearly does not entail not-P, so the closure
principle clearly does not apply to 1C. Consider the following:
Gettierized Case : I am standing near a table, considering whether or not I know
that there’s a table nearby. You point out that I might be a brain in a vat.
My impressions and sensations might be caused by electrical stimulations
in the vat juice, rather than by the objects I seem to perceive. You point
out that my vat might be located on a table.
Notice that what I have told is an effective skeptical story. That is, it seems to motivate
skepticism no less than any of the other stories. But in this case, SK is intentionally
structured so that in the skeptical scenario P is true (where P is ‘There is a table nearby’).
In Gettierized Case
,
if SK* is the skeptical hypotheses minus P, the following is the
relevant instance of CJ:
CJ3: If S’s evidence justifies P, and P entails not (SK* and P), then S’s evidence
justifies not (SK* and P).
P - that there’s a table nearby - does not entail the denial of the skeptical hypothesis
- a
fairly long conjunction involving frequent mention of vats. P is consistent with SK* and
hence SK. So the closure principle does not apply to 1C in Gettierized Case . The
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closure principle cannot be used to formulate a plausible skeptical argument in
Gettierized Case because the relevant entailment does not hold.'
4
In Open-ended and Gettierized Cases, the motivation toward a skeptical
conclusion is just as strong as it is in other very similar cases. Skeptical arguments based
on these cases, then, would be just as plausible as other skeptical arguments. Yet in Open-
ended and Gettierized Cases the closure principle is irrelevant; it is not applicable
because the relevant instance of it plainly does not apply. These cases show that some
plausible skeptical arguments, both local (Open-ended Case ) and global (Gettierized
Case ), do not require the closure principle. More importantly, no plausible skeptical
argument based on Open-ended Case or Gettierized Case can be formulated using CJ. I
have already argued that U2 in arguments based on underdetermination is either
indefensible or implausible, so Open-ended and Gettierized Cases also show that some
plausible skeptical arguments -again both local and global — are based neither on the
15
closure principle nor on the underdetermination principle.
Someone might object here that I have somehow cheated; I have misinterpreted
either the mundane hypothesis or the skeptical hypothesis. In Open-ended Case, someone
14
Others, among them G.E. Moore in “Certainty” p.47 and more recently, Jonathan Vogel in “Varieties of
Skepticism” p. 14, have made roughly the same point using veridical dream cases. My Open-ended and
Gettierized Cases extend that point. These cases show that veridical dream cases should not be treated as
rare anomalies in the realm of skeptical stories because virtually any skeptical case can be appropriately
similarly adjusted so as to thwart arguments (both Underdetermination and Closure) that require the
mundane proposition and the skeptical hypothesis to be incompatible.
Additionally, consider the version of UP stated earlier:
UP: For all S, <j>, vp, if S’s evidence does not favor 4> over some incompatible hypothesis
vp, then S’s evidence does not justify <j).
UP is sometimes stated so that P and SK have to be “competing”. On the most natural interpretation,
‘competing’ probably means that P and SK are not jointly satisfiable. If UP requires P and SK to be
competing or incompatible hypotheses, then my comments here that in many skeptical cases CJ does not
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might object that I have interpreted the skeptical hypothesis as having a disjunctive
component when in fact it does not:
Even if the subject, S, is in the section of upstate NY in which some of the barn-
like structures are real barns and some are fa9ades, the subject does know ‘That’s
a bam’ provided the barn-like structure in front of S is a real bam. Since no
skepticism results when the bam in view is real, this part of the story should not
count as part of the skeptical hypothesis. The only legitimate interpretation of the
skeptical hypothesis in Open-ended Case is: that I am in a section of upstate NY
in which some of the barns are real and some are fa?ades and there is not a real
barn now in front of me. The skeptical hypothesis is not properly broken down
into SK* & (P v not-P). Rather, it is SK* & not-P; the part of the story in which
we are told that there are some real bams near the fa<j:ades is an irrelevant detail.
When Open-ended Case is properly understood, the relevant version of the
closure principle is:
CJ2': If S’s evidence justifies P, and P entails not [SK* & not-P], then S’s
evidence justifies not [SK* & not-P],
The difficulty with this objection is that provided we are not brains in vats or under the
guidance of an evil demon, the person who claims that S knows that S sees a barn in a
situation in which the possibility of barn fa<?ades in the area has been raised but not “ruled
out” ought to claim that in everyday hand-viewing situations skepticism is easily
dismissed. If skepticism can arise only in cases in which P is false, then in many of the
standard skeptical stories, there is (presumably) no real threat of skepticism because P is
true. So, those who take the threat of skepticism seriously ought not appeal to the
objection that in Open-ended Case SK cannot be interpreted as being consistent with P.
In Gettierized Case, someone might object that I have misrepresented the
mundane hypothesis. I have represented it as being a simple proposition, when in fact it
is a long conjunction:
In Gettierized Case, P is not the simple proposition that there is a table nearby.
Rather, it is a more complex proposition — a conjunction whose conjuncts include
apply, also apply to UP. That is, in many skeptical cases UP cannot be used to formulate a plausible
skeptical argument because P and SK are compatible or non-competing (since P does not entail not-SK).
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claims about light refraction and claims about the subject’s perceptual apparatus,
as well as many other similar claims. Properly understood, P really has the
following structure: p, & p2 &...pn , where each p; is some particular claim abouthow the world works in the actual world when it comes to table perception The
conjunction claims that tables, rather than evil scientist with vat controls, cause
(through some complicated but “normal” process) my images of nearby tables
When Gettierized Case is properly understood, SK is also a large and complex
conjunction having the following structure: sk, & sk2 & ...,skn , where each sk, is
some particular claim about how the world works when it comes to the generation
of table images in the vat-world. P and SK, then, are competing hypotheses about
the way our world works, about what our world is like. When P and SK are
properly understood as large and complex conjunctions, P does entail the denial of
SK because for some conjuncts p, and sk„ p, entails the denial of sk,. Given that P
- Pi & p2 &...pn and SK = sk) & sk2 & ,...skn , the correct version of the closure
principle in Gettierized Case is:
CJ3': If S’s evidence justifies P, and (p, & p2 &...pn ) entails not-(sk, &
sk2 & . . . .skn ), then S’s evidence justifies not-SK.
This interpretation of Gettierized Case preserves the closure principle.
This objection also fails. On the objector’s closure-preserving interpretation of
Gettierized Case, the mundane hypothesis is hardly mundane. It is far from clear to me
that my everyday evidence justifies any sort of complex claim about how the world works
- even a very local claim about how perception occurs in a particular instance. In fact,
since I cannot even describe in any detail what such a “normal” perceptual event would
be like, I think I do not have the beliefs requisite for knowing P. By requiring the
addition of normality, P includes the claim that S isn’t dreaming, or being deceived, or
hallucinating, or malfunctioning, or (in local cases) in an area ripe with barn facades.
Under the objector’s interpretation of P, I think I don 't know P, even under the most
mundane of circumstances. In the redescribed Gettierized Case
,
closure does apply, and
skeptical results do follow, but something of the skeptic’s position has been lost; the
skeptic claims that we don’t have knowledge of the mundane, but on this account, the
skeptic wins the day by giving up on the claim that P is mundane. That is, the skeptic's
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position becomes that we fail to know many non-mundane propositions. I reject this
response to the objection because it allows a version of the skeptic’s position to capture
illegitimate gam, while not doing justice to the skeptic’s original cause .'
6
So far I have argued that there are some cases in which closure is clearly not at the
heart of the skeptical problem. I have done so by describing several such cases. But
these few cases reveal the broader point: Nearly all skeptical stories can either be
interpreted or adjusted (through slight and insignificant variations) so that closure is
largely irrelevant or inapplicable to the formulation of a skeptical argument. I think
virtually all skeptical stories can be interpreted along the lines of Split Interpretation
Case. But if re-interpretation seems unconvincing, adjustment is even more revealing.
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I here revisit the reinterpretation of cases like Gettierized Case
. As both Vogel and 1 have noted, the
same objection I give against closure - that in many skeptical examples, P and SK are not
inconsistent/incompatible - applies to UP(Vogel 13). In a recent paper, “Varieties of Skepticism”,
Jonathan Vogel argues that that a version of Deceiver Argument based on the Underdetermination Principle
is the skeptic’s best (most defensible) argument. The relevant version of UP Vogel favors is:
UPV If q is a competitor to p, then a subject can know p only if p has more epistemic merit (for S)
than q (Vogel 2).
In the part of the discussion in which Vogel grants that dreams can be veridical, he suggests that a skeptical
argument based on UPV can be defended, “it’s part of what you ordinarily believe about the world that you
are now awake, that you are now really perceiving things, and that you aren’t dreaming. The possibility that
you are dreaming tout court is, therefore, inconsistent with your body of beliefs about the world taken as a
whole”(Vogel 18). I think this approach fails to capture the root of the skeptical problem for reasons
similar to those given above for the rejection of CJ3’. As I understand Vogel’s interpretation of the
veridical dream case, UPV does not apply to the mundane proposition, T have hands’, and the skeptical
hypothesis ‘I’m dreaming that I have hands’. Rather, it applies to something like whole worlds - a p-world
that is like our world and in which the subject is not dreaming and a q-world that is like our world but in
which the subject is dreaming. On this way of construing P and SK, they are true competitors. And
skeptical results surely follow, since there is no epistemic reason, from S’s point of view, to favor P over
SK. But (as in the case of CJ3’), the “mundane” proposition is now a proposition not just about hands but
about hands and not dreaming. The requirement that P include anything like the claim that S is not
dreaming becomes non-mundane because P must now include (somehow) that perception is “normal” -
non-dreaming, non-deceiving, non-malfunctioning, etc. The proposition is no longer mundane, and I don’t
think we ever know it. Since Vogel is not a contextualist (RAT), I think accepting UPV -with P and SK so
interpreted -commits him to skepticism in even the most normal of circumstances, for S surely does not
have access to the god’s-eye perspective on possible worlds that might give S the “broadly inductive
grounds” (Vogel 2) for granting P more epistemic merit than SK. Also, note that UPV does not yield
skeptical results in many local cases because the background evidence supplies S with the broadly inductive
grounds for rejecting SK.
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The dream story becomes the veridical dream argument. The evil deceiver deceives the
subject not about the objects that are nearby but about the origins or sources of his images
and sensations; the subject is deceived because he thinks he perceives his world when he
does not. Car-theft and painted-mule stories can easily be adjusted along the lines of
Open-ended Case. (One exception to this adaptation process is the brain-in-a-vat
example when P is that I have a hand; any adjustment in this story that makes being a
brain-in-a-vat consistent with having a hand will be a non-trivial adjustment.) Since in
nearly all skeptical stories closure is irrelevant or inapplicable in the formulation of any
plausible skeptical argument, closure is largely irrelevant to the skeptical problem.
Unifying the Skeptical Problem
Over the course of many years, both underdetermination and closure have been
hailed as the principles best used as the basis for formulating skeptical arguments. At
first glance, arguments based on underdetermination or closure seem to capture the
argument for skepticism contained in skeptical stories, but upon closer examination,
neither does an adequate job of reflecting the skeptic’s reasoning. Arguments based on
underdetermination are implausible or indefensible, while skeptical stories are
remarkably compelling and difficult to dismiss. The details of the skeptical hypothesis
17
seem irrelevant to the closure principle itself, but in skeptical stories these details are
essential. Importantly, some plausible skeptical stories - Cases 2 and 3 — are such that
neither underdetermination nor closure can be used to formulate plausible skeptical
arguments based on these stories. If both underdetermination and closure are largely
More carefully, these details seem irrelevant to the first premise, which is supposed to be an instance of
the closure principle.
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irrelevant to the skeptical problem, then what is at the heart of it? Contextualists
including Peter Unger, Stewart Cohen, and most recently David Lewis have provided the
tools not only for a solution to the problem of skepticism but also for a satisfactory
diagnosis of the problem itself. The principle at the heart of the skeptical problem is a
contextualist one:
ENT: If ‘S knows P’ is true in context c, then for every possibility e-relevant in c.
if S has evidence E in that possibility, then P is true in that possibility.'
8
The companion argument to principle ENT follows:
Argument E
(El) If "
S
knows P is true in context c, then for every possibility e-relevant in c, if
S has evidence E in that possibility, then P is true in that possibility.
(E2) There is a possibility e-relevant in c in which S has evidence E but in which
P is false.
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(E3) ‘S knows P’ is not true in c.
With ENT in mind, consider anew a first encounter with a skeptical argument:
The professor asks you if know you have hands. “Sure”, you answer, “I’m
looking at them right now”. Meanwhile, you think to yourself that this is a dumb
class. “Perhaps you do not have hands”, your instructor remarks. “Maybe we all
just have stubs and not hands”, someone jokes. “Yeah, I know I have hands
”,
you
finally reply.
The professor then suggests that maybe you are a brain in a vat. Then she
points out to you in precise detail just how you might have the very perceptual
evidence you now have even though you did not have hands but were a brain in a
vat. Your visual hand-like perceptions are not caused by hands at all. Instead,
some vat operator changes the electromagnetic current in the vat causing your
18
The point of principle ENT is to express the relationship that must hold between E and P when S knows P
in a context. Above, I adopt Lewis’ account of evidence, on which evidence is the subject’s perceptual
experience and memory (Lewis 553), so talking of the truth of E makes no sense. However, the point here
is not tied to a particular account of evidence; it is broader. If one thinks that evidence can be propositional,
then the right way to express ENT is an obvious relative of the Lewisian analysis of knowledge. There are
several differences. In ENT is: If ‘S knows P’ is true in context c, then for every possibility e-relevant in
c, if S’s evidence E is true in that possibility, P is true in that possibility. Significantly, this principle is a
necessary condition, not a sufficient one.
19
ENT and Argument E are stated as metalinguistic claims. The contextualist and I (here) also hold the
object-language counterpart to each principle/argument. The shift from metalanguage to object-language
claims should not be problematic. If ‘S knows P’ is true in c, then in that context S knows P.
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hand-like images. Each time you mention some new sort of evidence, she makes
clear how that, too, might be just the same even though you are a brain in a vatYou start thinking maybe you’d better say “Ok, so 1 don ’t know 1 have hands ”
and you find yourself thinking this class is not so bad.
Before the skeptical story gets presented, the student thinks his evidence is sufficient.
After the story, he does not. Loosely speaking, what the skeptical story does is cause the
student recognize that at the latter time his evidence does not in any way “guarantee” the
truth of the mundane proposition he earlier took himself to know on the basis of that
same evidence. The skeptical story seems to do this by making the student aware at the
latter time of a possible situation, a situation that did not come to mind at the earlier time.
in which the evidence is “disconnected” from the mundane proposition it might otherwise
sufficiently justify. What has changed from the earlier time to the latter time is not the
evidence. Rather, it is the context. What changes from the earlier time to the later time is
the set of possibilities relative to which the student evaluates his evidence.
Although revisiting the skeptical problem with ENT in mind should help make
ENT’s account of the skeptic’s reasoning seem intuitive and plausible, this fond
remembrance of a first skeptical encounter is, of course, no argument for ENT. I have
shown that underdetermination and closure are largely irrelevant to the skeptical problem;
neither UP nor CJ can generate plausible skeptical arguments for a wide range of
skeptical stories. In what follows, I argue that ENT can unify the skeptical problem, in
part by generating plausible skeptical arguments in all the skeptical stories here
considered. The proof, as they say, is in the pudding.
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Before discussing the degree to which ENT is successful, two notions made use of
in the principle require further mention. First, since ENT’s appeal to context is now fairly
standard in epistemology, I will not here discuss the notion of context.
Second, ENT also appeals to the notion of e-relevance. For the present
discussion, e-relevance is Lewisian relevance as determined by David Lewis in “Elusive
Knowledge
.
(Later, in Chapter 4, e-relevance will be redefined, but the results of the
cases considered in the present discussion should remain unchanged.) The Lewisian rules
below should sufficiently clarify how e-relevance in ENT works. For Lewis, the first
three rules govern what possibilities may not be properly ignored. In the case of ENT,
these rules tell us which possibilities are e-relevant:
Rule of Actuality : The actual possibility is always e-relevant (Lewis 154).
Rule of Belief: A possibility the subject believes to obtain or one that he ought to
believe obtains is e-relevant (Lewis 555).
Rule of Attention : If the participants in a conversational context attend
to/consider/focus on a possibility, then that possibility is e-relevant in that
20
context (Lewis 559).
For Lewis, the second set of rules governs which possibilities may be properly
ignored. In the case of ENT, these rules tell us which possibilities are (defeasibly) not e-
relevant:
Rule of Reliability : We may defeasiby presuppose that perception, memory, and
testimony are processes on which we can rely; that is, we may presume
(defeasibly) that perception, memory, and testimony are reliable indicators
of truth. Defeasibly, possibilities in which our perception, memory, or
testimony are not reliable are not e-relevant.
Rule of Method : We may also presuppose that a sample is representative and that
the best explanation of our evidence is the true explanation. Defeasibly,
I’m assuming some familiarity with Lewis’ rules. It should be clear that I’ve merely switched ‘properly
ignoring’ for ‘not e-relevant’ and ‘not properly ignored’ for ‘e-relevant’ and that (here) nothing turns on
this terminological change. Also, I’m assuming that Lewis’ Rule of High Stakes can get subsumed under
this rule. In a High Stakes situation, the participants in fact focus on more possibilities, so the rule of
attention will guarantee that the set of relevant possibilities expands accordingly.
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possibilities in which samples are not representative or in which inference
to the best explanation is not reliable are not e-relevant.
I ignore here Lewis’ Rule
discussion. (I discuss it at
of Resemblance because it is not applicable in the cases under
length in Chapter 3.)
Defeat: Loosely, a rule of presupposition (Reliability, Method) may be defeated in a
context in two ways: (a) if as a result of a rule from the first category (Belief, Actuality,
Attention), a particular possibility that might otherwise not be e-relevant by one of the
presupposition rules become e-relevant, then a presupposition rule is defeated (b) if
because the participants (speakers and hearers) question the legitimacy of a certain kind
of presupposition itself (e.g., they wonder whether a given sample size is large enough or
whether future events will resemble past events), possibilities that might otherwise not be
e-relevant - namely propositions in which the relevant (dropped) presupposition is false -
- become e-relevant, then a presupposition rule is defeated. These methods of defeat are
by no means exclusive. Generally, the discussion of a particular skeptical scenario causes
participants to drop some presuppositions about reliability or method, so that the first
kind of defeat is accompanied by the second kind. But sometimes only one kind of defeat
occurs, as when the presupposition itself is dropped without the aid of a specific skeptical
scenario. Additionally, defeat can occur piecemeal or whole-scale; the Rule of Reliability
might be defeated for visual images as of a barn but not for visual images as of a car, for
instance.
We can now return to the classical skeptical story above, this time offering a
precise account of how the ENT and its companion argument, Argument E, explain the
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skeptical problem. Though more precise, this account of the problem should preserve the
reasoning present in the earlier, more intuitive, account. Let’s call the first part of the
story Part 1, the second Part 2, the student S, the professor B, and the student’s evidence
(visual) E.
In the context of Part 1, by the Rule of Attention, B’s comment makes e-relevant
possibilities in which S has stubs rather than hands. But B’s comment does not make e-
relevant all such possibilities. By the Rule of Reliability, S and B in this context
legitimately presuppose that perceptual evidence is reliable, so possibilities in which S’s
perceptual evidence is not reliable are not e-relevant. B’s comment makes e-relevant only
those possibilities in which S has stubs rather than hands and in which S’s perceptual
evidence is reliable. So of the e-relevant possibilities, there are possibilities in which S
has stubs rather than hands but S does not have E (the perceptual visual evidence of
having hands) and possibilities in which S has E and has hands, but there are no e-
relevant possibilities in which S has E but does not have hands. In this context, the
consequent of ENT is true (and 2E is false), so no skeptical results get generated via
Argument E. When S claims “Yeah, I know I have hands” at the end of Part 1, S speaks
truly. The statement made at the end of Part 1 is true in the context of Part 1
.
In the context of Part 2, by the Rule of Attention, B’s mention of the possibility
that S is a brain in a vat makes e-relevant possibilities in which S is a brain in a vat rather
than a person with hands. B also mentions important details about how S’s perceptions
might be unreliable — e.g., they might have been caused not by hands but by a vat
21
My account of defeat for the two rules above should be consistent with the examples Lewis discusses in
“Elusive Knowledge”, though it may or may not be an accurate account of how he would say defeat in
general works for these rules.
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manipulator. Though the Rule of Reliability says we can ignore possibilities in which our
perception is unreliable, the Rule of Attention makes e-relevant possibilities in which
virtually no kind of perception, memory, or testimony is reliable; B’s comments break the
presumption - in the context of Part 2 - that our perception (memory, method, and
testimony) is reliable. B’s comments, then, make e-relevant two important sorts of
possibilities
- (7) possibilities in which S is a brain in a vat and (2) possibilities in which
S is not a brain in a vat, but which are similar to the brain-in-a-vat worlds with respect to
the complete lack of perceptual (memory, testimonial, and methodological) reliability
(e.g., a possibility in which S is a brain in a tub). Since the specific possibility attended in
this case is one in which S is a BIV without hands, possibilities of the first kind are made
e-relevant by the Rule ot Attention—type (a) defeat. Possibilities of the second kind
become relevant since, because of the specific possibility described, the speakers and
hearers question the legitimacy of a broad range of presuppositions - type (b) defeat. In
general, no presupposition of reliability of perception, memory, or testimony is legitimate
since the Rule of Attention (via the specific possibility described) defeats the Rule of
Reliability whole-scale. In the context of Part 2, then, there is an e-relevant possibility in
which E is true but P is not - a possibility in which S is a brain in a vat, S has evidence E,
but P is false. Since such a possibility is e-relevant, the consequent of ENT is false (and
2E is true). When S claims “OK, maybe I don’t know I have hands” at the end of Part 2,
S speaks truly. The skeptical claim made at the end of Part 2 is true in the context of Part
22
2 .
The contexts in Part 1 and Part 2 are fairly straightforward, but suppose that instead of explaining that
someone’s perceptual evidence might be just as it is if the person were just a brain in a vat whose
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Having examined the mechanics of ENT and Argument E, I now turn to the
advantages of accepting this account of the skeptical problem. Argument E fares better
than either the closure argument or the underdetermination argument in reflecting the
.23
skeptic’s reasoning. Unlike the closure arguments, Argument E reveals why the details
of the skeptical hypothesis are important. With ENT at the center of the skeptical
problem, the role of the skeptical hypothesis becomes clear; skeptical hypotheses
disconnect E from P in such a way that a class of possibilities in which E and not-P
becomes e-relevant. In standard stories, the skeptical hypothesis itself is such a
possibility, but skeptical hypotheses needn’t accomplish the disconnection by
incorporating not-P into the skeptical scenario itself. The details of the skeptical story are
integral to this account of the skeptical problem because they ensure the salience of a
possibility in which E but not P, usually by rendering some customary presupposition
about reliability moperant in the context. The reason the details of the skeptical
hypothesis are indispensable on this account of the skeptical problem is that Argument
E’s focus is on E’s relation to P when SK is e-relevant rather than, as with closure
perceptions are caused by vat manipulation, B merely mentions to the students that the person might be a
brain in a vat, without describing any of the details of the classic skeptical scenario. Would skeptical results
be generated via ENT? I think not. I think that the Rule of Reliability is not automatically trumped by mere
mention of a skeptical alternative. The details of the story allow the listeners to understand that the
possibility is inconsistent with S’s having hands, to take seriously the possibility and, in so doing, to grasp
the scenario’s implications for reliability. My point is not that merely mentioning an outlandish possibility
never makes e-relevant possibilities in which reliability is broken (thus generating skeptical results), rather,
it is that such a break is not automatic. Mere mention of BIV’s to a crowd of philosophers may serve to
change a context, but it may not so serve amongst a crowd of naive undergraduates.
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More accurately, it fares better at reflecting the reasoning present in skeptical stories. The skeptic would,
of course, not accept that there are any contexts in which a person can truly claim to know a proposition.
What I am trying to capture here is the skeptic’s reasoning when giving a particular skeptical argument.
That is, 1 am trying to explain the plausibility of the skeptic’s argument without accepting full-scale
skepticism. (The skeptic and the fallibilist could accept a non-contextualized version of ENT. The skeptic
would then get the result that whole-scale skepticism — as opposed to contextually relativized skepticism —
follows. The fallibilist will reject the non-contextualized version of ENT and deny the corresponding line
in the non-contextualized version of Argument E.)
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arguments, on the logical relation of P to SK. As a result, Argument E fares better than
the closure argument in reflecting the skeptic’s reasoning.
Argument E also fares better than underdetermination arguments in reflecting the
skeptic’s reasoning. Unlike underdetermination arguments, each line of Argument E has
a strong defense; unlike Argument U, with its indefensible second premise, Argument E
coriectly captures the force, or strength, of the skeptic’s argument. Unlike 2U, 2E is
clearly true. In fact, each premise of Argument E seems intuitive and plausible.
Not only does Argument E do a better job of capturing the skeptic’s reasoning
than closure or underdetermination arguments, Argument E also preserves much of the
insight of those who advocate either underdetermination or closure arguments. Some
advocates of underdetermination focus on SK’s explanatory role; they claim SK’s role is
to explain E just as well as P. ENT makes clear that SK plays an important explanatory
role — SK s role (even in problem cases like Open-ended and Gettierized Cases) is to
explain how E could be true though P is not. The details of SK’s explanation are critical
to raising the salience (e-relevance) of the possibilities that allow the generation of
skeptical results. Advocates of closure focus on the logical relation that holds between P
and SK; they claim that P entails not-SK. ENT preserves the focus on entailment, but it
is the “entailment” relation between E and P when restricted to e-relevant possibilities
that is critical.
In addition to its advantages over underdetermination and closure in offering a
more accurate account of the skeptic’s reasoning, ENT (via Argument E) allows global
and local cases to be treated equally, or alike, in the generation of skeptical results.
Because an infinite string of local skeptical cases can be used to generate global
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skepticism, and because a global skeptical hypothesis can be used to generate local
skeptical results, there seems to be no significant difference in the way the skeptic reasons
in these two kinds of cases. Since the separation of cases into global and local does not
seem driven by any theoretical difference in the two kinds of skeptical stories, equal
treatment of these types of skeptical cases is an advantage. In Stewart Cohen’s “Two
Kinds of Skeptical Argument”, global and local cases receive separate treatment. Cohen
claims that while global skeptical cases may plausibly be interpreted either as
underdetermination arguments or closure arguments, plausible interpretation of local
cases requires closure arguments (Cohen 1998b, 155). Unlike Cohen’s account, accepting
ENT as the central principle behind the problem allows local and global cases to be cast
as ditferent versions of the very same argument, Argument E. In typical local cases such
as the car theft case, the painted mule case, and the bam fayade case, the relevant
skeptical hypothesis is itself an e-relevant possibility in which E and not-P. ENT’s
consequent is false, 2E is clearly true, and skeptical results follow via Argument E.
Similarly, in typical global cases such as the evil deceiver case, the brain in a vat case,
and the dreamer case, the relevant skeptical hypothesis itself is an e-relevant possibility in
which E and not-P. Again, ENT’s consequent is false, 2E is clearly true, and skeptical
results follow via the argument above.
Unlike either closure or underdetermination, ENT can accommodate non-standard
or problem cases, like Open-ended and Gettierized Cases. Recall that in these cases, the
skeptical hypothesis described in detail in the story is consistent with P, so no possibility
in which E but not P gets described or mentioned
;
this is why no plausible closure
argument can be used in formulating the arguments for Open-ended or Gettierized Cases.
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Significantly, scenarios/possibilities/hypotheses can be e-relevant in a context without
being specifically spelled out or mentioned in a context. In Open-ended and Gettierized
Cases, even though the skeptical hypothesis is not itself a possibility in which E but not P,
the skeptical hypothesis does make e-relevant a whole class of scenarios that do not
explicitly get mentioned - scenarios in which the details of the skeptical story are the
same, but P happens to be false. How? In each of these cases the skeptical hypothesis is
e-relevant because the speakers in the context attend to it. So in each case, by the Rule of
Attention, SK is e-relevant. Additionally, in each of these cases, the skeptical hypothesis
disconnects E from P by making clear that E in no way guarantees the truth of P - P just
happens to be true but could just as easily have been false. In the skeptical hypothesis
described in Open-ended Case, perceptions as of a bam are not reliable indicators of the
presence ol bams. And in the skeptical hypothesis described in Gettierized Case, all sorts
of perception, testimony, memory and method are not reliable indicators of truth. So in
each case, SK is e-relevant by the Rule of Attention, and, via SK’s e-relevance, the Rule
of Reliability (and Method in global cases) is either wholly or partially defeated. In
Open-ended Case, participants no longer presuppose the reliability of perceptions as of a
bam. Because the Rule of Attention (via the possibility described) partially defeats the
Rule of Reliability (bam-like perceptions can’t be presumed reliable but hand-like
perceptions can be presupposed reliable), participants can no longer (legitimately) ignore
the possibility that is exactly similar to the skeptical hypothesis except that there is no
bam. So, in Open-ended Case, the dropping of the presupposition about the reliability of
bam-like perceptions makes e-relevant possibilities in which there are unreliable visual
perceptions as of bams but not possibilities in which there are unreliable visual
45
perceptions as of a hand. In Gettierized Case, all sorts of possibilities become relevant -
namely possibilities in which there is a general, large-scale, lack of reliability of
perception, testimony, and method of the sort brought to attention by the specific
skeptical scenario described. Some of these possibilities become e-relevant because the
speakers and hearers focus on the possibility itself [type-(a) defeat]; others become
ielevant because the skeptical scenario causes them to drop a presupposition about
reliability or method [type-(b) defeat]. One possibility that becomes relevant because the
Rule of Attention (via the possibility descnbed) wholly defeats the Rule of Reliability and
Method, is the possibility in which you are a brain in a vat, but the vat is on the floor.’"
4
So, as in typical skeptical cases, in Open-ended and Gettierized Cases, there is an e-
relevant possibility in which E but not P. The consequent of ENT is false, 2E is true, and
skeptical results follow again via Argument E. With ENT, problem cases are no longer
problematic; they get treated just like typical skeptical stories.
Again, unlike either underdetermination arguments or closure arguments, ENT
explains why examples involving the problem of induction are a subclass, or type, of
skeptical problem. One way to generate skeptical results in induction cases is to
describe, or bring attention to, a scenario -a possibility - in which the inductive step fails.
For example, if you claim to know by induction that all emeradls are green, I might claim
that you don’t know this because there is some as yet unexamined stash of purple
emeralds hidden in the New Zealand bush. In such a case, you fail to have knowledge by
induction because you focus on a specific possibility in which E but not P, and the Rule
24
Another possibility that becomes relevant because the presupposition of reliability is widely defeated is
the possibility in which you are a brain in a tub. So, in the context described in Gettierized Case, the
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of Attention makes that possibility e-relevant. hi still other cases, skeptical results are
generated when possibilities in which not-P become e-relevant without there being any
particular story or scenario mentioned at all. For example, in discussing whether or not
someone knows the sun will rise tomorrow, I might make e-relevant a class of
possibilities in which E but not-P by repeatedly mentioning or explaining that past
experience, even a lot of it, does not entail anything about future experience. Perhaps I
discuss swan coloration at length, calling in question the reliability of making inferences
based on large sample sizes. In so doing, I have created a context in which there is an e-
relevant possibility in which E (the subject has the same abundant past sunrise
experiences) and not-P (the sun does not rise). I have made such a possibility e-relevant
not by giving a detailed “skeptical story” that explains how, exactly, E could be true while
P is not. Rather, I have attended to or focussed on the fact that we are merely
presupposing that making inferences about future events based on experience of similar
past events is a reliable method. By calling into question such a presupposition in a
context, the presupposition itself becomes a matter of attention and so can no longer
legitimately be presupposed irrelevant. When the presupposition is defeated in a context,
a class of possibilities earlier presumed not-e-relevant becomes e-relevant by the now
defeated rule (presupposition). Again, ENT will yield skeptical results in induction cases
either when there is a specific scenario made e-relevant in which the induction step does
not hold or when a general presupposition (say, about the appropriateness of the sample
size or about the validity of the induction) gets called into question; otherwise, we can
subject also fails to know that there are vats.
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have knowledge by induction (via “proper” presupposition). So, ENT nicely
accommodates problems about induction as a subclass of skeptical problems.
25
While on Lewis’ account, Lottery problems are akin to Gettier problems (see
Lewis, p.557), on this account, Lottery problems are akin to skeptical problems. As on
Lewis account, the lottery ticket holder does not know he will lose the lottery because
there is an e-relevant possibility in which he has loads of statistical evidence E and yet P
-that he loses - is false. However, on this account, the possibility that he wins is not
made relevant because of the Rule of Resemblance, rather, the possibility is made e-
relevant by the Rule of Attention. Those who attend to the Lottery case attend to a case in
which there is a fair lottery, namely, one in which there’s a winner. So, in attending to
the lottery, speakers and hearers automatically attend to the winning possibility. Since 1
discuss lottery cases at length in the following chapter, I here simply state what I think is
the right way to treat them - namely, as another variety of skeptical case that, again,
receives a unified treatment by ENT.
25
In “Varieties of Skepticism”, Vogel points out:
If our beliefs about the external world are justified by evidence, and the evidence for those beliefs
doesn’t entail [that is, entail with no restrictions] their truth, then the support for our beliefs about
the world is inductive. If a general skepticism about induction holds, then our beliefs about the
world don’t have the status of knowledge. Cartesian skepticism would follow from Humean
skepticism [skepticism about inductive justification or inductive knowledge] as a special case
(Vogel 21).
I think that our having knowledge depends on our making presuppositions - about the reliability of
justification by induction, the reliability of perception, testimony, etc. - and that arguments for domestic
Cartesian skepticism depend on some or all of those presuppositions being dropped (or defeated partially or
wholly) So, I think that Humean skepticism is a subclass of what Vogel calls domestic Cartesian
skepticism, one that involves the defeat of a presupposition about some aspect of induction. However, if it
turns out that all these other kinds of skepticism turn on induction because all knowledge somehow relies on
presuppositions about induction, then that will mean that all forms of skepticism are Humean. Either way,
my central point remains: Cartesian and Humean skepticism are of a kind; arguments for them are
structurally the same and resolutions of those arguments ought to be essentially the same.
48
ENT elucidates the skeptical problem by making precise an account of it that both
preserves its intuitive plausibility and generates skeptical results appropriately. ENT
does not require the separate treatment of global and local cases. ENT handles typical
cases, problem cases, induction cases, and lottery cases all in the same way. Via
Argument E, ENT will generate skeptical conclusions whenever there are e-relevant
possibilities in which E but not-P. Cars, zebras, bams, deceivers, vats, dreamers
(veridical or not) - even future sun risings and lotteries - all get treated as versions of the
very same skeptical argument. ENT is the one general principle that can treat all
skeptical problems equally and correctly; ENT unifies the skeptical problem. It is the
one general principle at the heart of the skeptical problem.
Before addressing the question of whether or not some version of contextualism
provides a solution to the skeptical problem, it is important to be clear about what exactly
the problem of skepticism is. If I am right that ENT together with the argument based on
it best reflects the reasoning present in all skeptical stories, then one key to escaping the
whirlpool of skepticism is some form of contextualism.
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CHAPTER 3
THE PROBLEM WITH GETTIER
I have argued that a Lewis-style contextualism both identifies the source of the
skeptical problem and solves it. Roughly speaking, skeptical problems are solved under
the Lewis system when the Rule of Attention acts as a defeating mechanism for the Rule
of Reliability, the Rule of Method, or the Rule of Conservatism. If the speakers and
hearers in a context focus on a skeptical scenario, the Rule of Attention requires that the
skeptical possibility is relevant, thus defeating the operant presumption - under a Rule
of Reliability - that such a possibility is not relevant. If the speakers and hearers are in
an everyday context in which they do not attend to a skeptical scenario, the Rules of
Reliability, Method, or Conservatism are not defeated and the skeptical possibility is
properly ignored. I now turn to Gettier problems. Roughly speaking, Gettier problems
are supposed to be solved under the Lewis system when the Rule of Resemblance acts
as a defeating mechanism for the Rule of Reliability, the Rule of Method, or the Rule of
Conservatism. According to Lewis, Gettier problems are solved because the Rule of
Resemblance requires the inclusion of a world at which P is false and that S’s evidence
can’t rule out. Consider again these central rules:
Rule of Resemblance : “Suppose one possibility saliently resembles another.
Then if one of them may not properly be ignored, neither may the other.”
(Lewis 556).
Rule of Reliability : “. .
.
[W]e have a presumptive rule about what may properly
be ignored; and it is by means of this rule that we capture what is right
about causal or reliabilist theories of knowing. Consider processes
whereby information is transmitted to us: perception, memory, and
testimony. These processes are fairly reliable. Within limits, we are
entitled to take them for granted. We may properly presuppose that they
work without a glitch in the case under consideration. Defeasibly - very
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defeasibly! - a possibility in which they fail may properly be
ignored. (Lewis 558).
Now, suppose that S is in a Gettier situation: S is looking at a sheep-shaped rock on a
hill behind which (unbeknownst to S) there happens to be a sheep.
2
According to
Lewis, the Rule of Resemblance requires the inclusion of the sheep-shaped-rock-minus-
sheep possibility. The inclusion of this possibility defeats the Rule of Reliability and -
since S can't ignore or rule out that possibility - solves the Gettier problem.
Throughout this chapter, I again take Lewis’ brand of contextualism as the
model, though the basic points in the chapter, like those in Chapter Two, apply more
broadly. In the first section, I discuss Lewis’ Rule of Resemblance in some detail, in
part by examining how the rule is not supposed to work; it is not supposed to unleash
resemblance unrestrained, lest whole-scale skepticism follows. Toward that end, some
sort of provisos on resemblance seem essential in any rule that successfully resolves
Gettier problems without generating unwanted skeptical results.
Though Lewis’ Rule of Resemblance contains two provisos, I concentrate, in the
second section, on the second of Lewis’ provisos - salience. Stewart Cohen in
“Contextualist Solutions to Epistemological Problems: Scepticism, Gettier, and the
There are also:
Rules of Method : “We are entitled to presuppose - again, very defeasibly - that a sample is
representative; and that the best explanation of our evidence is the true explanation. (Lewis, p.
558)
and the Rule of Conservatism : “We are permitted, defeasibly, to adopt the usual and mutually
expected presuppositions of those around us.” (Lewis 559).
For simplicity of discussion, I propose that these two rules above be subsumed under the Rule of
Reliability along the lines suggested by Lewis - by counting the methods mentioned above as normally
reliable processes and by assuming that behind our customary practices lies a normally reliable process
(Lewis 559).
A version of this example was first given by Roderick Chisholm ( Theory ofKnowledge, 2"
d
edn.,1977).
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Lottery” argues that it is just this feature of the rule that causes it to be an ineffective
defeating mechanism for the rule of Reliability. Cohen is right; as it stands, Lewis’
Rule ot Resemblance does not provide a satisfactory solution to Gettier problems. I also
argue that Mark Heller’s salience-based boundary-specific proviso, introduced in also
fails to provide a satisfactory solution to Gettier problems. While Lewis’ proviso
admits knowledge in cases it should not, Heller’s proviso does not admit knowledge in
cases that it should. Neither is a satisfactory proviso.
In the third section, I present a new proviso and rule. The defeating mechanism
for this rule does not rely on a proviso involving salience. Rather, it contains a proviso
that involves a match between the subject’s beliefs and circumstance. The new rule -
the Rule of Special Similarity - is a relative of Lewis’ Rule of Resemblance. So, the
new rule can be incorporated into a Lewis-style contextualism, and, if it is, the new view
that emerges does a better job of resolving Gettier cases.
In the fourth section, I defend the Rule of Special Similarity (ROSS) by pointing
out its problems and its promise. The new proviso is reliabilist in spirit, and so it might
inherit the problems of traditional process Reliabilism. Reliabilism has often been
touted as a promising solution to the Gettier problem, but reliabilist views are also
plagued by a serious weakness - the generality problem, as shown by Earl Conee and
Rich Feldman in “The Generality Problem for Reliabilism”. Although ROSS can avoid
the generality problem that plagues traditional reliabilist views, it retains a weakness of
all reliability-based views, namely, a remaining lack of clarity about when an
appropriately specified process is or is not reliable. There not being an analysis of the
truth-conditions for reliability claims is clearly a weakness for a rule that relies on the
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truth-conditions of such claims, but since the truth (or falsity) of appropriately specified
reliability claims seems intuitively clear and since the problems of specifying truth-
conditions are not (as is the generality problem) fundamentally intractable, the new rule
should not be rejected on these grounds. Furthermore, the new rule shows promise; it
gets the right results in many Gettier cases, as well as other related cases. ROSS may
well provide Lewis-style contextualists with a better approach to the Gettier problem.
A Proviso on Resemblance is Required
In order to understand how the Rule of Resemblance is supposed to work as a
mechanism of defeat for the Rule of Reliability, it is helpful first to understand how it
does not work. The example below illustrates one way in which the rule is not
supposed to work:
Consider possibilities pi, p2, p3 .... And suppose the following: pi is actual; p2
and p3 resemble pi in the appropriate way; p4 resembles p3 in the appropriate
way, and p5 resembles p4. No other resemblances hold. Well, pi is relevant by
the Rule of Actuality. By the Rule of Resemblance, p2 and p3 are relevant
because pi is. And p4 is relevant because p3 is, and p5 is relevant because p4 is,
etc. So, all the possibilities are relevant.
The rule is not supposed to work by including possibilities in a chain of resemblances in
which each one resembles the next. Instead, the rule should only include that cluster of
possibilities that closely resembles a possibility that itself cannot be ignored for some
independent reason. According to Lewis,
u[w]e should say that if one ...[possibility] may not properly be ignored in virtue
ofrules other than this rule , then neither may the other. Else nothing could be
properly ignored; because enough little steps of resemblance can take us from
anywhere to anywhere.)”(Lewis, 556).
In the example above, pi is relevant by the Rule of Actuality, and only p2, and p3 are
relevant by the Rule of Resemblance. But p4 and p5 get excluded because, although
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they resemble a relevant possibility
- p3 and p4 respectively, those possibilities are
relevant only by the Rule of Resemblance. This first proviso in Lewis’ Rule of
Resemblance is essential for reining in resemblance. The Rule of Special Similarity,
which I introduce later, retains this proviso; I don’t discuss it further. Instead, the
discussion centers on Lewis’ second proviso.
Lewis also explains a second way in which the Rule of Resemblance is not
supposed to work. Consider the following:
We are in an everyday situation in which S knows that P on the basis of evidence
E. E is surely a salient feature in that context because the speaker who makes
the knowledge claim and the audience who hears that claim are interested in the
subject’s evidence. By the Rule of Actuality, the actual world is relevant The
actual world and the BIV world resemble one another exactly with respect to E,
and E is salient, so by the Rule of Resemblance, the BIV world is relevant.
Lewis says, “Plainly, the Rule of Resemblance was never meant to apply to this
resemblance!”(Lewis 556). The rule is supposed to apply to salient resemblances other
than the subject’s evidence, otherwise the view would amount to an acceptance of
3
skepticism in all contexts. This feature of how the rule is not supposed to work—that
in order for resemblance to turn to relevance, another kind of salience is required -is
essential in resolving Gettier situations. Consider the sheep example again. The Rule
of Resemblance is supposed to have the result that the subject does not know that
there’s a sheep on the hill because the possibility in which there’s a sheepless hill with a
sheep-shaped rock on it can’t be properly ignored or ruled out by the subject’s evidence.
The reason that possibility can’t be ignored is that the actual possibility is relevant by
the Rule of Actuality, and the sheepless possibility saliently resembles actuality with
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respect to the sheep-shaped rock, so by the Rule of Resemblance the sheepless
possibility is relevant. Salience, properly understood, is not mere evidential
resemblance; if it were, unwanted skeptical results would emerge, since, even in
everyday circumstances, the sheep-shaped-rock-minus-sheep possibility and the actual
possibility resemble one another exactly with respect to the subject’s evidence. So, there
must be an additional reason (other than qua piece of evidence) that the sheep-shaped
rock is salient (or there must be an additional resemblance (other than the sheep-shaped
rock) between these two worlds). With this bit of background about how the rule is not
supposed to work, the essential role of the salience proviso in Lewis’ rule emerges.
Without it, skeptical scenarios are always e-relevant because they exactly resemble the
actual world with respect to evidence. Some proviso on resemblance is essential
because it allows a solution to the Gettier problem that keeps full-blown skepticism at
bay; for Lewis, that proviso is salience.
Faulty Provisos
Stewart Cohen
,
in ‘Contextualist Solutions to Epistemological Problems; Scepticism,
Gettier, and the Lottery”, concludes that, as it stands, Lewis’ Rule of Resemblance does
not solve Gettier problems:
Because ol the salience qualification, the Rule of Resemblance is speaker-
sensitive. ... This means that features of the context of ascription - facts
concerning what resemblances are salient to the speaker (and hearers) - will
determine which possibilities can not, by this rule, be properly ignored. This
aspect of the Rule of Resemblance, I shall argue, leads to a serious difficulty for
Lewis’ treatment of the Gettier problem. (Cohen 1998a, 295).
3
That the rule applies to salient features but not to the clearly salient feature of evidence makes the
application of the Rule of Resemblance ad hoc. (See Lewis 556-557).
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Cohen s point is that Lewis’ rule fails to act as an adequate defeating mechanism in
Gettier cases in which both the subject and the speaker are unaware that the subject is in
a Gettier situation. However, before reviewing Cohen’s account of why the rule fails, it
is important to see how the rule does successfully resolve many standard Gettier cases
like the one below:
S is looking at a sheep-shaped rock on a hill behind which there happens to be a
sheep. F, who is far away from S, can see that S is in a Gettier situation. F
claims that S fails to know that there’s a sheep on the hill.
In the example above, the possibility in which there is a sheep-shaped rock with a sheep
behind it is relevant because it is the actual possibility. The Rule of Resemblance makes
relevant any possibilities that saliently resemble possibilities that are relevant by some
other rule. Cohen suggests two interpretations of the appeal to ‘salience’ in the Rule of
Resemblance: speaker-salience and subject-salience. A feature of a possibility is
speaker-salient when that feature is somehow important to the speaker. A feature is
subject-salient when that feature is important to the subject. In the example above, the
sheep-shaped rock is not salient to the subject. After all, the subject is in a Gettier
situation. Had S been aware of a sheep-shaped rock, S would not be in a Gettier
situation. Since in all Gettier examples the subject is unaware of being in a Gettier
situation, subject-salience is not the kind of salience that would allow the Rule of
Resemblance to resolve Gettier problems. So, in resolving Gettier problems the kind of
salience operant in the Rule of Resemblance must be speaker-salience (see Cohen,
1998a, 295). In the example above, the sheep-shaped rock is salient for the speaker, F,
precisely because F is in a position to appreciate that S is in a Gettier situation. Because
the sheep-shaped rock-minus-sheep possibility saliently (for F) resembles the actual
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possibility (in virtue of the rock), that possibility is relevant by the Rule of
Resemblance. So in this case, the correct results follow: S fails to know there is a
sheep on the hill because the sheep-shaped-rock-minus-sheep possibility can’t be
ignored and can t be ruled out. The Rule of Resemblance ensures, via the mechanism of
speaker-salient resemblance, that the possibility in which there’s a sheep-shaped rock
but no sheep is relevant, but the Rule of Resemblance also preserves S’s knowledge
with respect to hands by ensuring that BlV-style possibilities are not relevant because
they are not saliently similar to the actual world. The Rule of Resemblance contains a
proviso — salience — that resolves many standard Gettier cases while keeping skeptical
results in check.
If all Gettier examples were like the one above, perhaps Lewis would have
solved Gettier’
s problem. But Gettier examples are a widely varied lot (as shall
become more clear in the final section of this chapter). The relevant resemblance may
easily fail to be speaker-salient, as Cohen shows in the following alternative version of
the case above:
S is in the same Gettier situation, at the bottom of a hill looking at a sheep-
shaped rock behind which there happens to be a sheep. A and B are also with S
at the bottom of the hill. Both A, B, and S think they are looking at a sheep
rather than a sheep-shaped rock. No one involved recognizes he is in a Gettier
situation. A utters to B, “S knows there’s a sheep on the hill”. (This is a
shortened version of Cohen’s example (Cohen, 1998a, 297) ).
Notice that in the very slightly modified example, the sheep-shaped rock feature is not
salient for any person in the context (S, A or B). Since none in the context even believes
there’s such a rock present (they all think it is a sheep), none finds the rock an important
feature of their surroundings. Someone might object that the rock may be salient for
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someone de re - as in, that thing-over-there-shaped-like-a-sheep is important. But this
objection won’t do. Under such a scenario, the thing-over-there-shaped-like-a-sheep
may well be salient, but it would be salient only in virtue of its status as evidence. As
we have seen, lest all contexts are skeptical ones, there must be some additional sort of
salience at work in order for the Rule of Resemblance to apply. Because the sheep-
shaped rock feature of the actual world is neither subject-salient nor speaker-salient in
the relevant way, the Rule of Resemblance cannot be used to make relevant the
possibility in which there is a sheepless hill with sheep-shaped rock. Perhaps ‘salience’
might mean something other than speaker-salience or subject-salience? Perhaps Cohen
overlooked some other, more objective, notion of salience? I think not. Because
‘salience’ roughly amounts to ‘importance’, I think it really is a psychological notion
that requires a subject. The speakers (and hearers) and subjects seem to exhaust the
possibilities for those to whom a feature might be important. So, I think that Cohen has
shown that in the very slightly modified example, the Lewis account has the result that S
knows that there’s a sheep on the hill even though S is in a Gettier situation. Such a
4
result is unsatisfactory. Cohen’s example shows that as it stands, Lewis’ account of
contextualism - in particular the Rule of Resemblance - does not give a satisfactory
solution to the Gettier problem. In a broad class of Gettier cases, the Rule of
Resemblance fails to defeat the Rule of Reliability, resulting in the Gettier subject’s
having knowledge when he should not. As a proviso on resemblance, then, salience
fails.
4
I’m not going to argue that this result is unsatisfactory; I think it is obviously so. However, as Cohen
notes, it is open to Lewis to claim that there really are different results in the different case, but I think
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Mark Heller, in Contextualism and Anti-Luck Epistemology” proposes an
alternative solution to Gettier problems:
Context, the evaluator’s context, selects a set of relevant respects of similarity
[The relevant respects of similarity will include the subject’s reasoning process
in forming the belief and an environment like the one in which he formed his
belief. (125).] The actual world.... combines with that set to select a world
ordering around the actual world. The evaluator’s context draws an approximate
boundary line between those worlds that are close enough to the actual world to
be relevant and those that are too far away. (Heller 121).
According to Heller, in everyday situations and in Gettier cases, the evaluators (speakers
and hearers) determine two things — they determine that the relevant similarity ranking
is similarity with respect to the believer’s evidence plus similarity with respect to the
believer’s circumstance, and they determine that the boundary line for relevance does
not extend very far from the actual world along that ranking. In everyday situations,
knowledge is preserved because the BlV-world is outside the e-relevance boundary set
by the interests/attentions of the speakers and hearers; the BlV-world is, though exactly
similar with respect to evidence, distal with respect to believer’s circumstance
(presuming the actual world is not a BlV-world). BlV-worlds become e-relevant only
when those involved - the subject or the speakers and hearers - attend to the possibility
and, in so doing, extend the boundary line of relevance. But in the Gettier case,
knowledge is not preserved because the sheep-shaped-rock-minus-sheep-world, though
not necessarily salient itself, is within the e-relevance boundary set by the
interests/attentions of the speakers and hearers; the sheep-shaped-rock-minus-sheep-
world is exactly similar with respect to evidence and -- since the subject is in a Gettier
circumstance — very similar with respect to the believer’s circumstance. Heller’s
there are good reasons to reject this response. Cohen gives some. (Cohen 1998a, 298).
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account, then, includes a boundary-specific proviso on resemblance that is salience-
based. Possibilities become relevant because of resemblance (to an already relevant
possibility), even mere evidential resemblance, but only if the resembling possibility lies
within a boundary set by the conversational participants on the basis of salience.
Heller’s boundary-specific proviso seems to get Gettier cases right while
warding off skeptical results in everyday situations. However, Heller's account fails to
keep skeptical results appropriately in check. Suppose that the topic of conversation is
handedness, and the conversants take seriously the possibility that S might be a non-
handed Architeuthis (giant squid); they take it seriously, but they think that that
possibility is eliminated by S’s evidence. Possibilities in which S is a non-handed
Architeuthis are e-relevant but ruled out, since there are no (relevant) possibilities in
which E is true and in which S is a non-handed Architeuthis. But the inclusion of the
Architeuthis possibility means that the relevance boundary is distal along the similarity
ranking. So on Heller’s account, even in an everyday sort of conversation, S does not
know that S has hands (rather than tentacles). Because the boundary line for relevance
is so distal along the similarity ranking, skeptical possibilities surely get included; a
world in which S is handless and dreaming is surely closer to the actual world with
respect to the subject’s evidence and circumstance than one in which S is a handless
6
Architeuthis. On Heller’s view, then, unwanted skeptical results infect the solution to
' I’m just granting here that Heller’s two-part similarity requirement is unproblematic. See
Conee/Feldman for a discussion of why it might not be unproblematic (Conee/Feldman 23).
6
1 learned of this kind of objection in Jonathan Schaffer’s epistemology seminar. This sort of example
was discussed as an objection to standards views.
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Gettier problems. Heller’s boundary-specific proviso on resemblance also fails to
generate a successful solution to Gettier s problem; it fails to rein in resemblance.
A New Rule
To rein in resemblance, some sort of proviso seems essential to any rule that
includes possibilities as e-relevant based on similarity to an already included possibility.
However, neither Lewis’ salience proviso nor Heller’s boundary-specific proviso can
resolve Gettier cases while keeping unwanted skeptical results at bay. On any
reasonable interpretation of Lewis’ salience proviso, its inclusion leads, in some cases,
to the subject’s having knowledge in Gettier cases when he should not. The inclusion of
Heller’s boundary-specific-proviso leads, in some cases, to the subject’s not having
knowledge in everyday situations when he should. So, a new proviso is needed - one in
which the trigger for inclusion of possibilities on the basis of similarity is independent
of what either the subject or the speakers and hearers take to be salient. I propose a
new rule in which the proviso for the inclusion of additional possibilities is an objective
feature of an already included world - a feature of the world that does not depend on the
awareness or focus of either the speaker or the subject, nor does it depend on what either
takes to be salient. In the new rule, loosely speaking, the proviso on inclusion based on
resemblance is a mis-match between the subject’s belief system and his circumstance in
an already e-relevant possibility. I call the revised rule the Rule of Special Similarity,
ROSS for short:
When considering whether subject S knows that P in context c, the Rule of
Special Similarity applies:
Rule of Special Similarity : For any possibilities p and q, and proposition Q,
if p is relevant in c in virtue of some rule other than ROSS ,
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and p is a possibility in which Q is a false belief or presupposition that
figures prominently in the formation of S’s belief that P,
then if q is appropriately similar to p -doxastically indiscernible fromp
with respect to S, exactly similar to p in that Q is also false at q, and is
otherwise very similar to p with respect to S’s circumstance
- q is also
e-relevant in c (that is, q cannot be ignored in c).
ROSS retains Lewis’ first proviso - that additional possibilities get included as e-
relevant only if the appropriate constraints apply to possibilities included by some rule
other than ROSS. But ROSS does not retain Lewis’ second proviso: Under the Rule of
Resemblance, the crux of the solution to Gettier problems is salience, but under ROSS,
the crux of the solution is a failure of a critical sort in the formation of S’s P-belief.
ROSS, then, avoids the problem with Lewis’ salience proviso; because ROSS does not
require the speakers, hearers, or subject to find some feature of the subject’s
circumstance salient, ROSS has the result that the subject does not have knowledge in
Gettier cases - even ones in which neither the speakers, hearers, nor subject recognize
that the subject is in a Gettier situation. Like Heller’s account, ROSS, is minimally
contextualist, because the only way that salience or attention (subject or speaker) affects
the inclusion of additional possibilities is through initial inclusion of a salient or
attended to possibility via some rule other than ROSS. But unlike Heller’s view, what
triggers the inclusion of additional possibilities on the basis of similarity is not inclusion
in a salience boundary. Rather, what triggers the inclusion of additional possibilities is
that an already included possibility, there is a false belief or an assumption that figures
prominently in the formation of the subject’s P-belief. ROSS, then, avoids the problems
of Heller’s boundary-specific proviso; because ROSS does not require that all
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possibilities within a salience boundary are relevant, it does not have the result that
skeptical results infect everyday cases - even cases in which the topic is outlandish.
As the discussion progresses, the details of ROSS should become more clear, but first, I
give a brief account of how the new proviso works to resolve very basic Gettier cases. I
discuss two Gettier cases. Since I think Gettier cases come in two strains, I discuss a
paradigm of each type:
Sheep: Consider again the standard Gettier situation involving sheep. Does the
subject in that example know that there’s a sheep on the hill? No. The actual world is
relevant by the Rule of Actuality. In the actual world, there is a false belief that figures
prominently in the formation of the belief that there’s a sheep on the hill. If asked his
reasons for believing that there’s a sheep on the hill, the subject would readily invoke
such a belief, which he might express in one of the following ways:
‘That thing right there is a sheep.’
‘I’m looking at it.’
‘The thing in my visual field is a sheep.’
‘I’m perceiving a sheep.’
‘I’m seeing a sheep.’
The subject looks at/perceives/sees a rock, not a sheep. Likewise, the thing right there-
the thing in the subject’s field of vision - is a rock, not a sheep. The sheep-shaped
rock-minus-sheep possibility is doxastically indiscernible from the actual world with
respect to S, and that possibility is also very similar to the actual world with respect to
S’s circumstance (because of the sheep-shaped rock). And finally, the sheepless
possibility is exactly similar to the actual world in that it is false that S is looking
at/perceiving/seeing a sheep. So, by ROSS, the sheepless possibility is relevant. The
subject in the Gettier sheep example does not know that there’s a sheep on the hill
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because there is an unelimmated (not ruled out), unignored (relevant) possibility in
which that proposition is not true, namely, the sheepless possibility. ROSS seems to get
this case right, and in so-doing it does not leave resemblance unrestrained. While the
subject in the sheep example does not know that there is a sheep on the hill, the subject
does know that he has hands; although a BIV possibility is doxastically indiscernible
with respect to S’s evidence and with respect to the subject’s not looking at a sheep, the
BIV world is not otherwise very similar to the actual world with respect to S’s
circumstance. While S s false belief at the actual world resolves this Gettier problem by
triggering the inclusion of additional worlds, appropriate similarity keeps resemblance.
and thus unwanted skeptical results, in check.
7
Barns: In this barn example, unbeknownst to the subject, S is in an area in
which there are both barn fa9ades and real barns. No one mentions fake barns. The
subject is standing in front of a real barn. (Importantly, this is a different barn example
from the one considered in the previous chapter. In the earlier example, there are no
actual fake bams, only mention of the fact that there might be such structures. In the
present example, the subject is in a land rife with bam fa9ades, but no one mentions it
(or is aware of it). The earlier example is a skeptical problem; the latter is not - it’s a
Gettier problem.) In the example above, does S know that S is standing in front of a
bam? No. Again, the actual world is always relevant. And again, there is something
false that figures prominently in the subject’s formation of the belief that S is standing
in front of a barn. But in this case, unlike in the sheep case, the “something” is a
7
This example comes from Alvin Goldman, “Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge” in The Journal
ofPhilosophy 73, 1976.
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presupposition. Unlike the belief in the sheep case, the subject might not have this
assumption “on his mind”, nor need it be the case that S would, if asked, be able to state
explicitly the particular false assumption he makes. As in the case with most beliefs,
there are many presuppositions that remain “in the background”. Nevertheless, several
of those background assumptions may well figure prominently in the formation of the
subject’s P-belief. In the barn case, one of the assumptions that figures prominently in
the formation of the subject s barn belief is false. The false proposition might be:
If it looks like a real bam, it is.
If it appears to me to be a real bam, it is.
If my perceptual mechanisms indicate a real barn, they are correct.
My barn indicating system is reliable.
Each assumption is false; many of the bam facades look/appear/are perceived just like
real barns, though they are not. The possibility in which the subject is standing in front
of a fa9ade and not a barn is doxastically indiscernible from the actual possibility from
the point of view of the subject; it is exactly like the actual possibility in that at the
fa9ade possibility the assumption is false; and it is otherwise very similar to the actual
possibility with respect to the believer’s circumstance. So, by ROSS, the fa9ade
possibility is relevant. It is an e-relevant (unignored), not ruled out (uneliminated)
possibility in which it is false that P, so the subject does not know that he is standing in
front of a barn. And, as in the sheep case and for similar reasons, S in the bam case also
knows he has hands.
I’ve said that Gettier problems come in two strains. Their coming in two strains
adds credence to the rule’s disjunctive nature. In Gettier cases of the first kind, of which
the sheep case is a paradigm, the subject would, if asked, list the relevant false
65
proposition as one of his beliefs; the subject is aware of having that belief. In cases of
the first type, the false belief is generally not about the reliability of a process. In the
sheep case, the subject mistakenly identifies a rock as a sheep, but one mistake does not
unreliability make. The subject’s sheep-identification may still be reliable, just not
infallible. On the other hand, in Gettier cases of the second kind, of which the barn case
is a paradigm, the subject has the relevant false belief, but it is a “background belief’ -
an assumption the subject makes (and would acknowledge having if it is mentioned) but
would not necessarily cite if simply asked. That is, the subject clearly holds the belief,
but might not be aware of having it. In cases of the second type, the false assumption
8
does involve a reliability claim.
The new rule, ROSS, deserves further explanation, but at first glance, it appears
to resolve two strains of Gettier cases without yielding unwanted skeptical results.
ROSS is not without problems, but I think there is something right about this approach
that deserves attention. In the following section, I discuss its messiness and its merits,
its problems and its promise. Each of these discussions should serve to further clarify
ROSS and its new proviso on resemblance.
I think all of the standard Gettier cases fall within one paradigm or the other, but it is not hard to imagine
a gradation of cases that begins in one paradigm and ends in the other. Start with the standard sheep case.
Obviously, this case fits the first paradigm. Add one more sheep-shaped rock. Continue describing the
case, each time add one more sheep-shaped rock. When you’ve got a case in which there is a whole
village, say, filled with sheep-shaped rocks, then you’ve got a case that now fits the other paradigm.
Where does one kind of case start and the other stop? I don’t think it is clear, just as I don’t think that it
entirely clear how many actual mistakes it takes to make a system unreliable. (Notice that counting
counterfactual mistakes would make sheep identification unreliable in even an everyday case, so I don’t
think that’s the way to go.) It’s being unclear where one kind of case stops and the other kind starts does
not mean there are not two kinds of cases. Additionally, it should be clear that whichever kind a case is,
this disjunctive rule resolves it.
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Its Problems and Its Promise
Messy: ‘Figures prominently in the formation of is downright fuzzy, but I think
I can make it a bit more clear, in part by distinguishing it from what it is not, and in part
by offering a rough account of what it is. A belief -Q- might figure prominently in the
formation of subject S’s belief that P, even though Q is not justification for or evidence
9
for P. Suppose that Q is that my sense perception is reliable and that S, who has never
taken a philosophy class, simply looks at the tree in front of her and comes to believe
that that 's a tree. S’s evidence includes her sense perception as of a tree; it does not
include a presupposition about the reliability of perception in general. S, if asked for
justification of her tree belief, would offer her sense perception, not a presupposition
about perceptual reliability. Though beliefs that are evidence or justification for P
figure prominently in the formation of the belief that P, a belief or presupposition that
figures prominently in the formation of the belief that P need not be evidence for or
justification for P.
Loosely speaking, a belief or presupposition -Q- figures prominently in the
formation of S’s belief that P when, if presented with a list of propositions and asked to
identify those on the basis of which S came to believe that P, (an ideally rational) S
would check Q. In the tree example, while S would not, if asked, cite Q as support for
P, S would, if Q were on a list, recognize her reliance on Q as support for P. So, Q
figures prominently in the formation of S’s tree belief. In the tree example, Q is a
background presupposition. But Q might also be a belief—in particular, Q might be a
9
For Lewis (1996, 553), S might have evidence E even though S does not believe E. I don’t accept this
account of evidence. See Chapter 5 for further discussion.
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belief that supports S’s justification for P. In this case, Q might figure prominently in
the formation of S’s belief that P, not because Q is in the background as a
presupposition, but because Q, though is slightly removed from directly justifying P,
still occupies a significant place in the belief-forming chain that results in S’s P-belief.
While S’s justification supports P directly, Q may “figure prominently” by supporting
S’s justification. So, in the long belief-forming chain that is part of any belief-forming
process, temporal closeness generally (though not always) matters and remoteness or
nearness along the chain generally matters. Presumably, such proximity will be
reflected by S’s checking on the hypothetical list; S will check those propositions that
are “close enough” and omit those that, though supportive of P, are too distal.
So, if Q is part of S’s evidence for P, if Q justifies P (for S), if Q is a significant
“background presupposition” S holds in forming P, or ifQ is “proximate” in S’s belief-
forming chain for P, then Q figures prominently in the formation of S’s P-belief.
Loosely put, if in a hypothetical list of propositions, S would check Q as a proposition
on which S’s P-belief depends, then Q figures prominently in the formation of S’s belief
that P. What it means for a belief or presupposition to “figure prominently in the
formation of a subject’s belief that P” should at least now be intuitively clear, although
the notion remains philosophically woolly.
Inherited Problems: In many Gettier examples, I claim that the relevant false
proposition that figures prominently in the subject’s formation of the belief that P is a
background presupposition about reliability. So, my solution is decidedly reliabilist in
spirit and may inherit some of the problems inherent in traditional reliabilist accounts.
68
In The Generality Problem for Reliabilism,” Earl Conee and Rich Feldman
argue that traditional (process) reliabilist accounts are subject to an intractable problem
- the generality problem. Conee and Feldman characterize the central idea of process
reliabilism as follows:
A belief is justified if and only if it is produced by a process that reliably leads to
true beliefs (Conee/Feldman 1).
The generality problem begins with the need for typing. For any one instance of belief-
formation, there is exactly one sequence of concrete events that leads to the formation of
that belief, but since claims about reliability clearly do not apply to a particular sequence
of events, the reliability claim must apply to a type of process of which that particular
sequence is a token. In brief, the problem is that there are many, many different process
types of which the particular sequence is a token; these various process types vary
widely with respect to their status as reliable; and there is no principled way to pick out
which among the many process-types is the one type that is the “relevant type” in the
production of the belief (Conee/Feldman 1-3).
A principle like ROSS, centered around presumptions about reliability in belief-
formation, would seem to suffer from the same problem. Consider an average, everyday
case in which, based on seeing a barn-shaped image, a subject forms the belief that
there’s a barn in the distance. That subject makes a presupposition about reliability. Like
the typing of a process, we might variously characterize the subject’s presupposition
about reliability with any one of the following propositions:
a) My perception is reliable.
b) My visual system as a whole is reliable.
c) My perception of large-sized objects is reliable.
d) My perception of mid-sized buildings is reliable.
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e) My visual perception of barns and houses is reliable.
f) My barn-indicating system is reliable
g) My perception of bams is reliable.
h) My perception of barn-door handles is reliable.
i) My perception of bams every other day between 12 and 2 is reliable
j) My perception of ‘/2 of the bam and V2 the house is reliable.
k) My perception of some bams and one house is reliable.
It seems that the subject might presuppose any of these propositions in forming his barn
belief. However, these assumptions are a widely varying lot with respect to reliability
and there seems no principled way to choose which of the many ways of characterizing
the subject s presupposition is the relevant way with respect to reliability. In
particular, the subject himselt will likely not be helpful in identifying exactly one of
these presumptions as the proposition used in the formation of his bam belief. The
presuppositions are likely a blur of background ’ information to which he does not
attend. The generality problem for presuppositions about reliability seems parallel to
the generality problem for process reliabilism.
Turning to ROSS, as long as none of the presuppositions is false, the issue of
generality will not be a problem; according to ROSS, the subject is free to make as
many true presuppositions about reliability as he likes without triggering the addition of
newly e-relevant possibilities. At no point does the theory require adjudication among
true presuppositions. But if one or more of the presuppositions S makes is false, it
seems to matter. For example, if the one and only fundamental presupposition is (a) and
(a) is false, then ROSS yields the result that the subject does not know he has hands,
because all sorts of possibilities in which perception is unreliable would get counted as
10
Essentially, the same arguments against ways of determining which is the relevant process also apply to
ways of determining which is the relevant assumption. (Conee/Feldman 4-24).
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relevant, including worlds in which S is handless and hallucinating. On the other hand,
it the one and only fundamental presupposition is (e) and (e) is false, then ROSS yields
the result that the subject retains his knowledge of hands and houses, since no
possibilities in which hand/house perceptual reliability fails are e-relevant. So if one or
more of the presuppositions the subject makes is false, there seems to be a problem of
generality because there seems no principled way to adjudicate between the possible
presuppositions. The generality problem seems to remain.
Though at first glance ROSS seems to inherit the generality problem from its
reliabilist cousin, I think with a better understanding of ROSS and the acceptance of a
few reasonable stipulations, ROSS can avoid the generality problem.
I’ll begin with a few reasonable stipulations and then return to a clarification of
ROSS:
Claim 1: Presuppositions about reliability are natural.'
Claim 2: One presupposition can subsume another. If one presupposition subsumes
another, then if S presupposes the former, S presupposes the latter.
Claim 3: A reliability presupposition that subsumes a false reliability assumption need
•
12
not itself be false; it may be either true or undetermined.
Consider the bam case, but this time let’s again suppose that the subject is in an area of
upstate New York in which there is a preponderance of barn fagades. Claim 1 allows
for the reasonable rejection of presuppositions (i) - (k) simply because they are non-
Feldman and Conee discuss naturalness and the generality problem. As a solution to the generality
problem for reliabilists it fails, though it can narrow the scope of the problem to some small degree.
Obviously, some account of naturalness is needed, but obviously I’m not giving one here.
12
1 think it is probably undetermined if “enough” parts of it are false, but this is another topic. How the
question of true vs. undetermined gets resolved is not relevant here, though it is relevant to the general
project of giving truth conditions for reliability claims.
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natural; since in characterizing S’s belief formation, we in part characterize S’s
psychological process, it seems fair to place a naturalness restriction on such
characterizations. In the hypothetical list of propositions that S would mark as figuring
prominently in the formation of S’s P-belief, non-natural propositions won’t appear.
One pretty clear way that one presupposition about reliability can subsume
another is when the former has a higher “level of generality”. (Conee/Feldman’s term;
Conee/Feldman 8). In the list above, (a) subsumes (b)
-(h), as well as many unlisted
presuppositions, such as that my bam door indicating system is reliable. Returning
again to the hypothetical list presented to S, according to Claim 2, if S checks off (a) as
a presupposition that figures prominently in S’s bam belief, then S also presupposes the
subsumed presuppositions as well. So, in the bam case under current consideration, the
subject probably makes jots of presuppositions about reliability. (Of course, remember
that only those that are false will trigger the addition of e-relevant possibilities). I said
earlier that the subject would likely not be helpful in picking from the hypothetical list
the one proposition that figures prominently is forming his P-belief, but what now
seems clear is that by using the subject’s picks from the hypothetical list together with
Claims 1 and 2, we can generate the correct list of propositions (beliefs and
presuppositions) that figure prominently in the formation of S’s P-belief.
Though I’ll have more to say about the truth conditions for reliability claims
shortly, I here just want to make the point that Claim 3 is pretty reasonable. Consider
(a) and (f); (a) subsumes (f). According to Claim 3, even if (f)’s value is false, (a)’s
value need not be false. That (a) is true seems reasonable in part because the vast
majority of S’s perceptions do seem reliable; in the situation described, S’s visual
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perceptions as ot hands, cars, people, animals, etc. remain reliable as do all sorts of
other types of perception including sound, touch, smell, and taste. That (f) is false also
seems reasonable given S’s circumstance (S is in a region with lots of bam fa9ades).
Though (a) subsumes (f), (a)’s truth is not undermined by the presence of fake barns
even though (f)’s is.
I now return to a clarification of ROSS. Recall that the generality problem
seems to occur for ROSS only if, like process reliabilism, it requires the selection of one
assumption among many as the one presupposition used by the subject. But no such
selection is required. No selection is required among true or undetermined assumptions
(the subject is entitled to assume as many true ones as he likes). Such presuppositions
now include claims (a)-(e). Nor does ROSS require the selection of one of the
remaining false presuppositions, as earlier appeared to be the case. Every
presupposition that is false should count. If in the actual world some subject, S, falsely
presupposes both (a) and (f), and both presuppositions figure prominently in the
formation of S’s P-belief, then possibilities in which (a) is false become e-relevant and
possibilities in which (f) is false become e-relevant (provided, of course, that these
possibilities are also otherwise appropriately similar to the actual world). ROSS claims
that if in a possibility made e-relevant by some other rule, S, in forming the P-belief,
significantly relies on any false belief, then other possibilities that are similar to the
already included world with respect to that false belief or presupposition also get added
as e-relevant (provided, of course, that they are otherwise appropriately similar). As a
result, the e-relevant set of possibilities that ROSS generates will always be the more
inclusive set with respect to the false presuppositions. Despite initial appearances, no
73
generality problem need occur for ROSS. Plus, the resulting e-relevant possibility-set
seems to be just right in the barn case - knowledge of hands and houses is retained,
while knowledge of bams and bam doors is not.
Even if ROSS does not suffer from the generality problem, it does inherit one
problem from its reliabilist cousin. Conee and Feldman make the following point
against process reliabilism: “A second necessary task for process reliabilists is to
specify which situations of a process type’s operation determine whether or not the type
is reliable”(Conee/Feldman 3). That is, the process reliabilist must explain in virtue of
what a given process is reliable. The comparable point for ROSS is this: there are no
clear truth conditions for reliability claims (presuppositions). For example, it is not clear
which features of the process count in determining its reliableness. Nor is it clear how
statistical information affects truth, etc. (Notice that above, I basically just make claims
about the truth or falsity of a reliability assumption based on intuition.) Though truth
conditions for reliability claims are not clear, there are several areas in which progress
can be made:
1) Circumstance matters. The truth-value of a claim about reliability may vary
with the subject’s circumstance. For instance, if an amateur birder finds
himself in the North America and not near a large body of water, then he
can truly presuppose that if he sees a large white-headed bird, it’s an
Eagle. But if that same birder strays toward a large body of water, that
assumption is no longer true; he may be seeing an osprey. Or, a process
that is generally reliable (say, identifying a barn by its visual appearance)
may fail to be locally reliable (say, because the local presence of lots of
barn fa9ades undermines the reliability of that process in that area).
Truth-values for presuppositions about reliability vary across locales or
situations; the process is reliable “here” but not “there” or “generally”
but not “locally”. But how far “out” is “here” (if barn-perception fails in
Greenwich, can it be truthfully assumed reliable again by Darien or not
until Massachusetts)? And when does local failure undermine a more
generalized reliability presupposition (how does barn-perception failure
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locally affect the truth of presuppositions about bam perception (or just
plain perception) in general?
2) Size matters (statistically speaking). Statistics are important in
determining the truth conditions for reliability. In order for it to be true
that a process is generally reliable, there must in general be a statistically
very high correlation of the (actual) predicted outcome to the (actual)
presence of that outcome. But how highly correlated do the results need
to be? Clearly not 100%. I think that one or two “incorrect” results do
not make a generally reliable process unreliable. For example, ifmy
long-distance vision of sheep is working well in general, but I once
mistake a sheep-shaped rock for a sheep, then I think that my sheep
identifying process remains reliable. However, if I find myself in an area
riddled with sheep-shaped rocks, then that process is no longer locally
leliable (perhaps because the process theoretical underpinnings are no
longer true or perhaps because counterfactual statistical results somehow
1
3
become relevant). So the question remains, how many “incorrect”
results does it take to undermine the reliability of a process locally?
Generally? And how
-if at all—do counterfactual results get counted?
3) Process matters. The nature of the process itself is important in
determining its reliability. Very good statistical results are necessary but
not sufficient for reliability. As Conee and Feldman mention, a good
account of reliability will not “render irrelevant the details of the process
intervening between an input and a resulting output” (Conee/Feldman
1 5). The nature of the process counts, lest repeated instances of “dumb
luck” amount to a reliable process. A reliable process might be reliable in
virtue of having the appropriate sort of underlying causal mechanism or
theory. For example, determining the time by looking at a clock is a
reliable process only if (in general) the time-telling mechanisms on
clocks work. And identifying sheep or bams by a list of visual criteria is
reliable only if (in general) those criteria only apply to sheep or bams
(respectively). So a process that is generally reliable might be locally
unreliable even though there is 100% statistical correlation between
prediction and outcome if there is a local “breakdown” in an underlying
causal mechanism or theory that is critical to the reliability of the
process. But what features of the mechanism, precisely, are the ones that
count?
With each area in which some clarification can be made, much more clarification is
needed; the truth conditions for reliability claims remain somewhat opaque.
13
Adding counterfactual results as a condition on reliability strikes me as a sure way toward getting the
result that our common, everyday, perception is unreliable. If, in the sheep case, the subject’s sheep-
identifying process is unreliable because it is counterfactually true that S can’t tell a sheep from a sheep-
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Nevertheless, I hope the points above make two things clear: This very useful notion
(reliability) is not a bankrupt” or “empty” one, so, while at present we will have to rely
on intuition in determining the truth-conditions for reliability claims, the problem of
producing appropriate truth conditions for such claims does not seem entirely
intractable.
I ve argued that if Claims 1-3 are accepted, the generality problem is not a
problem for ROSS. And I’ve indicated that the notion of reliability is a useful notion
that seems to have some clear meaning, though an account of that meaning is far from
clear. Unlike the generality problem, resolving the truth conditions for reliability does
14
not seem intractable. The problems ROSS inherits from its reliabilist cousin are
problematic, not damning.
It’s Promise
Claiming that ROSS doesn’t have severe problems is hardly an argument for its
adoption. However, illustrating how ROSS can solve a wide array of Gettier problems is
such an argument. I’ve already said that ROSS resolves the basic sheep case and the
bam facade case without generating whole-scale skeptical results. And I’ve already said
that ROSS does not yield unwanted skeptical results in everyday cases even those in
which the topic is outlandish, such as whether or not the subject knows he is not an
shaped rock, then the same seems to hold for a doxastically similar subject who is not in a Gettier
situation.
14
Suppose you reject what I’ve just said about ROSS’s avoidance of the generality problem and the hope
of giving a satisfying account of reliability. You needn’t reject ROSS. A) Virtually anytime particular
tokens (acts, intentions) can be multiply typed and a choice of type must be made, some relative of the
generality problem occurs. Generality -type problems abound in philosophy and are often ignored. B)
Whatever problems there are with the notion of reliability, Lewis already has them. Obviously the Rule of
Reliability makes use of assumptions about reliability. So, ROSS doesn’t worsen that problem.
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Auhiteuthis. I 11 now illustrate how ROSS resolves a range of Gettier cases. In so
doing, I assume a basic familiarity with the cases themselves.
15
Clocks: The subject looks at a broken clock, which happens to be stopped at
the correct time - 5:00. Does the subject know what time it is? No. This case can be
resolved in either of two ways; whether this case is a Sheep-type case or a Barn-type
case depends on the subject’s actual belief forming process. It might be that like the
Sheep case, in the actual world, the subject has a false belief, namely, that the clock
works. Alternatively, it might be that like the Bam case, in the actual world, the subject
might have a false presupposition that this clock is reliable (it’s not because process
matters). Either way, a false belief or presupposition figures prominently in the
formation of the belief that the time is 5:00. This false belief/presupposition triggers the
inclusion of similar worlds in which that belief/presupposition is also false. Because a
world in which the clock is broken but stopped at 5:20 is included in the e-relevant set
and is uneliminated by the subject’s evidence, the subject does not know that the time is
5:00.
16
Coins: In the first of Gettier’s original cases, Smith has a false belief that
figures prominently in the formation of his belief, namely, that Jones will get the job
,
and that Jones has ten coins in his pocket. The actual possibility is e-relevant by the
Rule of Actuality. Because in the actual possibility Smith has a false belief that figures
prominently in his belief that the man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket,
' The original clock example is Bertrand Russell’s. It appears in Human Knowledge: Its Scope and
Limits, 1948.
16
Both this and the following case are from Gettier’s “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?” (Analysis 23,
121-123).
77
additional possibilities become relevant. In particular, the possibility in which Smith
gets the job but has five coins in his pocket becomes e-relevant; it is a possibility that is
similar to the actual possibility in that ‘Jones will get the job, and Jones has ten coins in
his pocket is false at both worlds, it is doxastically indiscernible from the actual world
with respect to Smith, and it is otherwise very similar to actuality (only the number of
coins in Smith’s pocket changes). So, Smith does not know that the man who will get
the job has ten coins in his pocket because there is an e-relevant possibility that is not
ruled out by Smith’s evidence and in which the proposition is false.
Fords: In the second of Gettier’s original cases, Smith, the subject in the actual
possibility, has a false belief, namely, that Jones owns a Ford. That belief figures
prominently in his belief that either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Brest-Litovsk.
This makes relevant a possibility in which Jones does not own a Ford and Brown is not
in Brest-Litovsk. Such a world, call it q, is e-relevant because the actual possibility is e-
relevant by the Rule of Actuality, and in that possibility Smith has a false belief that
figures prominently in the formation of his belief that either Jones owns a Ford or
Brown is in Brest-Litovsk and because q is similar to the actual world with respect to
the false belief (in both possibilities it is false that Jones owns a Ford), q is doxastically
indiscernible with respect to Smith, and q is otherwise very similar to the actual world
(only Brown’s location changes). So, Smith does not know that Jones owns a Ford or
Brown is in Brest-Litovsk because there is an e-relevant (unignored) possibility that is
not ruled out by Smith’s evidence and in which that proposition is false.
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Hallucinogens: Lewis views this case as a Gettier problem. He gives the
following description of and resolution of the problem:
Sometimes, though, the possibility of hallucination is not properly ignored; for
sometimes we really do hallucinate. The Rule of Reliability may be defeated by
the Rule of Actuality. Or it may be defeated by the Rules of Actuality and of
Resemblance working together, in a Gettier problem: if I am not hallucinating,
but unbeknownst to me I live in a world where people mostly do hallucinate and
I myself have only narrowly escaped, then the uneliminated possibility of
hallucination is too close to actuality to be properly ignored. (Lewis 558).
First, it is unclear how the Rule of Resemblance could consistently yield this result. If
both speakers and subject are members of the hallucination world, then none of them is
aware that anyone is hallucinating. So neither the subject nor the speakers would find
the resemblance salient. The salience proviso on the Rule of Resemblance can cause a
breakdown in the Lewis solution in this case, just as it can in Cohen’s version of the
sheep example. ROSS eliminates this problem, while still leaving open this Lewis-style
account of and resolution to the hallucination case:
Unbeknownst to the subject, he lives in a world where everyone else hallucinates
wildly. In the subject’s actual world, visual perception in general is not reliable.
So even though the subject does not hallucinate, the Rule of Special Similarity
guarantees that he is not entitled to presuppose that visual perception is reliable;
that rule makes relevant a possibility in which the subject’s visual perception is
just like that of the rest of his world-mates.
This way of looking at the case makes it a barn-type case. I am not sure what I think
about this case. It seems to me there is another way of looking at it according to which
the subject does know things via perception. After all, his own perception works
perfectly well and in the customary way. Plus, unlike the barn case there is nothing
about his world or his surroundings that undermines this method. So, on the other way
17
The original version of the hallucination case is from Lewis, “Veridical Hallucination and Prosthetic
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of looking at the problem, it is not a Gettier problem. The Rule of Special Similarity
can accommodate this way of looking at the example as well:
Unbeknownst to the subject, he lives in a world where everyone else hallucinates
wildly. In the subject's actual world, visual perception in general is not normally
broadly reliable. However, the subject’s own visual perceptual system is
normally and currently fully reliable. Though others in his world have no
knowledge, the subject does. Since in the subject’s actual world his own visual
system is perfectly reliable, condition (b) in the Rule of Special Similarity is not
met. So the possibility in which he, too, is hallucinating is not relevant.'
8
On this way of looking at the case, the subject (and only the subject) knows the usual
things via visual perception.
Since I have conflicting intuitions about this case, I think it is an advantage of
the Rule of Special Similarity that it can accommodate both intuitions about this case.
Lotteries: Lewis treats lottery problems like Gettier problems; both are
resolved by the Rule of Resemblance:
It is the Rule of Resemblance that explains why you do not know that you will
lose the lottery, no matter what the odds are against you and no matter how sure
you should therefore be that you will lose. For every ticket, there is a possibility
that it will win. These possibilities are saliently similar to one another: so either
one of them may properly be ignored, or else none may. But one of them may
not properly be ignored: the one that actually obtains. (Lewis 557).
The Rule of Resemblance does seem to resolve the lottery case above. ROSS, on the
other hand, cannot resolve lottery problems; in the actual possibility (and in other
already e-relevant possibilities) there is no false belief or assumption that acts as a
trigger for the inclusion of additional possibilities (specifically the one in which “you
win”). Is this a disadvantage of ROSS? I think not. The reason I don’t think it is a
Vision,” Australasian Journal ofPhilosophy 58, 1980.
1
8
Remember that in this way of looking at the case, those in the world are not attending to any
possibilities involving hallucination. But |f we here in our world attend to it, then we can’t attribute
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disadvantage is that, like Cohen, I don’t think lottery cases are a special variety of
Gettier problem.'
9
Stewart Cohen has this to say: “...I will take issue with
...[Lewis’]
assimilation of the Gettier problem to the lottery problem.
...I argue that the lottery
problem is of a piece with scepticism, not the Gettier problem” (Cohen 1998a, 292)
Since I think lottery cases are of the same ilk as skeptical problems, I count ROSS’s
failure to resolve lottery cases not as a disadvantage but as an advantage.
I think the Rule of Attention resolves lottery cases and does so in a way that is
more satisfactory than the resolution offered by Lewis’ Rule of Resemblance. Suppose
Janet buys a ticket in a numbers lottery. Then Janet focuses on the lottery - a set of
possible outcomes of number distribution. If Janet buys a lottery ticket, Janet ipso facto
focuses on the possibility that she will win; she focuses on it qua a member of a set
number outcomes {qua ways the lottery may go, not necessarily qua winning ticket for
Janet). I say that Janet does not know she will lose because in focussing on or attending
to the lottery, she attends to the possibility that she will win. Similar remarks apply to
speakers and hearers who discuss Janet’s lottery knowledge. Such speakers and hearers
are talking about a lottery, a set of possible outcomes. They may think Janet has
virtually no chance of winning, but they can’t ignore this possibility when they consider
the lottery as a set of possible outcomes, one of which is that Janet wins.
knowledge to the subject because we are attending to the possibility that he might be hallucinating, but
that is a different case. It becomes a skeptical case, not a Gettier case.
19
I don’t give an argument for this claim. However, I think that one mark of a Gettier case is that the
subject relies on a false belief or presupposition in forming S’s P-belief, and I don’t think the subjects in
lottery cases do this.
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Nor is the solution to the poor Bill version of the lottery problem lost.
Assimilating lottery problems with skeptical problems rather than Gettier problems
allows what Lewis says about the poor Bill case to remain basically intact:
Pity poor Bill! - He squanders all his spare cash on the pokies, the races, and the
lottery. He’ll be a wage slave all his days. We know he’ll never be rich. ...When
we are busy pitying poor Bill for his habits and not his luck, the resemblance of
the many possibilities was not so salient....Afterward, I switched the context. I
mentioned the possibility that Bill might win, wherefore that possibility was no
longer properly ignored. (Lewis 565).
It is the salience proviso in Lewis’ original Rule of Resemblance allows him to get
plausible results in the poor Bill case, and it is just this feature of the case that allows
roughly the same solution to emerge using the Rule of Attention. At first, the speakers
and hearers know Bill will be poor; they focus on Bill’s irresponsible financial behavior,
not on the lottery. (They may mention but not attend to this feature of Bill’s financial
behavior.) If, however, they focus on the lottery behavior itself, then they don’t know
that Bill will be poor. (Cohen makes the same point (Cohen 1998a, 298)).
So far, both Lewis’ resolution, using the Rule of Resemblance, and the
resolution I favor, using the Rule of Attention, seem on a par. That is, they both resolve
basic lottery cases and poor-Bill-type lottery cases. But I think there is an advantage to
the latter approach. Solving basic lottery problems with the Rule of Resemblance
generates a problem for our knowledge of many statistical laws, such as the Second Law
of Thermodynamics, which we commonly take ourselves to know. Notice that the
following application of the Rule of Resemblance is parallel to Lewis’ application of it
to the basic Lottery case (see the beginning of this section):
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Consider an array of molecular arrangements. Each is saliently similar to the
other. If one can't be ignored, neither can the rest. One of those possibilities is
the one in which entropy is reversed, violating the Second Law of
Thermodynamics. So, since that possibility can’t be ignored and is not ruled
out, we don t know that law to be true-- ever. (Just as we never know we’ll lose
the Lottery.)
Resolving lottery problems by appeal to a resemblance rule generates problems for
knowledge of other propositions that we routinely claim to know despite there being a
negligible (and appropriately similar) statistical possibility to the contrary. Resolving
lottery problems with the Rule of Attention does not generate such problems; as long as
we don’t focus on the “aberrant possibility,” our knowledge is intact. In basic lottery
cases, the participants always attend to the winning possibility in virtue of attending to
the (fair and potentially winnable) lottery itself, but in poor Bill cases no one attends to
the winning possibility. Comparably, in a cases involving statistical laws, if we do not
focus on the statistically unlikely possibility, our knowledge remains intact, but if we
really do focus on the “aberrant possibility,” perhaps by carefully attending to the law’s
statistical nature, then we do not know that, for instance, entropy will never be reversed
or that some quantum-based effect won’t appear in the macroscopic world.
So, while ROSS fails to resolve lottery cases, this is not a disadvantage; lottery
cases should not be resolved as if they were Gettier problems. Instead, lottery problems
should be treated like skeptical problems and resolved with the Rule of Attention.
Restricted Skeptical Cases with Gettier Twists : The Rule of Special
Similarity (ROSS) also ensures the failure of the relevant knowledge claims in all
skeptical cases with Gettier twists. Recall the example of the instructor who tells the
Phil 1 10 students to suppose that they might be in a vat that sits on a table. The student
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at the back of the room claims that he retains some knowledge of the external world,
namely that there are vats and tables. In such a case, the Rule of Attention resolves the
case; the student does not have knowledge of vats and tables in this context because the
details of the example cause the student to stop presupposing that his perception in
general is reliable, making e-relevant all sorts of possibilities in which perception in
general is unreliable, such as the possibility in which the student is a BIT (brain in a
tub). If the case is artificially modified (say by stipulation) so that attention is restricted
to exactly one envatted possibility - one in which the vat is on the table - ROSS
guarantees that the student fails to have knowledge of vats and tables. In the one
possibility made relevant by the Rule of Attention, there is a whole-scale breakdown of
reliability of perception, memory, and testimony; nearly every presupposition about
reliability the subject makes is false. Because this possibility is e-relevant by the Rule
of Attention, ROSS makes e-relevant a vast array of other similar possibilities - ones in
which there is unreliability of all sorts. Specifically, it makes relevant a possibility in
which the student is entubbed and on a pedestal because that possibility is similar to the
envatted, tabled world with respect to the whole-scale breakdown of reliable systems.
In the example described, the Rule of Attention and the Rule of Special Similarity
together ensure that the entubbed, pedestal possibility is relevant, so the student does not
know there are vats or tables, even when the context is such that the focus of the
speakers and hearers is somehow artificially restricted.
Conclusion
In this chapter, I don’t claim to have solved the Gettier problem; that would be
philosophically naive. Instead, I claim to have produced a rule - ROSS - that, though
84
not without problems, shows promise in that it seems to resolve many Gettier cases
correctly. At heart, this rule is not contextualist. That is, though conversational context
can affect the outcome of the rule (because the “initial” set of e-relevant worlds can be
affected by the attentions of speakers and hearers), that effect seldom matters. At heart,
the rule is reliabilist, since the solution centrally depends on the inclusion of
possibilities as e-relevant based on similarity with respect to the believer’s belief-
forming circumstance, regardless of conversational context. ROSS’s not being, by
itself, primarily contextualist needn’t be challenging to the overall project of producing
a contextualist epistemology. Instead, contextualists can embrace ROSS because it
lends itself to incorporation into an epistemology that is, overall, centrally contextualist
and because a contextualist epistemology that includes ROSS will fare better when it
comes to resolving Gettier’ s problem.
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CHAPTER 4
THE WAYS OF CONTEXT
If contextualism is true, then the truth of knowledge claims is context
dependent. Perhaps the most compelling objections against contextualism are based on
the claim that the context dependence of knowledge claims is somehow problematic.
For instance, some claim that the context dependence of knowledge claims is
problematic because “know” does not behave like a well-behaved indexical. Others
object that the contextualist’ s brand of context dependence of knowledge claims
generates an unnecessarily unparsimonious or unintuitive semantics because the
linguistic phenomena that contextualism is supposed to explain can be explained
without adopting the contextualist’ s semantics. But not all contextualist views are
indexicalist. And not all ways of contextualizing knowledge claims are Contextualist,
with a capital ‘C’. To better understand the class of views that might appropriately be
called ‘Contextualist’ as well as to understand the class of objections to them that might
loosely speaking be called ‘linguistic-based’, it is necessary to understand the different
ways of contextualizing. In particular, it is important to understand how different ways
of contextualizing yield significantly different epistemologies. In this chapter, I try to
offer such an explanation, as well as a suggestion for the best way of capturing context’s
role in epistemological claims.
In “On Quantifier Domain Restriction”, Jason Stanley and Z.G. Szabo discuss
the phenomenon of quantifier domain restriction. Theirs is a discussion about “how
context contributes to interpretation’^ Stanley/Szabo 219). It is a discussion about “how
context figures into the process of determining what a speaker meant by making a
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linguistic occurrence on a particular occasion” (Stanley/Szabo 219). This, too, is a
discussion about how context contributes to interpretation. It, too, is a discussion about
how context figures into the process of determining what a speaker meant by making a
linguistic occurrence on a particular occasion. But rather than quantifier domain
restriction, this is a discussion about how context contributes to the interpretation of
knowledge claims. In “On Quantifier Domain Restriction,” Stanley and Szabo identify
three different ways that context can contributes to interpretation. More carefully, they
divide the ways that context contributes to interpretation into three main types based on
the point in the interpretation process at which context plays its role. Their division of
the roles of context is apt and equally useful for the present discussion, so the present
discussion about knowledge claims follows the Stanley-Szabo discussion about
quantifier domain restriction in making use of this division. The three roles of context
are as follows:
Grammatical:
What is articulated + context = what is uttered
Semantic:
What is uttered + linguistic meaning + context = what is said
Pragmatic:
What is said + context = what is communicated. '(Stanley/Szabo 228-230).
Loosely speaking, one might think of what is articulated, what is uttered, what is
expressed, and what is communicated as items in a staged linguistic process, in which
Throughout this chapter, I use the following conventions: articulations - strings of sounds - are
underlined; utterances - structured lexical items and words - appear in single quotes; and what is said -
propositions - appear after a that-clause. For clarity, 1 sometimes italicize propositions or offset them
within the text (as if they were numbered). I use ‘P’ and ‘Q’ for propositions, though sometimes, for
clarity, these appear as lower-case, unitalicized. I use ‘S’ or ‘s’ for the subject of the knowledge claim,
not the subject of the sentence, though in all the examples I consider these are the same. Again, ‘S’ is
used as a variable for the purported knower, never as a variable for the speaker. I use ‘x’ as a variable for
the speaker. I use ‘p ’ and ‘q
’
for possibilities. Though propositions may be sets of possible worlds,
nothing I say assumes this.
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each item is associated with a different stage in the process. When context plays any
one of these roles, there is some early stage in the linguistic process in which there is an
item that does not fully determine the item associated with the next stage. In each of its
roles, context provides a means of fixing, or determining, which of the items associated
with the next stage gets uttered, said, or communicated. The three different roles reflect
the three central points in the process at which context can enter the picture.
Each of these three basic roles that context can play reflects a different general
approach to handling the interpretation of knowledge claims. Consider the following
2
conversation:
Hannah and her husband are driving home on a Friday afternoon. They plan to stop
at the bank on the way home to deposit their paychecks. But as they drive past the
bank, they notice that the lines inside are very long, as they often are on Friday
afternoons. Thinking that it isn’t very important that their paychecks are deposited
right away, Hannah says, “I know the bank will be open tomorrow morning.” But
then Hannah’s husband reminds her that a very important bill comes due on
Monday, and that they have to have enough money in their account to cover it. He
says, “Banks do change their hours. Are you certain that’s not what is going to
happen tomorrow?” Hannah concedes, uttering “I guess I don’t really know that the
bank will be open tomorrow.” (Stanley 3).
Since the conversation above is perfectly natural, it seems reasonable that a theory of
knowledge ought to accommodate the linguistic evidence provided by the conversation
by taking it seriously. I here mean ‘accommodate’ in the following broad sense - a
theory accommodates the conversation when it provides some kind of theoretical
explanation of the coherence of the conversation. Theoretical explanations that
accommodate the evidence provided by the conversation above can be divided into three
basic kinds. Each type of accommodating explanation features context in some kind of
Stanley attributes this example to Keith DeRose.
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prominent explanatory role, however, the level at which context enters the picture is
significantly different in each of the three sorts of explanations. Contextualists claim
that context plays a semantic role in the interpretation of knowledge claims- not only
knowledge claims like those in the bank case but all knowledge claims. Others claim
that context s grammatical or pragmatic role is the key to interpretation of knowledge
claims like those in the bank case. If those who think that the bank case can
successfully be accommodated either by an account that features context’s grammatical
role or one that features context’s pragmatic role are wrong, then their inability to
accommodate the bank case is a mark in favor of the Contextualist approach. So, first I
discuss how one might accommodate the bank case using context’s grammatical or
pragmatic role, and then I discuss how Contextualists accommodate the bank case. The
central role of this discussion is to get a better understanding of the details of the
Contextualist position with respect to semantics—in part by comparing context’s
semantic role to its grammatical and pragmatic roles, but a by-product of the discussion
is that it is yields favorable results for the Contextualist.
Grammatical:
When context plays its grammatical role, it may disambiguate (by resolving
either a lexical or a structural ambiguity in what is articulated), or it may supply missing
(unarticulated) lexical items. When a person articulates a sequence or pattern of
sounds, that phonological expression usually picks out exactly one grammatical
3
expression, a sentence with a fully determinate syntactic structure. However,
sometimes the sequence of sounds articulated alone might not be sufficient to pick out
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the sentence the utterer expresses
4
In such cases, context serves to disambiguate or
complete, and thereby fix, which sentence (which grammatical sentence) is uttered.
The first sort of grammatical role context may have is to disambiguate an
ambiguity of grammatical structure. Consider the following articulation (example
appears in Stanley/Szabo 227):
Visiting friends can be annoying
.
The grammatical structure of this articulation is ambiguous; the underlined articulation
might pick out one of two different utterances. For a given occasion of articulation,
context plays the role of determining which grammatical structure is uttered. The role
oi context in disambiguating grammatical structure has no relevance to accommodating
the bank case above, since there is no structural ambiguity of this sort present in either
of the relevant articulations.
The second sort ot grammatical role context can have is to disambiguate lexical
ambiguity, and this sort of grammatical role does provide one method of
accommodating the linguistic evidence in the bank case. Consider the following
articulation:
Hannah knows the bank is open.
Notice that this articulation contains one uncontroversially lexically ambiguous
item - bank. Bank is a sequence of sounds (or a spelling) that might be used to pick out
two very different lexical items — one, ’bankl’, whose referent is a financial institution,
Chris Potts points out that ambiguity in natural language is pervasive. Right. But throughout this
discussion, there is some idealization of the language assumed.
It’s easier to discuss phonological examples, but the same points apply to graphically identical
words/sentences.
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and the other, ‘bank2’, whose referent is by the river. When context plays this kind of
grammatical role, it serves to determine - together with the articulation itself—which
grammatical expression is uttered. In the bank case, for example, the context makes
clear that the utterance contains the former lexical item and not the later. The role of
context is to pick out, on a given occasion of utterance, the correct lexical item. So
similarly, one way to accommodate the linguistic evidence in the bank conversation
above is to claim that know is similarly lexically ambiguous. For discussion, let’s
assume that Hannah twice articulates the following two strings of sounds:
Hannah knows the bank is open.
Hannah does not know the bank is open.
At the earlier time, before the bill gets mentioned, context determines that in what
Hannah articulates know (the sound) picks out a particular lexical item, call it ‘know
3798’. But at the later time, after the bill becomes important, context determines that in
the later phonologically identical articulation know picks out a different lexical item,
call it ‘know 4376’. On both occasions, what is articulated, know, is the same,
however, what gets uttered is not—despite appearances to the contrary, each of
Hannah’s utterances expresses a true proposition. On this method of accommodating the
conversation - call it the lexical ambiguity theory-- the articulations above contain a
lexically ambiguous item, know , and context serves to determine, on a given occasion
of articulation, which lexical item is part of the utterance on that occasion.
The lexical ambiguity theory does not provide a successful accommodation of
the bank case. First, if know is lexically ambiguous, its ambiguity is rampant. That is,
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if know is lexically ambiguous, it does not seem plausible to claim that it is merely
ambiguous between just a few lexical items. Assuming that each lexical item associated
with know corresponds to exactly one relevancy region of logical space, positing only a
few fixed relevancy regions could not account wide variation in relevancy conditions
necessary to accommodate all occurrences of know . Second, if know ’s lexical
ambiguity is rampant, the lexical ambiguity method of accommodation is implausible.
In order to make lexical provisions for the wide variety of relevancy conditions
necessary to accommodate all reasonable occurrences of know
,
the lexical ambiguity
theorist would have to posit lots of distinct lexical items associated with the one
phonological item. Since it is implausible to claim that a typical language learner
masters that many distinct lexical items associated with just one phonological sound,
this method of accommodating the bank case is not successful.
A third grammatical role that context can play is to supply missing lexical parts
of the articulation, and this sort of contextual role provides the basis for yet another
grammatical-style method of accommodating the bank case. Consider the following
conversational situation (example appears in Stanley/Szabo 232):
Mary: “Jim plays chess on Sundays.”
Helen: “Max does too.”
The sounds Helen makes alone - Max does too - do not determine what she utters;
context supplies missing lexical items that are covertly present but unarticulated.
5
Throughout this chapter, I’ll discuss the case as if Hannah had said “Hannah
knows the bank is open
1
and then “Hannah does not know the bank is open”. Having an indexical as the
subject just contuses
matters.
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Helen s articulation on that occasion amounts to the following utterance, in which
missing lexical items ‘plays chess on Sundays’ are supplied by the context:
‘Max plays chess on Sundays.’
Had Helen articulated those same sounds - Max does too - under different contextual
circumstances (say, when the conversational topic is tennis on Saturday), she would
have uttered something different. In the example above, context does not serve to
disambiguate one phonological item that is associated with several different lexical
items. Rather, for one string of sounds (one unambiguous phonological structure),
context can supply different lexical items that, on different occasions of articulation, are
covertly present but unarticulated. So similarly, in the bank case, one way to
accommodate the conversation is to claim that different utterances are associated with
the same phonological structure because context supplies different covertly present but
unarticulated lexical items in the earlier and latter occasions of articulation. The first
series of sounds, Hannah knows the bank is open, articulated on the earlier occasion,
yields, together with context, something like the following utterance:
‘Hannah knows the bank has normal open hours that include Saturdays rather than
Sundays. ’
The second series of sounds, Hannah does not know the bank is open , articulated on the
latter occasion, yields, together with context, something like the following very different
utterance:
‘Hannah knows the bank has its normal open hours rather than new hours .’
Despite appearances to the contrary, each articulation, together with context, picks out
an utterance that expresses a true proposition. On this method of accommodating the
conversation - call it the missing lexical items approach - contextual variation, via
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missing lexical items, explains why each articulation in the conversation seems
acceptable.
The missing lexical items approach does not provide a successful
accommodation in the bank case. This approach requires that when a string of
phonological items occurs on a given occasion (and so in a fixed context), the utterance
associated with that articulation is fully determinate. That is, an articulation plus
context yields exactly one grammatical sentence, exactly one structured array of
linguistic items. In the bank case, as with virtually all cases involving knowledge
assertions, such a requirement is implausible. Consider just a few of the many
utterances that seem equally good candidates for association with the articulation
Hannah makes on the earlier occasion:
‘Hannah knows the bank has opening times on only one day of the weekend, and
that day is not Sunday.’
‘Hannah knows the bank is open on the day after Friday, but not on the day before
Saturday.’
That there is a one-one correspondence between the phonological structure articulated in
a particular context and a determinate lexical structure, while plausible in the chess
case, is implausible in the bank case.
None of the three grammatical ways of contextualizing provides a successful
method of accommodating the bank case. I don’t think any epistemologist actually
thinks that context’s grammatical role explains the linguistic evidence in the bank case.
However, in attempting to construct a map of how one might use context to
accommodate the bank case, I would be remiss in omitting these ways of
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comextuaHzing. Additionally,
, hope that the present dtscussion wi.l inform the later
discuss,on. In particular, I hope it will result in a better understanding of the
epistemological Contextualist’s claim about what is - and what is not - context's
semantic role.
Pragmatic:
According to the pragmatic approach, what is said (i.e„ the proposition
expressed) might communicate different propositions on different occasions.
Alternatively put, what is said alone does not determine what gets communicated;
context is needed to supply the “missing pieces” needed to determine what gets
communicated by a given proposition. Generally, context plays a pragmatic role when
the proposition expressed is obviously false. Consider the following proposition
(example appears in Stanley/Szabo 235; originally from K. Bach 1994, 134);
Johnny Smith is not going to die.
Let s suppose that Johnny has just gotten a small scrape on his knee and that the
proposition above is what his mother says. Notice that what she articulates, Johnny
Sjnith is not going to die, determines exactly one grammatical structure (utterance),
which in turn determines exactly one proposition (what is said), so in the case described,
context plays neither a grammatical nor a semantic role. In the case described, the
proposition the mother expresses is obviously false. What gets communicated,
however, seems to be something true. Context’s role is to pick out the true proposition
communicated, namely, that Johnny Smith isn’t going to die from his recent knee
scrape. (Notice that the role here is significantly different from context’s grammatical
6
Obviously “John knows P and Jim does too” is a knowledge assertion in which the “Jim knows P” part
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role; there are many utterances (many grammatical structures) that pick out that same
proposition.) Had the original proposition above been expressed under different
circumstances, it might have communicated a different proposition, say, that Johnny
Smith isn't going to die from his recent heart attack. So again, Johnny’s mother’s
articulation fully determines a grammatical structure uttered that in turn fully determines
a proposition expressed, but the proposition expressed alone does not fully determine
which proposition gets communicated.
Similarly, the pragmatic approach to an accommodation in the bank case claims
that one ot the propositions expressed - either the earlier proposition, that Hannah
knows the bank is open, or the latter proposition, that Hannah does not know the bank is
°Pen > communicates some other proposition. On one or the other occasions on which
the relevant utterance is made, the proposition expressed is fully determined but,
without contextual considerations, the proposition communicated is not. One version of
the pragmatic approach to accommodation in the bank case goes something like this:
At the earlier time when Hannah says “I know the bank is open ”, she expresses a
proposition that is false. The proposition is false because (loosely) Hannah’s
evidence does not eliminate all the possibilities in which the bank is closed. The
participants in the conversation, recognizing that making an obviously false
assertion violates a Gricean norm, employ context to determine which true
proposition she communicates. What Hannah actually communicates is not the
false proposition she expresses but some other proposition, namely, the proposition
that ifthe bank has not changed its regular hours, she knows that the bank is open.
Another version of the pragmatic solution to accommodation in the bank case might go
roughly like this:
At the later time when Hannah says “I do not know the bank is open”, she expresses
a proposition that is false. The proposition is false because (loosely) just as
Hannah’s evidence at the earlier time was sufficient for it to be true that she knew
plausibly is supplied by context’s grammatical role.
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the bank was open, so that very same evidence remains sufficient at the later time;
Hannah’ s evidential state has not changed, so neither does the truth of the
proposition that she knows the bank is open. The participants in the conversation,
recognizing that making an obviously false assertion violates a Gricean norm,
employ context to determine which true proposition the husband communicates.
What Hannah actually communicates is not the false proposition she expresses but
some other proposition, namely, the proposition that although Hannah knows the
bank is open, she is really concerned about getting the check deposited in the bank.
The two versions employ essentially the same strategy for accommodation in the bank
case. Let’s call this the basic pragmatic approach.
7
The basic pragmatic approach to accommodation seems implausible. It requires
that the participants in the conversation readily recognize as false either the earlier or the
later proposition expressed by Hannah. Accepting the basic pragmatic approach also
means that very many of the claims (propositions) about knowledge we commonly
make (express) are false. Stanley has this to say about the pragmatic approach to
quantifier domain restriction, but I think it is equally apt in the present case of context
dependence:
The obvious disadvantage is that one has to abandon ordinary intuitions concerning
the truth or falsity of most [in this case many] sentences containing ...[‘know’].
This is worrisome because accounting for our ordinary judgments about the truth-
conditions of various sentences is the central aim of semantics. Since these
judgements are the data of semantic theorizing, we should be careful with proposals
that suggest a radical revision of these judgements. (Stanley/Szabo 240).
At this point, I turn to yet another means of accommodating cases like the bank
case. I introduce an approach that is non-contextualist; it is the non-contextualist
Relevant Alternatives Theory (NCRAT). Initially, the discussion ofNCRAT might
seem to be a complete divergence from the present topic — ways that accommodate the
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bank case by using context’s pragmatic role. But it is not the complete divergence it
initially appears to be. While NCRAT may accommodate the bank case without making
use of context, it will, I claim, need to employ some version of a pragmatic use of
context to explain cases that are virtually parallel to the bank case. So, the same serious
disadvantage that plagues the basic pragmatic approach also plagues its cousin once
removed, NCRAT.
To begin the apparent divergence, consider the following version of a NCRAT:
[knows] =
,ha, relation R such that R (<x,w,t,p>) if and only if (1) p is true a, w and
, (2) x believes that p at w and t, and (3) x has ruled out the p-alternatives that are
relevant for x at w and t (where x,w,t,p are variables for persons, worlds, times and
propositions respectively). (This formulation is Stanley’s; it appeared in an earlier
V
,
e
m°oo
0f Tn Llng“ lstic Basis for Contextualism,” pp.40-41, that Stanley gaveat the
-0CL University of Massachusetts conference Contextualism in Epistemology
and Beyond. In it, ‘x’ is used for the subject of the knowledge claim - the purported
knower, in the discussion that follows, I follow my convention of using ’s' as the
variable for the subject - the purported knower. Keep in mind that no variable
applies to the speaker on this view, because no aspect of the circumstances of
utterance is relevant.)
In Contextualist relevant alternatives theories, the context of use plays a semantic role,
in helping to determine the semantic content of ‘know’ relative to context. That is, on
the Contextualist account, the circumstances of the speakers and hearers help determine
e-relevancy, but not on non-contextualist relevant alternatives theories. In contrast to
the Contextualist position, for NCRAT, the word ‘know’ is invariant; it has the same
semantic content with respect to every context, namely the knowledge relation specified
above. Utterances containing the word ‘know’ may have different truth-values with
respect to different circumstances of evaluation, e.g., at different possibilities or times,
It isn’t the case that one of the propositions expressed must be false. There might be some other
Gricean-style reason why the proposition expressed is not the proposition communicated, but if both of
the knowledge propositions are true and no other explanation is given, this is problematic.
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because the facts about which alternatives are relevant for the putative knower differ in
these different circumstances.
So, now the bank case. At the earlier time, when Hannah says “Hannah knows
that bank is open,’' Hannah’s circumstances are such that the bank’s having changed its
hours is not a relevant p-alternative, but at the later time, Hannah’s circumstances are
such that it is a relevant p-alternative. Equivalently, <Hannah, the actual world, the
earlier time, that the bank is open> is in the extension of the knowledge-relation, but
<Hannah, the actual world, the later time, that the bank is open> is not. (See Stanley’s
earlier version of “On the Linguistic Basis for Contextualism”, 41.) NCRAT thus
accommodates the bank case without appeal to context.
NCRAT, however, can not accommodate the following slightly different bank
case in the same way:
Hannah and her husband are on the phone on a Friday afternoon. Hannah plans to
stop at the bank on the way home to deposit their paychecks. But as she drives past
the bank, Hannah notices that the lines inside are very long, as they often are on
Friday afternoons. Hannah mentions this to her husband on the phone. Suddenly,
she loses her cell-phone connection. At home, Hannah’s husband realizes that a
very important bill comes due on Monday, and that they have to have enough
money in their account to cover it. While Hannah says to her friend in the car, “It
isn’t very important that our paychecks are deposited right away”, her husband says
to his friend at home, “Banks do change their hours. How can we be certain that’s
not what is going to happen tomorrow?” As Hannah’s husband says, “I guess
Hannah doesn’t really know that the bank will be open tomorrow,” Hannah,
simultaneously, says, “I know the bank will be open tomorrow morning.”
Notice that the original bank case and the one above are virtually the same case. Some
sort of accommodation of the case above seems reasonable, particularly since the story
just presented seems, like the earlier version, perfectly acceptable, but NCRAT does not
and can not accommodate the slightly altered version of the bank case in the same way
that it accommodates the original bank case. Unlike Contextualists, NCRAT can’t
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claim that the explanation lies in the context of utterance; NCRAT can’t claim that the
reason both Hannah’s utterance and her husband’s both seem acceptable is that the
gEeaker s attentions, beliefs, etc. differ. According to NCRAT, only the purported
knower s circumstances count toward determining the relevant alternatives. In the case
above, according to NCRAT the quadruple <Hannah, the actual world, t, that the bank is
°Pen> is either in the extension of the knowledge relation or it is not. Since there is
exactly one purported knower, world, time, and proposition involved, there is exactly
one (determinate) quadruple (exactly one proposition expressed); either Hannah
expresses a false proposition or her husband does. The only reasonable way for NCRAT
to accommodate such a case is to appeal to the pragmatic role of context. Either
Hannah or her husband (depending on which version of the pragmatic approach you
pick) expresses a false proposition but communicates some other contextually
determined proposition, which is true. The pragmatic approach to accommodation that
NCRAT must employ in the slightly altered version of the bank case is essentially the
same approach as the pragmatic approach to accommodation in the original bank case.
Accepting NCRAT, then, involves also accepting the pragmatic approach to those cases
that deserve accommodation but which NCRAT alone cannot accommodate. I’ll call
such a view NCRAT + pragmatics.
I think NCRAT has two significant drawbacks. First, it cannot handle parallel
cases in a parallel manner. According to NCRAT, it is not conversational context that
determines the relevant alternatives; instead, the relevant alternatives are determined by
the proposition P, together with the purported knower’ s circumstance in a world and at
a time. Keeping the distinction in mind, there are a few minimal requirements about the
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conditions under which a P-altemative is “relevant for s in w at t” for NCRAT. First
there can be no change in the p-alternatives without a change in s, w, or t, since the
knowledge relation just is an ordered set with the following form: <s,w,t,p> where s is
the purported knower, w is the world, t is the time, and p is the proposition. That is, the
p-alternatives are not included in the ordered quadruple, precisely because they are fully
determined by the members of that set. Second, the p-alternatives on the non-
contextualist version can’t change just because the focus of the speakers and hearers
changes; otherwise the view might just amount to Contextualism. With these
requirements in mind, consider the features in the bank cases that make them parallel.
In both, the purported knower in both the earlier and the latter utterances is Hannah,
whose evidence remains fixed. The world does not change, nor does the proposition. In
both cases, there is a change in focus; in both cases it seems that a possibility becomes
relevant to the evaluation of a knowledge ascription that earlier was not. So, the only
feature of the theory that allows theoretical accommodation in the original bank case but
not in the revised bank case is time. In the original bank case, there is an earlier and a
latter utterance, but in the revised case the utterances are simultaneous. In the original
bank case, the subject changes her focus - she considers a scenario under which the
bank has changed its normal hours, but in the revised bank case the speaker changes his
focus - he considers a scenario under which the bank has changed its normal hours. In
the original case, theoretical accommodation can be made by NCRAT because the
change in focus can be “pinned” to a change in time. But in the revised case, no such
option is open. Focus of speakers and hearers is not relevant to the evaluation of
knowledge ascriptions on this account. One might deny wholesale that mere changes in
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focus are epistemically relevant, but it seems odd to claim that changes in subject-focus
are epistemically relevant to determining the truth value of a knowledge claim while
changes in speaker/hearer focus are not. Given the parallel nature of the two bank
cases, it is a disadvantage that the theory must accommodate them it two very different
ways - one via a non-contextualist theory and the other via context’s pragmatic role.
The second drawback is that NCRAT retains the serious problems of the basic
pragmatic approach. IfNCRAT accommodates the revised bank case, then NCRAT
amounts to NCRAT + pragmatics, and it inherits the problems of its close cousin the
basic pragmatic approach, just in a more limited number of cases. Namely, the more
limited pragmatic approach still requires the implausible claim that the participants in
the revised bank case readily recognize the false proposition as false. That this is
problematic becomes strikingly clear when you consider those who hear only one side
of the “story” - Hannah’s friend in the car who (presumably) thinks Hannah has just
said something true, and Hannah’s husband’s friend who (presumably) thinks that he
just said something true. NCRAT + pragmatics also requires that many (though not as
many) of the claims about knowledge that we routinely make are false. And, again just
like its close cousin, it also prevents us from taking our intuitive judgments seriously
g
about the truth-value of propositions in a range of cases.
8
Even ifNCRAT does not accommodate the revised bank case by offering some pragmatic-style
explanation of how both speakers communicate something true, it still yields the result that either Hannah
or her husband utters something false even though the participants have a strong intuition that both
speakers have “said” something true. So even without the pragmatic addition, NCRAT requires that we
give up our intuitive judgments about the truth-value of propositions in a range of cases, and has the
result that many of the claims about knowledge that we routinely make are false. Additionally, ifNCRAT
does not accommodate the bank case, it is obliged to explain why the participants - either Hannah and her
friend or the husband and his friend — readily accept as true a proposition that is false.
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Neither the basic pragmatic approach nor its cousin NCRAT + pragmatics offers
a successful accommodation of both the bank case and the revised bank case.
Furthermore, if no view that features context’s grammatical or pragmatic role can
accommodate the bank case (and its relatives) without significant problems, this
amounts to an argument in favor of Contextualism - the group of views that claims
context plays a semantic role in determining which proposition gets expressed by a
given knowledge ascription.
Semantic
Recall the schematic for context’s semantic role: what is said + context = what is
expressed. When context plays its semantic role, the sentence or grammatical (lexical)
structure is fully determined, but that one lexical structure does not fully determine
exactly one item expressed; context fills in the covertly present but missing parts.
Consider two examples (they appear in Stanley/Szabo 233):
‘John is tali’
‘I go to the beach often’
On each occasion of utterance, the grammatical sentence is completely determined, but
the proposition expressed is not. In the first case, context provides the relevant
comparison class, and in the second, it provides the relevant subject. On different
occasions of utterance, these sentences express different propositions. I call any view
that accommodates the bank case by claiming that it is resolved by context s semantic
role Contextualist, with a capital ‘C’. Accommodating the linguistic evidence
provided by conversations like the bank conversation is one of the goals of
9
This differs from Schaffer’s terminology. On mine, Contrastivism is a
form of Contextualism; on his it
is not.
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Contextualism in epistemology. To the extent that other ways of accommodating these
cases are not successful, this accommodation becomes an argument in favor of this
approach.
But Contextualism comes in many forms. The contextual parameter can show
up only in the metalanguage or it can be covertly present as a parameter in the
grammatical sentence. On the former kind of view, there is no contextual parameter in
the logical form; on the later there is. Different versions of Contextualism claim that the
contextual parameter (metalinguistic or not) gets “filled” by different kinds of things -
degrees, tracking points, or sets of possible worlds. And even if attention is restricted to
Contextualism in which there is a non-metalinguistic contextual parameter that gets
“filled” by possible worlds, differences remain; the word ‘know’ might be an indexical
whose meaning is partly contextually determined so that the open parameter is part of
the Kaplanesque character of the word ‘know’, or there may be a more independent
parameter, filled by the pragmatic mechanism of saturation. On my terminology, each
of these views (or kinds of views) is Contextualist. Each view is Contextualist because
each claims that accommodation in the bank case is due to context’s semantic role.
However, these views are significantly different. And in these views, differences in
how the contextualization works in the semantics translate into real and significant
differences in epistemology.
Standards, Tracking points, or Possible Worlds
For the moment, I leave the question of exactly how a contextual element enters
the logical form. Instead, I turn to a discussion of what, exactly, fills the slots in the
logical form that are open to be filled by context.
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Standards:
Stewart Cohen (1999) gives the following account of the truth conditions for
knowledge claims:
1
S knows P' is true in c iff P is true, S believes that P, and S’ s evidence meets the
standard operant in c for sufficient justification for P.
Leaving aside the other particulars of this account, one feature of a view of this style is
that the blank left by context is filled by a contextually determined standard. Context
determines what standard is operant in c. S has sufficient justification for P only if S’s
evidence meets the standard that is operant in the context in which the knowledge claim
is made. On Cohen-style views, what shifts from context to context is a standard for
justification. (Mark Heller (1999) also proposes a standards style view.)
Tracking points:
Keith DeRose (DeRose 1995) gives the following account of the truth conditions
for knowledge claims:
S knows P is true in c iff P is true and S can track P’s truth to a point determined
by c.
On a DeRose-style view, context supplies points in logical space through which S must
track (roughly, accurately predict) the truth of P.
Sets of possible worlds:
David Lewis (1996) gives the following account of the truth conditions for
knowledge claims:
‘S knows P’ is true in c iff S’s evidence eliminates all worlds relevant in c in which
not-P.
On a Lewis-style view, context supplies sets of possibilities that are (somehow) relevant
alternatives to P in c.
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The three approaches I’ve just sketched reflect very different, obviously
different, epistemic views. Whether knowledge is gotten via elimination, tracking, or
justified-true-belief
,
makes for fairly obviously different epistemic accounts. However,
the particular difference on which I want to concentrate is the difference in what kind of
thing fills the slot left open by context. Whether the slot is filled by standards, tracking
points, or sets of possibilities might seem insignificant, however, as Jonathan Schaffer
notes in From Contextualism to Contrastivism in Epistemology,” the choice affects the
resulting epistemology. Schaffer explains one reason to prefer sets of possibilities to
standards:
Some contextualists invoke standards (strength of epistemic position) instead of
alternatives [possibilities]. Every standard corresponds to a set of alternatives: a
given standard s determines a distance in logical space, d, which determines a
sphere of worlds, b (DeRose 1995, 34-5; Heller 1999, 116). But not every set of
alternatives corresponds to a standard: if a set of alternatives does not comprise a
sphere in logical space, no standard will correspond to it. Thus, alternatives are
preferable to standards on grounds of generality. (Schaffer 2004, 3).
The corresponding point also holds for tracking points. On a DeRose-style view,
possibilities are ordered with respect to similarity to the actual possibility. The context
determines a tracking point - a point along the similarity ordering - through which S
must track the truth of P. That point determines a set of possibilities, namely the one
that includes all the worlds that are of greater or equal similarity to the actual world.
Because tracking points can only capture possibilities along a continuum, each set of
possibilities that is determined by a tracking point occupies a sphere of logical space.
Consider the following three diagrams of logical space:
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Figure 1
f-1
Figure 2
employs possibilities can capture all three, in particular, the cottage-cheese-like nature
of the third. So, sets of possibilities are preferable because they can do all the work of
standards or tracking points, and then some; sets of possibilities can capture relevance
even when the relevant regions of logical space are non-contiguous. Furthermore, if one
ot the features ot context that Contextualists want to capture is the focus of the speakers
and hearers in a context, possibilities are preferable because there is every reason to
think that the possibilities determined by this feature of context will be disjointed and
not spherical (Schatter 2004,3). The choice to use possibilities clearly yields different
epistemic results:
In an everyday, non-skeptical circumstance, you are asked whether you know you
have hands rather than octopus tentacles. You say “I know I have hands.” (This is
roughly Schaffer’s example and point from a seminar on contextualist
epistemology)
On a DeRose-style view, for example, the context determines a tracking point that is
fairly close to the actual possibility. On the similarity continuum, a possibility in which
you are handless but dreaming is closer than one in which you are tentacled (this seems
fair). There is no obvious way on the tracking point-style view or the standards view of
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^eluding the nearer possibility while including the more distant one. In the example,
the set oi possibilities on which the speakers and hearers focus seems disjointed:'
0
,3
Figure 4
Since possibilities are preterable to standards or tracking points on grounds of
generality because they can capture non-contiguous regions of logical space, I will - in
all the different views discussed - assume that these are the items that fill the slot that is
open lor context to fill. However, keep in mind that any view discussed might be
formulated with standards or tracking points as the contextually supplied element.
Metalinguistic vs. Non-metalinguistic
There is a central division among the ways of handling context’s semantic role -
metalinguistic and non-metalinguistic. On metalinguistic approaches, the contextual
parameters do not occur within the logical formula, but in non-metalinguistic
approaches the contextual parameters are present in the logical formula. On the former,
context’s disambiguation of which proposition gets expressed by a given utterance is
antecedent to interpretation of the logical form (when metalinguistic contextual
parameters are determined), but in the latter, context’s disambiguation of which
proposition gets expressed by a given utterance occurs during the interpretation of the
logical form (via contextual parameters present in the logical form).
i° .... . .
Though someone might gerrymander the way tracking points work so that the relevant possibilities just
mentioned comprise a sphere, the fact that the possibilities must comprise a sphere on the standards and
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Terminological note: Throughout the following discussion, ‘context’ is
somewhat ambiguous between the informal notion of conversational context - loosely
the aspects of focus, interest, surrounding, setting, etc that are part of the conversational
situation — and the formal notion of context — an ordered set of n-tuples, consisting of at
least a speaker, world, and time. The two are clearly closely related. When the
distinction matters, I try to mark it.
Metalinguistic:
Montague-style approach: On this approach, context is built into the
evaluative parameters. Propositions are not functions from world-times to truth values.
Rather, they are functions from context-possible worlds (points of reference) to truth-
values. These points of reference are ordered n-tuples consisting of —at least — a
speaker, a world, a location, and a time. In order to handle words other than the
traditional indexicals, T, ‘here’, now’, these points of reference will need to include,
say, a set of relevant alternatives that are operant for the speaker in that conversational
situation. Leaving aside the issue of which parameters, exactly, should be included these
points of reference, this approach seems flawed because of its general loss of
explanatory power, rather than some failure that is particular to epistemology. If a
Montague-style approach is adopted to accommodate the bank case, then the linguistic
approach in general must also be Montague-style. But the failures of this general
approach are well-documented (See Stalnaker 1972). In particular, two explanatory
failings of that general approach are:
tracking points view still means that disparate sections of logical space can’t be captured by these kinds of
views.
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a) The simpler account of pragmatics [a Montague-stye approach] which merges
possible worlds with contexts cannot account for Donellan’s distinction. If one
goes directly from sentence (together with context) to truth value, one misses the
ambiguity, since the truth conditions for the sentence in the fixed context (in normal
cases at least) coincide for the two readings.” (Stalnaker 1972, 391).
b) ‘I am here now,’ since true at every point of reference, turns out necessarily true,
which it is not; it is analytic but not necessary. On the Montague approach, there is
no explanation for the difference between analyticity and necessity. (See Stalnaker
1972,386).
Since the Montague-style approach to context is unsatisfactory on grounds unrelated to
epistemology, and because no Contextualist in epistemology currently advocates it, I do
not discuss this further.
Model theoretic approach: On the metalinguistic model-theoretic approach,
propositions (as usual) have their truth-values relative to a model M= <D,W, A>. The
model is an ordered triple: a domain of individuals, a set of possible worlds, and an
assignment to the free variables. On this approach, a proposition’s truth is evaluated
only relative to a restricted set of models; context restricts the admissibility of models.
Each conversational context provides a restriction on the set of models that might be
used in the evaluation of a given proposition. Consider Stanley and Szabo’s example of
this approach as it applies to context’s role in quantified domain restriction:
The model theoretic approach works very well for sentences which contain only one
quantified expression, such as:
(30) Everyone smokes.
. . . .Suppose that the domain of quantification for a particular utterance of (30) [as
determined by the conversational context] is the students in Mr. Desiato’s third-
grade class. We incorporate this fact into the semantic theory, according to the
model theoretic approach, by considering the truth of (30) relative to models in
which the domain is the set of students in Mr. Desiato’s third-grade class.
(Stanley/Szabo 348).
Rather than context’s restricting admissible models by determining that only those
models with a particular domain of individuals get considered, the contextualist who
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opts for the model theoretic approach claims that conversational context restricts the set
of models by determining (pragmatically) that only those models with a particular set of
worlds -those relevant to that context—get considered.*
' In the bank case, when
Hannah first utters Hannah knows the bank is open,’ the context restricts the set of
models so that the truth of that utterance is considered relative only to models that don’t
contain worlds in which the bank has changed its regular hours, but when Hannah utters
Hannah does not know the bank is open,’ that restriction on admissible models does
not apply. Know
,
then, might have a straightforward ’ meaning, unencumbered by the
mechanics of context, that is, it might pick out a binary relation and have invariant
content.
On the model theoretic approach, contextualization takes place at the level of the
entire discourse rather than at the level of some sort of constituent of the discourse.
Just as intra-sentence contextual variation can’t be adequately handled by the model
theoretic approach to quantifier domain restriction -as shown by particular utterances of
‘Every sailor waved to every sailor’ (Stanley/Szabo 249), the model theoretic approach
to Contextualism in epistemology can’t adequately handle intra-discourse contextual
variation - even in the case of compartmentalization. Lewis mentions the case of two
epistemologists on a bushwalk:
As they walk, they talk. They mention all manner of far-fetched possibilities of
error. By attending to these normally ignored possibilities they destroy the
knowledge they normally possess. Yet all the while they know where they are and
where they are going! (Lewis 565).
Likely the domain of individuals will also be restricted as a consequence of restricting the admissible
worlds.
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Suppose that one epistemologist says to the other, “I grant you that I don’t know
whether or not I’m a brain in a vat, but, hey, there’s that big fern where I know we’ll be
within a mile of the trailhead.” It seems clear that there are two different
conversational contexts at play within the same discourse, and even within one
sentence. These two conversational contexts would determine very different restrictions
on admissible models, and neither restriction alone would provide a set of models that
could adequately capture “what the epistemologist says” when he utters the sentence
above. In order to capture the meaning of the sentence above, context variation will
have to be allowed at some level lower than that of the whole discourse. Since the
model theoretic approach allows only for contextual variation at the discourse level, it
fails to handle legitimate cases of compartmentalization.
Non-metalinguistic
Again, there is not just one non-metalinguistic approach but a whole range of
approaches. Their unifying feature is that context enters the picture at the level of
logical form. In each of these views, there is an “open” feature present in the logical
form that context “fills” - either there is a word whose reference shifts across contexts,
or there is a parameter whose content shifts across contexts, or some combination of the
two.
Indexicalist
Indexicalists claim that ‘know’ itself is context-variant; context enters the
logical form whenever ‘know’ appears. In other words, ‘know’ has a content and a
Kaplanesque character; ‘know’ is an indexical whose referent on a given occasion is
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determined in part by the context on that occasion of use. Jonathan Schaffer, who is not
an indexicalist, offers the following characterization of the position:
So just as the character of ‘I’ is a function from context to an individual by the rule
speaker ofthe utterance
,
so the character of ‘knows’ is a function from context to an
epistemic property by the rule relevant alternatives (Schaffer 2004, 2)
For mdexicahsts, there is a rule (the character) that at each context determines the
term’s referent (content) at that context. Significantly, it is the character of the indexical
the function from context to content - that competent speakers learn. On indexicalist
views, the term’s meaning is its invariant character, and its content is context-variant.
So, the term know’ picks out different epistemic relations in different contexts. Again,
Schaffer:
The traditional epistemologist supposes that there is one [binary relation of the
schematic form Ksp], while the indexicalist claims that there are many (Schaffer
2004, 5).
According to the indexicalist, there may be one epistemic relation, call it a Ki that is the
content (referent) of ‘know’ at one context and a different epistemic relation, K2 , that is
the content of ‘know’ at some other context. Each K-relation will be a set of ordered
pairs <S,P>, where S is the subject (purported knower) and P is the proposition to which
S stands in the given K-relation at that context.
In order to get a more clear account of how the indexicalist treats the bank case,
consider the following schema of an indexicalist account of extension, content, and
character:
12
‘Rule’ here is meant to allude to Lewis’ view. Many have taken Lewis to have been presenting an
indexicalist view. Others, notably Barbara Partee, do not: “....we are dealing not with a lexically specific
context dependence but with the kind of conversational standard-setting that Lewis discussed.”
(Comment 4.1 of her comments on Stanley’s paper). 1 think there is room for interpretation in what Lewis
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1 . The extension of ‘knows’ in world w relative to context c = that relation Rn of
ordered pairs, <S,P>, where S is a subject who exists at w and P is a
proposition, and S’s evidence rules out all non-P possibilities that are
members of the R-set.
2. The content of ‘knows’ relative to context c is a function that takes any world
w to the extension of ‘knows’ in w relative to c
The character of knows’ is a function that takes any context c to the content
of ‘knows’ relative to c.
Schematic Definition: the R-set for c is the set of relevant alternatives to P in c.
The example above is a schema for an indexicalist account of character because the R-
set is a free variable, specific instances of an indexicalist view are given by specifying
the value of that variable. In thinking about the bank case, we can think of the schema
above as being filled in by a Lewis-style account of relevance, though indexicalists will
all handle the bank case in essentially the same way. In the bank case, indexicalists
claim that two different propositions can be expressed by the same sentence, ‘Hannah
knows the bank is open,’ made on two separate occasions of utterance. On the earlier
occasion, the proposition expressed by the utterance ‘Hannah knows the bank is open,’
claims (loosely) that Hannah stands in the Kj relation to that the bank is open. While
on the later occasion, a compatible proposition is expressed by the utterance, ‘Hannah
knows the bank is open’- one that claims that Hannah stands in the K2 relation to that
the bank is open. At the two different contexts, the word ‘know’ picks out two different
epistemic relations, so that though the sentences seem incompatible, they are not. The
Ki relation includes the pair <Hannah, that the bank is open> because the possibility
that the bank has changed its hours is not relevant in that context, but the K2 relation
does not include that pair because the possibility that the bank has changed its hours is
stated in print, but I am told that when asked, he said he considered himself an indexicalist (Schaffer).
Whether Lewis is an indexicalist or not is really irrelevant here.
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relevant in that context. The proposition Hannah expresses at the earlier time is true,
and so is the one she expresses at the later time.
It should be clear that according to the indexicalist, the referent of the word
'know' changes across contexts; it refers to different epistemic relations at different
contexts. However, its Kaplanesque character remains the same:
The character of ‘know’ is the function from contexts to epistemic relations, such
that at each context cn> the value of the function is that epistemic relation Rn to
which ‘know’ refers at the context cn .
The claim that ‘know’ is an indexical includes the claim that the meaning of ‘know’ is
its character. A significant consequence of the claim that the meaning of ‘know’ is its
character is that the character function (described above in schematic form) must be
rule-like. In other-words, the function’s mechanism for determining the particular
epistemic relation operant at a given context - the function that is easily leamable by a
typical language-user — must be rule-like.
One serious problem for the indexicalist approach is that no such rule has been
produced. If the indexicalist approach is to succeed, a straight-forward, rule-like
function that can serve as the meaning of ‘know’ must be produced. This difficulty for
the view has been pointed out most recently by Jonathan Schaffer in “From
Contextualism to Contrastivism in Epistemology”:
No contextualist has ever offered anything near a precise account of relevance.
Indeed, the only contextualist who has even made a serious attempt in this direction
is Lewis (1996), who proposes seven rules. ...But with all due respect to Lewis, this
is little more than a laundry list of rules of thumb, replete with unclear principles,
subject to a variety of counterexamples, and open to skeptical usurpation as merely
pragmatical.(Schaffer 2004, 17).
The viability of a particular indexicalist account depends on whether or not that account
offers a character function for ‘knows’ that is suitable to serve as the term’s meaning.
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The viability of a particular indexicalist account of character depends obviously and
directly on that particular indexicalist’s definition of the R-set, the particular account of
relevance. The definition of relevance at a context must be precise enough to be applied
by the average language user (not an ad hoc “laundry list”), must be suitable to serve as
part ol a term-specific index (not amounting to general pragmatic means of
accommodation), and must provide the character function with the means to correctly
capture the meaning of know (by not generating counterexamples).
A second serious problem for indexicalists is that ‘knows’ does not seem to
behave like other indexicals. Indexicalists, so the objection goes, make ‘knows’ a
linguistic freak. The irregular shiftiness of ‘knows’ is particularly problematic for the
indexicalist. In On the Linguistic Basis for Contextualism, ’ Jason Stanley illustrates
this central point:
It is no surprise that context-sensitive expressions typically allow for standard-shifts
within a clause. In each case, the context-sensitivity is linked not to the discourse,
but to the particular context-sensitive term If ‘know’ is a context-sensitive
expression, then we would expect similar phenomenon. [In particular, indexicalists
predict that shiftiness is at the level of the term since they claim that the context
sensitivity of knowledge claims is due to fact that ‘know’ is context sensitive in a
way that is lexically specific.].... So, if contextualism were true, we should expect
the following to be fine:
(44)a Bill knows that he has hands, but Bill does not know that he is not
a ...[BIV],
b Bill does not know that he is not a . .
.
[BIV], but Bill knows he has
hands.
Of course, both of these are not fine - they are, as contextualists themselves
have taken great pains to argue, of dubious acceptability. . .
.
[Keith DeRose calls
such sentences “Abominable Conclusions”]....
Of course, contextualists have expended a great deal of effort trying to
explain the oddity of . .
.
[(44)a] . Once a skeptical possibility has been raised, they
Stanley suggests here that any view on which knowledge claims are semantically context-sensitive is a
view on which the context sensitivity is somehow linked to the term itself. I don’t think this is right. But
his point is still exactly right for the indexicalist, whose view is that the context sensitivity of knowledge
claims is due to the fact that ‘know’ is context-dependent in a way that is lexically specific.
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say, that has ramifications for the evaluation of future uses of ‘know within that
“f- But, there, arce two worries for this strategy. First, it leaves the oddity ofL(44)b)] unexplained. Second, it proposes a certain pragmatic constraint about the
xt;sensitivity of “know’' that simply has no parallel with pragmatic principles
governing the interpretation s of other context-sensitive expressions. Thus, these
inds of claims about how raising skeptical scenarios change the discourse look like
stipulations to save the theory from unattractive consequences such as (44)b (See
Stanley’s earlier version of the paper, pp. 33-34. He makes the same point in the
revised version
-Stanley forthcoming, 22-23.)
Stanley s comments here are damning to the indexicalist position. First, indexicalists
predict - based on the ease with which other indexicals shift — that ‘know’ is
significantly more shifty than it in tact is. Second, because indexicalists claim that
context-variation happens via the lexically specific mechanism of indexing, they have
no explanation for why the raising of skeptical scenarios in a discourse seems to affect
the meaning of know’ throughout the rest of the discourse.
Jonathan Schaffer, in “From Contextualism to Contrastivism in Epistemology,”
points to an additional explanatory failure for the indexicalist
-the failure to explain the
lack of parallel shiftiness in knowledge claims that involve ‘rather than’ clauses, such as
that ‘Moore knows he has hands rather than stumps’ and in those that do not, such as
‘Moore knows he has hands’:
[I] ndexicality predicts that non-binary ascriptions should be as shifty as their binary
counterparts. This is because, with indexicality, the shiftiness is generated by a
semantical rule triggered by the occurrence of ‘knows’. Since ‘knows’ occurs in all
the knowledge ascriptions, they should all generate this shiftiness.(Schaffer 2004,
12).
Even granting that there is some remaining shiftiness in the first comparative statement,
Shaffer’s point seems correct: the former statement is less shifty than the later (see
footnote 1 8, p. 12). While statements such as ‘Moore knows he has hands rather than
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stumps, and Moore does not know that he is a being with hands rather than a handless
BIV, seem perfectly natural, I also think the indexicalist has no satisfactory explanation
for the presence of the ‘rather than’ clauses. On the indexicalist position, all the
contextual variation is “built in” to the meaning of ‘know’ on each occasion of its use,
so any additional and explicit mention of a possibility as being relevant
—which is just
what the rather than clause does — makes no sense. If when someone utters the second
sentence handless BIV scenarios are contextually relevant, then, according to the
indexicalist, this fact is already taken into account via the lexically specific and context-
sensitive character of ‘know’. So, the indexicalist is left without an explanation of the
lack of parallel shiftiness in and the natural-sounding nature of what Schaffer calls
contrastive knowledge claims- those that include a ‘rather than’ clause (Schaffer 2004,
6 ).
In sum, indexicalists have failed to generate a viable character function, they are
left with an indexical whose behavior is linguistically freakish, and they fail to offer a
satisfying account of contrastive knowledge claims.
Contrastivist
First, some terminological points: Jonathan Schaffer developed and advocates a
third relatum view. He calls it ‘contrastivist’ and wants to distinguish it from the
contextualist view, which he characterizes as “the theory that ‘knows’ contributes
semantical context-dependence to utterances in which it occurs” (Schaffer 2004,1).
What counts as Contextualist on my terminology is different from what counts as
Contextualist on Schaffer’s. On my terminology, Contextualism is the claim that
14
Notice that you don ‘t have to accept that any knowledge claims are non-binary to accept the point here.
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context contributes a semantical role in disambiguating utterances in which ‘knows’
occurs. On my characterization, the model-theoretic approach, the Montague approach,
the indexicalist approach, and the third relatum approach are all Contextualist. On
Schaffer’s, only the indexicalist is a Contextualist. Again, the point here is that there are
some terminological differences, but they are just that
-mere terminological. So on
Schalfer s terminology, Contextualism and contrastivism contrast, but on my
terminology, contrastivism is a brand of Contextualism.
On the contrastivist view ‘know’ is not an indexical. Rather, ‘know’ is a three-
place relation whose third relatum is determined (in part) by context. In other words, the
term ‘know’ itself is not context-dependent, but its third relatum is determined by
features of the conversational context. On this view, when an apparently binary
knowledge claim is made, the claim has a hidden contextually determined relatum;
(ignoring worlds and times) ‘knowledge’ is a 3-place relation between a subject, a
proposition, and contextually determined alternatives to the proposition.
5
Whereas
indexicalists claim that ‘know’ picks out different binary epistemic relations in different
contexts, the contrastivist claims that ‘know’ picks out exactly one three-place epistemic
relation in every context:
The difference between indexicality and ternicity can be formally represented as the
difference between an indexed binary relation Kjsp (which may be given the natural
language paraphrase as: s bears that property to p) and an unindexed ternary relation
Kspq (s knows that p rather than q). (Schaffer 2004,12 footnote).
Namely, that indexicalists predict similar shiftiness, when in fact the shiftiness is not parallel.
15
In the first paper in which Schaffer develops the view, the third relatum is an argument slot filled by a
contrast class of alternative propositions (Schaffer, manuscript), but in the more recent paper, the third
relatum is an argument slot filled by a contrast proposition (Schaffer 2004, 5). In my discussion of the
view, I take the third relatum to be an argument slot filled by a set of contrasting possibilities. I don’t
think anything I say turns on these differences.
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In addition to there being an important difference between the indexicalist and
the contrastivist about the basic kind of relation that knowledge is - a large family of
two-place relations or one three-place relation - the two differ significantly in how
context works to disambiguate a knowledge utterance. Indexicalists claim that when ‘S
knows P gets uttered, a lexically specific index determines what gets said, that is, this
mechanism determines which of the many two- place relations is the referent of ‘knows’
in that particular context. Contrastivists, on the other hand, claim that there is no
lexically specific - no ‘knows’-specific - mechanism that determines which alternatives
get included in the contrast class. Rather, there are a variety of general linguistic
mechanisms at work that determine the appropriate contrast class for that context.
According to the contrastivist, the appropriate model for the semantics of ‘know’ is
‘prefers’. For ‘prefers,’ there is no lexically specific mechanism for determining the
contrast class. Sometimes the contrast class is articulated, as in ‘Anne prefers chocolate
ice cream to strawberry ice cream.’ Other times, the contrast class is determined by the
saturation of a free but unarticulated variable, as in ‘Anne prefers chocolate,’
(articulated at the ice cream store where the speaker is looking at a list of other flavors
offered). According to the contrastivist, the contrast class for ‘know’ is similarly
determined. Sometimes it is articulated by a ‘rather than’ clause, as in ‘Bobby knows
Mary rather than Sue stole the bicycle’; other times the contrast class is not articulated
so that membership in it is determined by the focus of the participants, their
interrogative interests, or salient features of their location or conversation. While for
indexicalists there is one uniform rule - the character of ‘know’— that determines for
each articulation which possibilities are relevant, for contrastivists there is no such rule.
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That is, though for each context there is exactly one contextually-determined set of
possibilities that is the value for the third relatum, there is no uniform way to determine
in advance what value gets picked, no learnable rule that language users master.
Again, Schaffer:
I turn now to the second main difference between [indexicalist views] and
contrastivism, namely that between relevance and saturation. These are distinct
linguistic mechanisms for factoring alternatives into the truth-conditions, which
differ as follows. By relevance, alternatives enter into the truth-conditions via the
semantical rule of relevant alternatives (as triggered by the ‘knows’ indexical).
Whereas by saturation, alternatives enter into the truth-conditions via such
mechanisms as ‘rather-than’
-arguments, interrogatives, focussing, and free variables
(as serving to saturate the q slot). In short, by relevance there exists a ‘knows’-
specific relevance function, whereas by saturation there is no ‘knows’
-specific
relevance function but rather just a variety of general linguistic mechanisms for
saturating an argument slot. (Schaffer 2004,17).
So, according to the contrastivist, the bank case can be accommodated because
the contrast class at the earlier context of articulation is different from the contrast class
at the later context of articulation. The contrast class at the earlier time does not include
the possibility that the bank has changed its normal schedule but the contrast class at the
later time does include that possibility. The ordered triple <Hannah, that the bank is
open, {the bank has its normal hours but is closed }> is a member of the knowledge
relation but <Hannah, that the bank is open, {the bank has its normal hours but is
closed, the bank has entirely new hours }> is not a member of the knowledge relation.
So, at the earlier time when Hannah says, ‘Hannah knows the bank is open,’ she makes
a true claim, and when she later says, ‘Hannah does not know the bank is open,’ she
•
16
makes yet another true claim .
’
I have said that, in discussing how context contributes to interpretation of knowledge claims, I follow
the Stanley-Szabo discussion in “On Quantifier Domain Restriction,” and yet it does not seem that I have
discussed an epistemic account on which what context contributes to knowledge assertions is an
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Schaffer s contrastivist account has some important advantages over competing
accounts. First, the contrastivist position is clearly better than the position that the
epistemic role of context is grammatical in that it supplies unarticulated lexical parts.
While both posit unarticulated parts, the contrastivist proposes a covert variable rather
than an unarticulated grammatical component (missing lexical parts). While those who
might think context plays this sort of grammatical role are plagued by the claim that
there is a one-one correspondence between what is articulated on a given occasion and
what is uttered, contrastivists do not make the comparable implausible claim that there
is a one-one correspondence between what is uttered and what is said. Instead, they
propose a one-many correspondence between utterances and propositions expressed;
one utterance can expresses different propositions in different contexts because there is
an open variable that can get saturated by various contrast classes.
unarticulated quantifier domain restriction. It might seem that Lewis espouses such a view, but 1 don’t
think so. I agree with Schaffer (correspondence):
Lewis starts off speaking as if all the variability was going to come out of the ‘all’ in his
infallibilist analysis.
. .
But then .
.
. when he starts writing the rules, he doesn’t invoke the general
tides of shift for ‘all,’ but rather invents new knowledge-specific rules. So I think Lewis
advertises a QDR view, but delivers an indexicalist one.
The view that comes closest to a QDR view is contrastivism. On a contrastivist-style QDR view, like on
the contrastivist account, the content ‘knows’ is invariant and picks out a three-place relation. On the
QDR version, the content of the third relatum (the contrast class) “defaults to the value that would be
denoted by ‘rather than anything else’ on the counterfactual supposition that the phrase was uttered”
(Schaffer, correspondence). The important criticisms I make against contrastivism - that it does not
ensure that known propositions are true, that it does not ensure that the knower believes the known
proposition, and that it does not resolve Gettier cases successfully - also apply to a QDR version of the
view. On the QDR version, general linguistic mechanisms — focus, presupposition, and attention -
determine the operant quantifier restriction and so determine the operant contrast class, on any occasion of
use. So on the QDR version, like on the contrastivist account, since the mechanism for determining the
content of the third relatum is a linguistically general pragmatic one (that is, it’s not epistemically
specific), the focus, presuppositions, and interests of the speakers and hearers need not include the true
possibility, the possibilities the purported knower accepts, or the possibilities that would resolve Gettier
puzzles. (One might develop another QDR-style approach - one that is not contrastivist in style - but any
QDR approach will suffer from these same problems; if quantifier domain restriction is the determiner of
e-relevance, then e-relevance involves only general linguistic (pragmatic) mechanisms, so such a view
cannot rightly adopt knowledge-specific requirements for relevance.)
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Second, the contrastivist avoids the central problems had by the indexicalist.
Namely, the failure to produce a ‘knows’-specific rule that is suitable to serve as the
character for ‘knows’ and the failure adequately to account for ways in which the
linguistic behavior ‘knows’ is disanalagous to the behavior of other indexicals. The
contrastivist avoids the problems associated with a lexically-specific rule by claiming
that there isn’t one. Instead, the contrastivist relies on general linguistic mechanisms to
saturate the third relatum, the q-slot. So, by not claiming that ‘knows’ is an indexical,
contrastivists simultaneously relieve themselves of the obligation to produce an
appropriate rule ol relevance and of the burden of claiming (in the face of
counterexamples) that ‘knows’ behaves like other indexicals.
Third, the contrastivist, unlike the indexicalist, has a good explanation for the
presence of rather than clauses in knowledge claims as well as for some of the other
linguistic behavior associated with ‘knows’. The ‘rather than’ clauses indicate the
presence of a third relatum in the logical form, which is covertly present but
unarticulated in knowledge claims whose surface structure is binary. The presence of
this open q-slot in the logical form also explains why “[knowledge ascriptions also
feature contrast-preservation under ellipsis” (Schaffer 2004, 7). In the following, ‘Ann
prefers chocolate and Ben does too,’ the word ‘too’ serves as an ellipsis site that “copies
the foil”(Schaffer 2004, 7). That is, if Ann prefers chocolate to vanilla, then through
contrast-preservation under ellipses, we know that Ben also prefers chocolate to vanilla.
Similarly, the contrastivist explains:
Suppose that an inquiry is underway as to whether Mary stole the bicycle or the
wagon, and one says ‘Holmes knows that Mary stole the bicycle, and Watson does
too’. Here what Holmes knows is that Mary stole the bicycle rather than the wagon,
and the evidence for the syntactic reality of the contrast is that the Watson conjunct is
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‘r
^j ff7'fatSon knows that Mary sto|e the bicycle rather than the wagon. (Schaffer
The presence of the variable for the contrast class in the logical form explains the
presence of the ellipsis site; the ellipsis site copies the contrast class.
Unfortunately, the root of much of the contrastivist’ s success is also the root of
the view s most serious problem. Because the saturation of the third relatum takes place
via just a variety of general linguistic mechanisms for saturating an argument
slot (Schaffer 2004,17), the members of the contrast class are determined by the focus,
interrogatives, and ‘rather than' clauses of the speakers and hearers in that context. The
problem is that the contrast class need not include alternatives that block knowledge
when the subject (unbeknownst to the speakers/hearers) is in a Gettier situation.
The contrast class need not include an alternative merely because that alternative
is a significant feature of the subject’s circumstance. Consider a Cohen-style Gettier
example in which the conversation takes place while all participants
-speakers, hearers,
and subjects -- are in a Gettier situation (and so are unaware that they are in a Gettier
situation). The participants are in typical sheep-type Gettier situation in which all the
participants are at the bottom of a field pointing at a sheep-shaped rock behind which -
unbeknownst to the participants—there’s a sheep, and one utters T know that’s a sheep.’
No mechanism in the contrastivist’ s arsenal of general linguistic mechanisms can
generate the result in this case that the contrast class includes the alternative that there ’s
a sheep-shaped rock in the field. The contrastivist account has the result that the above
utterance is true. In general, the contrastivist account can’t resolve Gettier cases.
An additional, though not as serious, difficulty for the contrastivist is the
remaining shiftiness of so-called non-binary ascriptions. Schaffer has this to say:
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Since non-binary ascriptions are relatively explicit as to the value of q, they should
have a lesser degree of shiftiness. Thus ternicity predicts, for instance, that (i)
“Holmes knows that Mary stole the bicycle rather than the wagon” explicitly fixes q
and so should leave little to shift....(Schaffer 2004,13).
‘Rather-than’ knowledge ascriptions do seem less shifty than their counterparts that
have a binary surface structure; it seems right that the contrast in the case above does
not contain alternatives in which someone other than Mary does the stealing or in which
what she stole was roller skates (Schaffer 2004,12). Schaffer acknowledges that some
shiftiness remains: “Thus the alternative that Mary stole the wagon may or may not
include worlds in which Holmes is a brain-in-a-vat vertically hallucinating Mary’s
thieving (footnote, page 12). My point here is that the remaining shiftiness is far from
epistemically trivial. If someone claims ‘Moore knows he has hands rather than
stumps’, then - because whether or not Moore knows that he has hands rather than
stumps depends on whether or not that Moore is stumped and dreaming is in the
contrast class — it is this “remaining shiftiness” that matters, not the ‘rather than’
clause. The significance of the remaining shiftiness of ‘rather than’ clauses somewhat
weakens the argument for ternicity itself, because in the vast majority of cases non-
binary ascriptions and binary ascriptions are on a par with respect to the kind of
shiftiness that really matters in resolving the (ever-pervasive) skeptical problem.
So, contrastivism fails to resolve Gettier cases. Additionally, the argument in
favor of the view based on the lack of shiftiness in ‘rather than’ ascriptions is far weaker
than it first appears to be.
Condexicalism -Doing the Two-Step:
I now want to defend a view on which the “slot” left open to be filled by context
is filled in part by an indexing rule and in part by general linguistic mechanisms. I'll
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claim that such an approach is less problematic than either a purely indexicalist view or
a purely contrastivist view. The suggestion for something like this approach was
initially made by Barbara Partee at the Contextualism in Epistemology and Beyond
conference. She mentions that ‘know* might have something important in common
with here. She gave the first of the two following examples;
In the claim “it’s
-56degrees here now” ‘here’ might mean here inside this plane or
it might mean here in this space our airplane isflying through right now. (Page 4 of
her comments on Jason Stanley’s paper.)
When I call the linguistics department to ask how to reach Partee, the person who
answered the phone began by saying “Well, I think she’s here” she might have
meant here occupying the points in space that are just beside the space occupied by
the voice on the phone, here in the linguistics office, here on Umass campus
,
or here
in this country.
As Partee points out, here varies both with respect to the location of the speaker and
with respect to the boundaries of that region. The referent of ‘here’ changes with a
change in what I call its ‘base
,
i.e., when the speaker location changes either from a
change in speaker or a change in location. And the referent of ‘here’ changes with a
change in what I call its ‘boundaries,’ as when it varies from the minute, in ‘this
electron is here’ in the very precise region ofspace indicated, to the grand, in ‘the new
planet is here’ in our galaxy and not another.
I think that ‘know’ is like ‘here’ in that it shifts mutidimensionally. I also think
that ‘know’ is like ‘here’ in that the shifts take place via similar mechanisms. Chris
Potts, in conversation, makes the following suggestion about how the dual shiftiness of
‘here’ might work. First, the boundaries. The boundaries of the appropriate region are
determined via general pragmatic mechanisms of the conversational context, such as the
interests and focus of the participants. These general mechanisms determine a
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restriction on the admissible contexts (of the formal kind) for that particular
conversational occasion. So, in any given conversational exchange, there are many,
many contexts that are available for use; that is, there are many, many n-tuples of the
form <w,x,l,t,.
. > where w is a world of utterance, x is a speaker, 1 is a location of the
speaker, t is a time, and where the ellipses mark the presence of other conversational
parameters. (Significantly, the Kaplanesque account of context provides for richness in
what parameters get included.) Via general pragmatic mechanisms, the conversational
situation restricts the contexts that are available for use by placing restrictions on the
context’s third-tuple. For example, in my conversation with the secretary, consider
some of the many available contexts (ignoring time and its complexities as well as other
possible parameters that might be included in the context):
<@,sec, right corner of linguistics office> <@j ,right comer of dining room>
<@,sec, linguistics office> <@,j,dining room>
<@,sec, UMass> <@,j, Shelburne Falls>
<@,sec, USA> <@,j, USA>
The interests, beliefs, and focus of the participants determine that intra-room
distinctions are too fine-grained, and that inter-town or inter-country distinctions are not
fine-grained enough. What these general mechanisms do is determine the right “level”
for the locational parameter; they restrict admissible contexts to those whose locational
parameter is of the right kind. Again, this sort of restriction, though determinate, is
achieved not by a rule-like function, but rather by general pragmatic means. In this case,
the only two contexts listed that are not ruled out by the restriction are those in the
second set. (Obviously there would be lots of available contexts admissible on this
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restriction that aren't listed, namely, all those where room-wide locations occupy the
third parameter.)
Next, the base region. The way that the the base region for ‘here’ is determined
is via a lexically specific rule, ‘here’s’ character, which is indexical. The character of
‘here’ is the function that assigns to each context that content which is represented by
the constant function from possible worlds to the location (of the speaker) of that
17
context. So, when the secretary reports ‘Well, I think she’s here,’ the lexically specific
rule for ‘here' determines that the secretary’s location is the base region for the referent
of ‘here’. That is, only contexts in which the secretary is the second member of the n-
tuple are relevant in determining the referent of ‘here’. So, together with the restriction
on appropriate contexts already in place, the character of ‘here’ guarantees that the
referent of ‘here’ is the linguistics department. On the other hand, had I uttered ‘I am
here' the indexical nature of ‘here’ plus the restriction on appropriate contexts
determines that the base of the region shifts to my location, my dining room.
A few comments on the shiftiness of ‘here’. Its base is easily and readily
shiftable because ‘here’s’ indexical nature guarantees that the base shifts as the speaker
either changes or relocates. However, the strictness (narrowness) of its boundaries is
not nearly as shifty, because the interests of the conversational participants do not in
general shift intra-conversationally; shifts in boundaries generally happen only at the
discourse level. But intra-discourse boundary shifts can take place. When they do, they
are often marked explicitly in the conversation, as in ‘Not only is Partee here in this
country, she’s here in this room,’ or they are the result of a compartmentalized
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conversation, such as the case of two micro biologists in the forest, looking at samples
through a microscope and simultaneously discussing when they were last ‘here’ in the
forest and whether or not a particular chromosome is ‘here’ at the end ofthe pointer on
the microscope.
Keeping here in mind as a model, I now turn to the boundaries for ‘know’.
First, when Kaplan introduces contexts, he notes that “aspects of the contexts” other
than speaker, place, time, and world “would be used if new demonstratives (e.g.
pointings, You, etc.) were added to the language” (Kaplan 412). To accommodate a
natural language, it seems clear that additional “aspects” of context are required. For
the purposes of accommodating ‘know’, at least one parameter needs to be added to the
traditional 4-tuple - a relevancy parameter, call it a. So, for the purpose of this
discussion, time will be ignored and a context will consist of the following ordered set:
<w,x,l,a>, where Cw , is a world, C x is a speaker, and Q is a location of the speaker.
Finally, C a is a set of alternatives to what is purportedly known when the utterance is
made—think contrast class! (Notice that if the speaker is not the subject (the purported
knower), then the subject is not a member of the context of utterance. Unlike NCRAT, a
variable for the speaker appears in the n-tuple) So, again there are many, many
available contexts, many 4-tuples whose members stand in the appropriate relations to
one another. Ignoring the complexities of the locational parameter, and considering
Hannah’s conversation with her husband about the bank, some of the available contexts
for the bank case are:
<@,Hannah, mall, {posted hours 7-9, posted hours 8- 12,etc. }>
17
See Kaplan, p.403.
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<@,Hannah, mall, {bank changed from what’s posted,posted hours 7-9 posted
hours 8- 12,etc. }>
<@,Hannah, mall, {Hannah is a BIV(so no bank exists), bank changed from
what’s posted
,
posted hours 7-9, posted hours 8-12,etc.}>
<@,Hannah, mall, {car in mall spot 22, car in mall spot 34, etc.}>
<@,Hannah, mall, {car stolen (so not at mall), car in mall spot 22, car in mall
spot 34, etc.}
>
<@,Hannah, mall, {Hannah is a BIV (so no car exists), car stolen (so not at
mall), car in mall spot 22, car in mall spot 34, etc.}>
What the conversational context does, then, is to restrict the available contexts by
putting a restriction on the alternatives parameter. Whether the topic is bank hours or
car location, the conversational context determines that the alternatives parameter’s
boundaries are set at the right level. The restriction is placed on the alternatives
parameter by general pragmatic mechanisms that take into account things like the
assumptions that the conversational participants have (that they aren’t brains in vats) as
well as their focus and interests (they are not initially focussing on the possibilities that
banks have changed hours or that car thefts at the mall are on the rise, though later the
focus regarding banks but not cars changes). Robert Stalnaker, in “Pragmatics” has this
to say about the process of boundary setting:
Presuppositions are propositions implicitly supposed before the relevant linguistic
business is transacted. The set of all the presuppositions made by a person in a
given context determines a class of possible worlds, the ones consistent with all the
presuppositions. This class sets the boundaries of the linguistic situation. (Stalnaker
1972 388).
The boundaries for ‘know’, then, are determined by general pragmatic mechanisms that
determine a restriction on the admissible contexts. Notice that the members of C a need
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not form a unified region of logical space; they can amount to disjointed regions of
logical space or even several individual points in logical space.'
8
Again keeping in mind the analogy to ‘here’, I now turn to how the base for
know gets determined. It is via an indexing mechanism that is lexically specific. As a
starting point, recall the indexicalist schema for the extension, content, and character of
‘know’:
1 . The extension of ‘knows' in world w relative to context c = that relation Rn of
ordered pairs, <S,P>, where S is a subject who exists at w and P is a
proposition, and S’s evidence rules out all non-P possibilities that are
members of the R-set for c.
2. The content of ‘knows’ relative to context c is a function that takes any world
w to the extension of ‘knows’ in w relative to c.
3. The character of knows is a function that takes any context c to the content of
‘knows’ relative to c.
So, recall that any indexicalist would accept something like the above schematic for
defining the extension, content, and Kaplanesque character of ‘knows’, though each
particular theorist will give a different definition of the R-set. That is, each brand of
indexicalist will have his or her own definition that satisfies the open R-set variable.
Furthermore, recall that since the learnability of the character function is directly
derived from features of the definition of the R-set, the viability of a particular brand of
indexicalism lays firmly at the feet of that theorist’s definition of the R-set.
I now state my particular brand of “indexicalism” by giving (and then
explaining) my definition of the R-set:
18
This is an advantage. In “On the Linguistic Basis for Contextualism”, Jason Stanley argues that if
knowledge comes in degrees, then ‘know’, like ‘tali’ and ‘flat’, should be gradable, but it is not (see
section two). Stanley’s objection applies to both standard-style views and tracking point-style views. But
on this account, as on others (like contrastivism) that allow for the e-relevant regions of logical space in a
context to be non-contiguous, there is no reason to think that knowledge comes in “degrees” or that (for
any two contexts that both include the actual world) one e-relevant region is a subset of the other. So,
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For any possibility, p, p is a member of the R-set for a context of utterance c iff
1 ) p is the subject’s actual world
2) or the subject believes p is the case
3) or p is relevant by the Rule of Special Similarity
4) or p is a member of the alternatives parameter for c.
Condition 4 determines the base for ‘know.’ That is, by determining the purportedly
known proposition, Condition 4 determines that it is alternatives to the proposition that
the hank is open rather than to the proposition that the car is in spot 22 that get taken
into account in both of Hannah’s utterances, and they determine that other possibilities
become relevant because of feature of Hannah’s circumstance, since she is the subject
(purported knower). Together with the restriction on contexts already in place, the
indexical character of ‘know’ (via Condition 4) ensures that on the first occasion of
utterance the relevant alternatives (the R-set) does not include the bank’s having
changed hours, because that alternative is not a member of C a for the context
determined by that particular occasion of utterance. However, that same Condition 4 -
together with the different restriction in place at the time - ensures that on the occasion
of the second utterance, the R-set does include the bank’s having changed hours, though
not the possibility that Hannah’s a BIV. The lexically specific character of ‘know’
determines, largely via Condition 4, a base for ‘know’ which comes with appropriate
boundaries because of the already present restriction on admissible contexts. So, like
‘here’, the contextuality of ‘know’ operates both via a lexically specific indexing
mechanism and via general pragmatic mechanisms. Condexicalism is a two-step
process.
since these sets can be as random as general focus and attention can be, there is no reason to think that the
word ‘know’ is gradable.
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Membership in the R-set, and hence in the specific relation picked out by ‘know’
on a given occasion of utterance, not only varies along two lines, one lexically specific
and the other not, it also varies along two additional dimensions - one speaker (and
audience) specific and the other subject-specific. Condition 4 captures ‘know’s context
dependence by capturing as relevant the worlds that the speakers and hearers take to be
relevant on that particular occasion. Conditions 1-3 capture the way in which the
referent of ‘know’ varies depending on facts about the subject, his beliefs, his world, or
his specific location within a world. (Though a notion of context can clearly be defined
that is rich enough to also include parameters that are subject-specific or agent-specific,
those who accept the view detailed above aren’t forced to accept such an expanded
account of context’s parameters.) Both to mark that the sort of variance guaranteed by
Conditions 1-3 is subject-dependent, not speaker-dependent, and to make clear that this
sort of variance needn’t be handled via parameters in a formal context, I call this sort of
variance ‘circumstantial variance.’
Though the role of Conditions 1-3 should be fairly clear at this point, I’ll briefly
state the central function of each condition. Condition 1 guarantees that even if the
speakers and hearers do not focus on the actual world, it is relevant. Condition 1 also
makes clear that if speakers in one world make a knowledge claim about a speaker in
some other world, it is the subject’s world that’s relevant and not the speaker’s.
Condition 2 guarantees that even if the speakers and hearers are not aware that the
subject believes she is a BIV, that possibility is still relevant. Since Condition 3 was
discussed at length in Chapter 3, 1 don’t discuss it again here. Clearly, Condition 3 is
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supposed to block knowledge in Gettier cases, even when neither the subject nor the
speakers and hearers is aware that the subject is in a Gettier circumstance.
Clarification and Results:
Significantly, condexicalism is not an account in which the role of context is
pragmatic (in the sense used earlier); it is one in which the role of context is semantic.
To make this more clear, consider an example: Suppose the secretary, who is sitting at
a desk in the linguistics departmental office, reports that ‘Barbara is here,’ when
Barbara is in fact down the hall in her own office. One might hold that the referent of
‘here’ in the case given is the very narrow region of space that the secretary physically
occupies. So the proposition she expresses is literally, semantically, false, though what
she communicates (pragmatically) is some other proposition that is true. On such a view
the semantic meaning for ‘here’ is very precise. Similarly, one might hold that when
Hannah says, ‘I know the bank is open’, the referent of ‘know’ is the set of ordered pairs
<S,P> such that S's evidence rules out all non-P possibilities. So the proposition
Hannah expresses is literally, semantically, false, though what she communicates
(pragmatically) is some other proposition that is true. Condexicalism is not such a view.
According to condexicalism (and the accompanying account of ‘here’), both utterances
above are literally, semantically, true, though there is a pragmatic mechanism at work in
fixing each term’s respective semantic meaning in a given context. When the secretary
says ‘here’, the semantic referent of that term in that context is in the linguistics
department. Likewise, when Hannah first utters ‘know’, the semantic referent of that
term in that context is an epistemic relation that includes the pair <Hannah, that the
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bank is open>. In both cases, the propositions expressed are literally, semantically true.
That the referent was fixed in part by a pragmatically determined restriction on
acceptable contexts does not make this a view on which context plays a pragmatic role;
it plays a semantic one. Condexicalism, then, retains an important advantage of its
kindred semantic accounts over pragmatic accounts and their descendants (like
NCRAT). Namely, like other semantic accounts of the context dependence of ‘knows’,
condexicalism allows us to take our semantic intuitions seriously when we hear
utterances like Hannah’s and take them to be true.
Recall that one central problem for the indexicalist is that no indexicalist has
successfully specified an appropriate character function for ‘know’. The character
function described above is clear and is not an ad hoc laundry list. The definition of the
R-set has only 4 components. Furthermore, each component corresponds to what a
normal language user might (upon careful reflection) find is an intuitive aspect of the
meaning of ‘know’. First, “ruling out” replaces the traditional notion ofjustification.
Condition 1 corresponds to the more intuitive truth condition. Condition 2 just amounts
to the notion that the beliefs of the subject matter. Condition 3 basically states that the
“ruling out” has to be reliable, and Condition 4 reflects the way ‘know’ in fact varies
across conversational contexts, depending on the interests of the speakers and hearers in
that context. So, like Lewis’ view, condexicalism defines a character function for
‘knows’, but unlike Lewis’ view, that function is easily graspable, intuitive, and not ad
hoc.
19
This might be something like a view taken by Peter Lasersohn in “Pragmatic Halos”, Language , 1999.
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Recall that a problem for the metalinguistic model theoretic approach and for the
purely indexicalist approaches is that they have the result that the behavior of ‘knows’ is
linguistically freakish, in particular with respect to its shiftability.
The metalinguistic model theoretic approach does not allow intra-dialogue
shiftiness, so it is unable to resolve cases in which there is a clear compartmentalization
in the discourse. Condexicalism can resolve compartmentalization cases. Unlike the
metalinguistic model theoretic approach, condexicalism allows for intra-conversational
shifts and even intra-sentences shifts in the specific epistemic relation to which ‘know’
refers. Condexicalism allows for such shifts because, unlike restrictions on admissible
models, restrictions on admissible contexts can change intra-dialogue or even intra-
sentence. Shifts in the restriction on admissible contexts are either marked explicitly, in
much the same way as similar shifts are marked for ‘here’, or they can occur without
explicit marking in cases in which the participants knowingly participate in a bifurcated
conversation, as in compartmentalization cases. Consider examples of the former kind
-those that include explicit markers: ‘Barbara is not here in the office, but she is here in
the US’ and ‘Schaffer does not know he has hands in epistemology class, but he does
know he has hands when he’s reaching for the cereal in the morning.’ And an example
of the latter kind, the kind in which the claim does not include an explicit marker: Two
epistemologists on a trek in the bush, and one says, T don’t know I’m not a BIV, but I
do know where the trailhead is’ (Lewis 565). In such cases, condexicalism clearly
allows the shifts (by counting the knowledge assertions as true) because of a change in
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the restriction on admissible contexts; boundary restrictions are determined
pragmatically by focus and attention. The one sentence contains different contexts.
20
So, knowledge ascriptions have greater shiftiness, so to speak, according to
condexicalism than they did according to the model theoretic approach, but has ‘knows’
gained too much shiftiness? One problem faced by indexicalists is that they predict easy
shiftability of ‘knows’ even when there seems to be no bifurcation of the context, no
compartmentalization. As a result, one would expect easy acceptability of the following
(unacceptable) “abominable conjunctions”:
a) Bill knows that he has hands, but Bill does not know that he is not a ...[BIV],
b) Bill does not know that he is not a ...[BIV], but Bill knows he has hands.
(See earlier discussion on Stanley’s criticism of indexicalism.)
The indexicalist’s prediction about shiftiness does not match with the linguistic
behavior of ‘knows’ in the case above, and in general. Knowledge ascriptions resist
shiftiness within a conversation, and when a shift does take place it tends to take place
in one “direction” but not the other. When a skeptical scenario is introduced within a
conversation, it seems to affect all subsequent ascriptions within that discourse, but once
that shift takes place, knowledge ascriptions resist the shift back to their earlier, “pre-
skeptical”, meanings (Stanley 23). Importantly, condexicalism does not predict the
same ease of shiftiness that purely indexical accounts predict. Condexicalism differs
from a purely indexical approach in that the boundaries for the alternatives are governed
by general linguistic mechanisms that restrict the admissible contexts antecedent to any
lexically specific indexing mechanism. So, condexicalism predicts that variations in the
20
This seems unproblematic because each conjunct is true at the context that is operant when it is uttered.
The sentence as a whole is true because each conjunct is true. But there is no one context at which the
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boundaries for ‘know’ will vary only when the interests of the speakers and hearers
change, that is, when there is a compartmentalized conversation or a shift in
conversational focus. Since restrictions on admissible contexts reflect the
presuppositions of the conversational participants, condexicalism also predicts that
'knows' will shift in a "lopsided” way with respect to skeptical scenarios;
presuppositions are easier to drop within a conversation than to add. If we fix a
restriction on acceptable contexts within a conversational context, then ‘knows’ resists
shiftiness unless there is a change in the proposition, the world, the subject, or the
subject s beliefs or circumstances (location within a world). So, because presumably
none of these features change, condexicalism makes the following prediction about the
two sentences mentioned earlier : The shiftiness of ‘knows’ above is due to a change in
the restriction on admissible contexts, and this can only be the result of a change in the
presuppositions operant in the context. Sentence (b) could be true only if there is either
a compartmentalized conversation or if there if there is a highly unlikely and non-
standard shift in the presuppositions operant in the context. Sentence (a) might be true
if there is a compartmentalized conversation or if there is a shift in the presuppositions
operant in the context that is marked by explicit mention of a skeptical scenario. Notice
that given these conversational circumstances the claim that ‘knows’ refers at different
contexts to different binary relations, neither of the sentences above is an abominable
conjunction, because each conjunct is true at a different context. In fact, such
ascriptions make perfectly good sense under the kind of conversational circumstances
under which they might legitimately get counted as true according to condexicalism.
whole sentence is true. Such sentences just aren’t suitable for use in an argument (formal or informal),
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Condexicalism explains much of the seemingly freakish shiftiness behavior of
‘knows’, and it provides a model for the shiftiness of ‘knows’, namely, ‘here’. ‘Here’
can serve as a model for shiftiness for ‘knows’ — provided the analogy is made
carefully. Non-boundary-related intra-conversational shifts are equally uncommon for
both terms, and when such shifts occur, they are usually marked by an explicit remark in
the conversation. When restrictions on admissible contexts are held constant, ‘here’
shifts more frequently than ‘knows’, but that is because the features that are relevant to
the meaning of ‘here' change more frequently than those that are relevant to the
meaning of ‘knows’. In general, and in contrast to a purely indexical account,
condexicalism makes ‘knows’ less of a linguistic freak.
Recall that the central drawback to the contrastivist view was that it fails to get
the truth conditions right in knowledge cases in which the subject is in a Gettier
situation but the conversational participants do not realize it. Condexicalism gets the
truth conditions right in these cases (or at least it has a better chance at getting them
right.) Additionally, the condexicalism can explain some features of the behavior of
‘know’ that the contrastivist highlights. ‘Rather than’ clauses make sense on the
condexicalist account because they mark a restriction on admissible contexts. As the
contrastivist Schaffer acknowledges in a caveat, “it may be difficult to discern whether a
variable is being really being copied [as the contrastivist claims], or a presupposition is
merely being carried”( Schaffer 2004, 7, footnote 12). Unlike the contrastivist,
condexicalism is not tied to the claim that a contrast class is read off of the ‘rather than'
clause, so the condexicalist is free to claim that the ‘rather than’ clause is a loose marker
since each premise of a sound (reasonable) argument would need to be true relative to the same context.
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of a more complete (or more exact) restriction that is in play as a result of the
presuppositions of the conversational participants. Whereas in accounting for “non-
binary” knowledge ascriptions, contrastivists must explain their “remaining” shiftiness
by appeal to some additional context dependence that is not part of the theoretical
apparatus (see earlier discussion), a condexicalist’s explanation of knowledge claims
that include ‘rather than’ clauses leaves no “remaining” shiftiness that is unaccounted
for by the theoretical apparatus, because on that view the ‘rather than’ clause is just a
conversational marker for a more explicit/complete restriction on admissible contexts
that is in place in the conversation in which the assertion is made. Condexicalism. then,
inherits some ot the advantages of contrastivism, while not succumbing to some of its
more serious drawbacks.
Conclusion
Three points emerge from this chapter. One: Precisely how a given theory
incorporates context into the explanation of knowledge ascriptions matters greatly
epistemically. Two: If arguments are to be made from the linguistic behavior of
‘knows’ (or more carefully, ascriptions containing ‘knows’) to the rejection of
Contextualism, then the linguistic-based arguments need to be general enough to
capture all of the various views that come under the category of Contextualism. Three:
There are ways of contextualizing that capture the advantages of Contextualism but
avoid many of the criticisms aimed at it; the view I offer, condexicalism, is such a way.
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CHAPTER 5
LOOSE ENDS
So, I said that the central topic of this dissertation is: How well does
l
contextualism fare as an epistemic theory? I’ve argued that it fares well.
In Chapter 2, 1 argue that neither the Closure Principle nor the
Underdetermination Principle is at the root of the skeptical problem. Neither can
account for the full range of skeptic-inducing stories. Instead, the root of the skeptical
problem is:
ENT: If ‘S knows P’ is true in context c, then for every possibility e-relevant in c, if S
has evidence E in that possibility, then P is true in that possibility.
That the principle at the root of the skeptical problem is contextualized strongly
suggests that the resolution of the skeptical problem is also contextualized in some way.
This chapter, then, is also an argument that contextualism in some form offers the best
explanation of and solution to skeptical problems—best because it can explain and
resolve skeptical cases that other non-context based views cannot.
In Chapter 3, 1 argue that though Lewis’ brand of contextualism fails to handle
Gettier problems successfully, a modified version of a Lewis-style contextualism can
resolve Gettier problems. By substituting the following Rule of Special Similarity for
Lewis’ Rule of Resemblance, a Lewis-style contextualism can resolve Gettier problems:
When considering whether subject S knows proposition P in context c, the Rule
of Special Similarity applies:
I drop the capital ‘C’ because in this chapter, as in Chapters 1-3, other views that employ context in a
“non-contextualist” way are not discussed.
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Rule of Special Similarity
: For any possibilities p and q, and proposition Q,
it p is relevant in c in virtue of some rule other than ROSS
snd p is a possibility in which Q is a false belief or presupposition that
figures prominently in the formation of S’s belief in P
then if q is appropriately similar to p -doxastically indiscernible from p with
respect to S, exactly similar to p in that Q is also false at q, and is
otherwise very similar top with respect to S’s circumstance
— q is also
e-relevant in c (that is, q cannot be ignored in c).
Unlike Lewis’ rule of Resemblance, ROSS is mainly a subject-sensitive rule (though
ROSS does add possibilities that become relevant via a speaker-sensitive rule).
Loosely, ROSS applies when an already relevant possibility is one in which the subject
has a false belief or presupposition about his circumstances, and ROSS triggers the
inclusion of additional possibilities when a special similarity to already relevant
possibilities obtains with respect to certain features of the subject ’s circumstances.
ROSS, then, offers a solution to Gettier problems that is not centrally based on
conversational context. Instead, the basis for the solution is the subject’s circumstances.
But the rule is clearly open to inclusion in an epistemology that is, in other respects,
broadly contextualist. That not every aspect of e-relevance is context dependent should
not be a problem for the contextualist. ROSS makes the view of which it is a part no
less “contextual.”
In Chapter 4, 1 claim that a new way of contextualizing knowledge ascriptions-
one that combines the insights of indexical versions of contextualism and contrastive
versions of contextualism - can resolve many of the difficulties that arise from
contextualism’s claim that the truth conditions for knowledge ascriptions are context
dependent (or perhaps more carefully, which proposition gets asserted when a
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knowledge ascriptions gets uttered depends on context). The view, condexicalism,
follows:
Contexts These are Kaplanesque contexts, they are abstract ordered sets, consisting of at
least a four members <w,x,l,a >
,
where Cw is the world of utterance, C x is the
speaker, Q is the location of the speaker, and C a is the set of alternatives to the
purportedly known proposition.
The alternatives parameter C a is the set of alternatives for a context. An alternative is
any non-P possibility (possibility in which not-P is true). Though every
alternative to P is eligible for membership in C a , not every alternative need be a
member of C a for every context in which P is the purportedly known
proposition.
Restrictions A restriction can be placed on admissible contexts by the speakers and
hearers who participate in a conversation. Restrictions are determined via
general linguistic mechanisms such as the speaker and hearer’s general focus,
specific attentions, and presuppositions. These contextual restrictions are based
on the alternatives parameter; if speakers and hearers presuppose that they are
not BIV’s, then a restriction is in place: no admissible context contains an
alternatives parameter (an a-set) that includes a BIV possibility.
‘Knows’ ‘Knows’ is an indexical with the following extension, content, and character:
1 . The extension of ‘knows’ in world w relative to context c = that relation Rn of
ordered pairs, <S,P>, where S is a subject who exists at w and P is a
proposition, and S’s evidence rules out all non-P possibilities that are
members of the R-set for c.
2. The content of ‘knows’ relative to context c is a function that takes any world
w to the extension of ‘knows’ in w relative to c
3. the character of knows is a function that takes any context c to the content of
‘knows’ relative to c.
The R-set captures e-relevance:
For any possibility,/?,/? is a member of the R-set for a context, c, iff
1) p is the subject's actual world
2) or the subject believes (to some degree) that p is the case,
3) or is p relevant by the Rule of Special Similarity.
4) or p is a member of C a .
In addition to claiming that the dissertation is a discussion in three parts of how
well contextualism in general fares as an epistemic theory, I also said that a view
emerges from the discussion and that the dissertation is, secondarily, the development
and defense of a new kind of contextualism. It should be clear that the view that
emerges is condexicalism with obvious and minor adjustments to ROSS and to the
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interpretation of ENT. The adjustment in ROSS is that ‘ifp is relevant in c in virtue of
some rule other than ROSS.../ becomes ‘ifp is a member of the R-set in c in virtue of a
condition other than condition 4.’ And the re-interpretation of ENT is simply that ‘e-
relevance in a context’ should now be understood not as Lewisian relevance but
relevance as determined by condexicalism, i.e. membership in the R-set for c.
Two points about condexicalism remain somewhat open. What counts as
evidence according to the view? And what does ‘rule out’ mean? The first point will
remain largely open, and the second will remain somewhat open. Giving a precise and
accurate account of what counts as a subject’s evidence is a topic beyond the scope of
the present dissertation. However, I can make some useful comments about what a
reasonable account of evidence should include. As a starting point, consider Lewis’
account of evidence and ‘elimination’:
I say that the uneliminated possibilities are those in which the subject’s entire
perceptual experience and memory are just as they actually are. There is one
possibility that actually obtains.... ;call it actuality. Then a possibility W is
uneliminated iff the subject’s perceptual evidence and memory in W exactly
match his perceptual experience and memory in actuality.... When perceptual
experience E (or memory) eliminates a possibility W, that is not because the
propositional content of the experience conflicts with W....The propositional
content of our experience could, after all, be false. Rather, it is the existence of
the experience that conflicts with W: W is a possibility in which the subject is
not having experience E.(Lewis 553).
As it stands, Lewis’ account of evidence and elimination is problematic, as shown by
Schaffer in “Knowledge, relevant alternative and missed clues.” Roughly, the problem
is that a subject may have an actual experience that serves as a piece of evidence in
eliminating possibilities even though the subject does not recognize the experience as a
piece of evidence. So a successful account of evidence will require that in order for an
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experience or a memory to count as part of the subject’s evidence, at the very least the
subject will have to be aware that an experience has evidentiary ramifications.
Additionally, for a subject to eliminate/rule out a possibility based on evidence E, the
subject might also need to be convinced that E is inconsistent with that possibility
(Schaffer forthcoming 18). So, if the account of evidence is something like Lewis’
experiential account, then some additional constraints need to be placed on a what
counts as evidence for a subject. Which constraints, exactly, I leave open. Also. I hope
condexicalism is neutral between an account of evidence according to which evidence
just is the subject’s experience (with appropriate constraints) and one according to
which evidence is the propositional content of the subject’s experience “accurately and
fully captured” (Lewis 553). If evidence is experiential, then subject s’s evidence E
guarantees the truth of P because S’s evidence eliminates a possibility p iff S does not
have experience E in possibility p. If the subject’s experience can be properly captured
by the propositional content of the subject’s experience, then S’s bits of evidence will be
propositions something like that it seems to me that I’m hearingfrom Jim that the Pat’s
won. A proposition that really fully and accurately captures S’s experience will also
have this feature: S’s having (propositional)E will guarantee the truth of E. So, ENT
may be stated in either its original form or its propositional form and condexicalism, as
it now stands, will guarantee the truth of P. The view does not, however, accommodate
an account of evidence that is propositional but not foundational or experiential in the
way described; if this turns out to be the correct account of evidence, then
condexicalism does not guarantee the truth of P because E might be false at the actual
world. If this is the right account of evidence, then condexicalism will need to be
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revised as follows: ENT should take its “propositional” form (see footnote 18), and a
truth condition will need to be added to the condexicalist account.
This brings us to ‘ruling out’. If evidence is experiential, then ‘ruling out’ just is
Lewis’ ‘elimination’: Subject S’s evidence E rules out possibility/? iffp is a possibility
in which S is not having experience E (Lewis 553). However, if evidence is
propositional, then ‘ruling out’ should be understood as follows: Subject S’s evidence
E rules out possibilityp iff S’s evidence is not true at p. So, condexicalism’s account of
ruling out is left slightly open just so that it can accommodate a wider range of views
about evidence.
Condexicalism claims that when ‘S knows P’ is true in c, S’s evidence e is
inconsistent with all non-P possibilities in the R-set. So when ‘S knows P’ is true in a
context, the presuppositions of the speakers and hearers (via condition (3)), the beliefs
of the subject (via Condition (2)), and facts about the subject’s circumstances (via
Conditions (1) and (4)) - together with the subject’s evidence - guarantee that all
remaining possibilities are possibilities in which P. If evidence is propositional, then
condexicalism has the result that whenever (in any context) S knows P, the speaker’s
presuppositions, the beliefs of the subject, and certain facts about the subject’s
circumstances - together with the subject’s evidence entail P. According to
condexicalism, we have knowledge by a combination of presupposition, belief,
circumstance, and evidence.
Presupposition and Defeat
Notice that unlike Lewis’ contextualism, condexicalism contains no rules of
permission. On Lewis’ account, these rules of permission - rules that allow
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conversational participants properly to ignore a possibility- are The Rules of
Reliability, Method, and Conservatism. Instead, according to condexicalism,
conversational participants are free to ignore any possibility they like, provided that a)
roughly all the participants agree
-usually tacitly
-to do so and b) doing so does not
conflict with one of the conditions for membership in the R-set in that context.
I 11 first discuss a), the general freedom of agreed-upon presupposition.
According to condexicalism, the presuppositions of the participants in a conversation
determine which possibilities they are ignoring. These presuppositions, together with
the participants’ particular focus, determine a restriction on acceptable contexts.
Generally speaking, when speakers and hearers participate in a conversation they tacitly
agree to presuppose lots of things, to take them for granted. They are able to achieve
this tacit agreement because the things they presuppose are customary or expected in
some way. Participants who are trying to communicate do not make presuppositions
that are “out of the ordinary;” otherwise, they fail to communicate. Occasionally,
participants may make a presupposition that is “out of the ordinary,” in which case, that
presupposition or intention to ignore gets explicitly mentioned in the conversation (and
is either implicitly accepted or explicitly rejected). In describing the Rule of
Conservatism, Lewis remarks: “We are permitted, defeasibly, to adopt the usual and
mutually expected presuppositions of those around us”(Lewis 559). The condexicalist
can embrace this remark; condexicalism also has this general permission for
presupposition, because it has no specific rules that restrict the permissibility of
presuppositions, and its “restriction” comes built into the theory — the presuppositions
must be accepted by the conversational participants whose goal it is to communicate.
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So, the presuppositions can’t be unexpected or unusual (unless they are explicitly
mentioned and then mutually accepted) because that would block communication.
Condexicalism s general permission for agreed-upon presupposition, then, covers the
same ground as Lewis’ rules of permission.
Defeat, according to condexicalism, is fairly clear. De facto permission to
ignore a possibility (as a result of a presupposition) can be defeated if Condition (1), (2),
or (3) adds that possibility to the R-set. Loosely, participants in the conversation cannot
presuppose something that conflicts with Condition (1), (2), or (3); Condition (1), (2), or
(3) can trump a presupposition that a world is not relevant. More carefully, the
participants in a conversation may make a presupposition that restricts the set of
admissible contexts in such a way that a possibility, q, is not a member of any
admissible context’s a-set (alternatives parameter), but that not-g is presupposed does
not automatically make q not e-relevant. E-relevance amounts to more that just the
attentions of the speakers and hearers. Recall (briefly) that on Lewis’ account, defeat
based on the Rule of Resemblance generates unsatisfactory results and is ad hoc (see
Chapter 3). While Conditions (1), (2), and (3) roughly correspond to Lewis’ rules of
prohibition - the Rules of Actuality, Belief, and Resemblance — the way defeat works
according to condexicalism is more straightforward and more successful.
Implications
It should be clear that ENT follows straightforwardly from Condexicalism. ENT
makes use of the term ‘e-relevance’. In Chapter 2, I stipulated that for the purposes of
discussion, e-relevance was to be taken as Lewisian relevance. I have above stipulated
that ‘e-relevance’ in a context should now be interpreted as membership in the R-set for
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that context. In changing the account of this critical component of the view, does the
newly generated view suffer any adverse effects?
Provided S’s evidence is S’s experience and memory or the propositional
content of that experience fully and accurately captured, condexicalism preserves the
truth condition. According to the new view, if it is true that S knows P in context c,
then by P is true in c. By Condition (1), the actual possibility is a member of the R-set
for any context. If P were not true in c, then S can’t know P in c because S’s evidence
would not rule out all the non-P possibilities in the R-set for c, namely S’s evidence
does not rule out the actual possibility.
Condexicalism also preserves the implication between knowledge and belief.
According to the new view, if it is true that S knows P in context c, then S believes that
P in context c. By Condition (2), a possibility that the subject believes to be the case is
a member of the R-set for any context. So, if S does not believe P (and S is consistent
in his beliefs) then S can’t know P because S’s evidence does not rule out all
possibilities in the R-set in which not-P, namely S’s evidence does not rule out the
possibility S that believes - not P.
Finally, condexicalism preserves a reasonable version of the closure principle:
If it is true that S know that P in c, and P entails Q, then S is in a position to
know Q in c.
If it is true that S knows that P in c, then S’s evidence rules out all non-P possibilities
that are members of the R-set for c. Since P entails Q, all non-Q possibilities are non-P
possibilities. In c, then, S is in a position to rule out all non-Q possibilities in the R-set,
because S can rule out all non-P possibilities in the R-set. So, S is in a position to know
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Q in c. Condexicalism, then, preserves at least one reasonable version of the closure
principle; it may also preserve other forms of closure.
Case Studies
Skeptical cases, lottery cases, cases of knowledge by induction, and cases of
knowledge of statistical laws all get handled in the same way according to
condexicalism. In all these cases, if the speakers and hearers attend to a possibility in a
context or if the subject gives it a sufficiently high degree of belief to that possibility,
that possibility is a member of the R-set for that context. If the speakers and hearers
attend to it, the restriction placed on admissible contexts is “loose enough” to guarantee
the attended-to possibility is a member of the a-set (the alternatives parameter) for all
admissible contexts, which in turn guarantees its membership in the R-set for that
context. If the subject believes to some non-trivial degree that a possibility may actually
be the case, then Condition (2) guarantees that such a possibility is a member of the R-
set for that context.
The essential feature of a skeptical case is that there is some skeptical story told
that somehow undercuts our knowledge of some ordinary proposition. In Chapter 2,
1
discuss at length how ENT, with ‘e-relevanf understood to be Lewisian, resolves
skeptical cases of all sorts. It should be clear that condexicalism offers the same results
via ENT, with ‘e-relevance’ understood as membership in the R-set. On Lewis’ account
the relevance of the skeptical scenario in skeptical cases is secured by the Rule of
Attention. According to condexicalism, that same relevance is secured by a restriction
that yields a set of admissible contexts whose a-sets are appropriately broad, i.e., they
include BlV-type possibilities. Likewise, on Lewis’ view, in ordinary circumstances.
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such skeptical scenarios are not relevant, so knowledge is preserved. On his view, the
Rule of Attention secures the result that skeptical possibilities are not relevant unless
attended to. Condexicalism secures that same result
; skeptical possibilities are not
relevant in ordinary circumstances because the conversational participants presuppose
that they are not, thereby placing a restriction on admissible contexts such that all
admissible contexts have a-sets that are appropriately narrow, i.e., they does not include
BlV-style possibilities.
I have said (Chapter 3) that lottery cases should be treated like skeptical cases
rather than Gettier problems. Unlike Lewis’ contextualism, condexicalism handles
lottery cases like skeptical cases. When lotteries are the topic of conversation, then
those who participate focus on the possibility that the subject might a winning ticket in
virtue of focussing on the topic at hand—fair lotteries. If the participants attend to the
possibility that the subject holds the winning ticket, by not presupposing that he will
lose, then that possibility is included in the a-set for all admissible contexts, which
guarantees that the “winning possibility” is a member of the R-set. In such cases, the
subject does not know that he will lose the lottery, despite overwhelming statistical
2
evidence to the contrary.
Cases involving knowledge by induction and cases involving knowledge of
statistical natural laws are, again, like skeptical cases according to condexicalism (see
Chapters 1 and 3). In cases in which the participants focus on the induction step or on
the legitimacy of the sample size, they stop presupposing that possibilities in which the
inductively predicted outcome fails to hold are irrelevant. In such cases, the subject
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does not have knowledge by induction because possibilities in which the inductively
predicted outcome is false are members the a-set for all admissible contexts and so of
the R-set in that particular context. In cases in which both the inductive step and the
sample size are presumed reliable, knowledge by induction is preserved. Similar
comments apply to cases involving knowledge of statistical natural laws, like the
Second Law of Thermodynamics. When such a law’s statistical nature becomes the
center of attention, the participants no longer presuppose that the statistically predicted
outcome is the only possible outcome. The possibility in which the statistically very
unlikely outcome occurs - say negative entropy in the case of the Second Law of
Thermodynamics - is no longer being ignored, so it becomes a member of the R-set.
However, as long as the statistical nature of the law (or some skeptical scenario
involving its violation) is not the focus of attention, knowledge is preserved.
Gettier cases are of a different ilk. Condexicalism does not handle these
(primarily) by the restriction on admissible contexts that reflects the attentions, focus,
and presuppositions of the conversational participants. Just like the inclusion of ROSS
in a modified Lewis-style contextualism can resolve Gettier cases, the inclusion of
ROSS (appropriately modified) ensures the same results for condexicalism. Instead of
working with other relevance rules (as in Lewis), ROSS, on the condexicalist view,
works in conjunction with Conditions (1), (2), and (4). If a possibility is a member of
the R-set because of being actual (Condition 1), being believed by the subject
(Condition 2), or being attended to by the speakers and hearers (loosely, Condition 4),
then if the subject has a false belief or presupposition in that possibility, ROSS can add
See Chapter 3 for the solution to poor-Bill-style cases.
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possibilities to the R-set - provided those possibilities are appropriately similar to the
already included possibility. Condexicalism and the modified Lewisian view discussed
in Chapter 3, then, resolve Gettier cases in essentially the same way, but with somewhat
different mechanisms. Condexicalism, with ROSS as an essential component, clearly
yields better results than Lewis’ original view in resolving Gettier cases (see Chapter 3).
Additionally, on the condexicalist account, the way that defeat (or trumping) works is
quite clear and the application of the rule (condition) it employs to resolve Gettier cases
is not ad hoc. If the participants make a presupposition that renders a possibility not e-
relevant (i.e., they impose a restriction such that the possibility is excluded from the a-
sets of all admissible contexts), Condition (3) - ROSS—can trump that presupposition
by making just that possibility a member of the R-set. Consider a Cohen-style sheep
Gettier example in which neither the participants nor the subject is aware of being in a
Gettier situation. The speakers and hearers presuppose that sense data is reliable, and so
do not attend to or focus on possibilities that include sheep-shaped rocks. So, while the
restriction on admissible contexts is such that none of the a-sets contain sheep-shaped
rock possibilities, Condition (3) does guarantee that the sheep-shaped rock possibility is
a member of the R-set. Condition (3) causes both the inclusion of the sheep-shaped
possibility and the exclusion of BlV-style possibilities (since BIV possibilities aren’t
appropriately similar) in a way that is not ad hoc. So, in the Gettier case described,
condexicalism (unlike Lewis’ view or contrastivism) has the result that the subject does
know that he has hands in that context but does not know that there ’s a sheep in the
field.
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A Final Explanation
An interesting complaint has been made against the contextualist by Stephen
Schiffer in “Contextualist Solutions to Scepticism”: The Moorean and the Skeptic seem
to have a vehement disagreement about knowledge, but if the contextualist is right in
her resolution of the skeptical problem, there was no disagreement in the first place;
there is no explanation of the source of the disagreement (Schiffer 325-328).
The complaint against the indexicalist version of contextualism is this: when the
Moorean says ‘Moore knows he has hands’ and the skeptic says ‘Moore does not know
he has hands,’ there is no disagreement because each speaker’s use of ‘knows’ picks out
a different knowledge-relation. If the indexicalist is correct, the following claims are
analogous to the knowledge claims above: Moore says ‘It is raining where I am,’ and the
skeptic says ‘It isn’t raining where I am.’ In the raining example, not only is there no
disagreement, but that there isn’t one should be clear to the participants in the
conversation. Analogously, in the claims involving ‘knows’, there should also be no
disagreement and no confusion of the sort that could lead us to find the knowledge
claims paradoxical (Schiffer 325-328)(Also Schaffer 2004, 23).
The comparable complaint against the contrastivist version of contextualism is
this: when the Moorean says ‘Moore knows he has hands’ and the skeptic says ‘Moore
does not know he has hands,’ what the Moorean really asserts is that Moore knows he
has hands rather than that he has stumps and what the skeptic really asserts is that
Moore does not know he has hands rather than that he is a handless BIV. Though there
may be confusion caused by the use of the binary surface structure, the two do not
disagree; Mooreans claim that one three-tuple is a member of the knowledge relation.
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while another claims that a different three-tuple is not.
3
If the contrastivist is correct,
the following are analogous to the knowledge claims above: Moore says ‘Jane prefers
chocolate ice cream
,
by which he means that Jane prefers chocolate ice cream to vanilla
and then the skeptic says ‘Jane prefers chocolate ice cream,’ by which he means that
Jane prefers chocolate ice cream to coffee. In the ice cream example, confusion may
arise because the surface structure of the utterances are binary, but there is no genuine
disagreement. Analogously, contrastivism might explain confusion based on binary
sui face structure (and so it has an advantage over indexicalism because it can explain
why skeptical arguments feel so nightmarish (Schaffer 2004,23-24), but it can’t account
for any genuine disagreement between the skeptic and the Moorean.
Neither indexicalism nor contrastivism has a theoretical peg on which to hang
the hat of disagreement between the Moorean and the skeptic. I think condexicalism has
such a peg. It’s not that the Moorean and the skeptic have a conversation in which they
disagree. Rather, they disagree in such a way that prevents them from having a
conversation in the first place. Each “flaunts” a conversational parameter. Loosely, the
skeptic insists that every conversational context is one in which the possibility of being
a BIV is relevant, while the Moorean insists that every conversational context is one in
which that possibility is not e-relevant. The Moorean wants to place a restriction on
admissible context, but the skeptic refuses to allow that restriction. Certainly confusion
could result from this sort of inexplicit, unarticulated flaunting of presuppositions.
Additionally, if we could ask each to list his pre-conversational presuppositions, we
3
The Moorean claims <moore, that moore has hands, {that moore has stumps}> is a member of the
knowledge relation, and the skeptic claims <moore, that moore has hands, {that moore is a BIV}> is not
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could see the intractable disagreement. I think this is the right way to characterize the
Moorean and the Skeptic, respectively. It’s not that the Moorean is a fallibilist who
takes seriously a skeptical possibility, all the while insisting that though he can’t rule out
that possibility, he still knows he has hands; it’s just that he refuses to take that
possibility seriously. He maintains a presupposition that excludes it. And the Skeptic
simply insists, no matter the everydayness of the circumstance, that BlV-style
possibilities must be taken seriously; he just refuses to presuppose anything. So, the
condexicalist’s response is this: the disagreement is not apparent from the logical form
of the respective propositions (since like the indexicalist’s account, ‘know’ refers to a
different knowledge relation in each person’s assertion ), because the disagreement goes
much deeper; it is a stubborn-minded disagreement about the parameters of the
conversation in the first place.
a member of the knowledge relation.
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